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 I 
ENGLISH SUMMARY 
This thesis examines bereaved parents’ experiences of grief after the loss of an infant 
child, and how cultural representations, expectations, and norms mediate individual 
bereavement experiences. It explores how bereaved parents interpret and mediate their 
own grief experiences and practices by drawing on interpretive repertoires that are 
available through their personal and family history, popular culture, personal 
accounts, bereavement communities, etc. In light of recent debates on diagnosing 
prolonged or complicated grief as a mental disorder within the diagnostic manuals, 
the thesis also explores how bereaved parents relate to professional and popular 
accounts of grief as a potential illness.  
Each year more than 400 babies in Denmark die during the last half of the pregnancy 
(after 22 gestational weeks), during birth, and within the first year of life.1 As infant 
mortality rates in the developed countries have declined throughout the last century, 
our cultural expectations towards pregnancy – at least after the first weeks where the 
risk of miscarriage is still considerably high – are highly optimistic. Hence, the shock 
of losing a baby is typically all the more devastating for the bereaved parents and their 
families. Research on parental bereavement after infant death indicate that a large 
proportion of these parents experience long-lasting and pervasive grief (Dyregrov et 
al., 2003; Kersting et al., 2011). Several researchers within the field of bereavement 
argue that a considerable proportion of these parents might develop a psychiatric 
disorder such as the proposed diagnosis for complicated or prolonged grief disorder. 
While our knowledge about how bereaved parents are affected by the symptoms 
described in the proposed grief diagnoses has increased, we know only little about 
how these very diagnostic understandings affect parental grief experiences. By 
analyzing how bereaved parents relate to professional and lay conceptions of healthy, 
normal and appropriate versus pathological, abnormal and inappropriate grieving, this 
thesis contributes to a limited literature on bereaved parents’ experiences of cultural 
norms about suffering in general and grief in particular. 
The analyses are based on data from a longitudinal (approx. 2 years), qualitative study 
with 13 bereaved parents (6 heterosexual couples and one woman participating 
without her husband, aged 26-42 years) who had lost children during the latter half of 
the pregnancy (>22 weeks of gestation), or within the first week of the child’s life. 
With one exception (a couple participating in one interview approx. 2 years after the 
death of their child), all of the couples were interviewed at least three times during the 
two years: (1), 1-2 months after their loss; (2), 7-8 months after their loss; and (3), 
                                                            
1 E.g., in 2014, 242 stillbirths were registered (out of 57.572 births), and 229 children died 
within their first year (Statistics Denmark [Danmarks Statistik], 2017; National Board of Health 
Data [Sundhedsdatastyrelsen], 2017, advanced searches, Jan 9th, 2017). 
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approx. 2 years after their loss. All of the informants were recruited through my former 
workplace, The Danish Infant Death Association2, who has also provided financial 
support for this project. Based on my background in the organization and my personal 
experiences with losing a child, the study also involves autoethnographic inquiries 
into my personal experiences with loss and the significance of these experiences for 
my research. Informed by a cultural psychological outlook, the study depicts grief as 
an historically embedded, culturally and materially mediated practice. Accordingly, 
the thesis argues that grieving is enacted and experienced in relations to the lost loved 
one, to other people, to historically contingent conceptions of life and death, 
personhood, parental attachment, suffering and disease, as well as socio-material 
practices and technologies such as images, gravesites, therapeutic practices, self-help 
communities, etc.  
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 describes the background of the project 
and the structure of the thesis.  
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical outlook of the thesis. 
Chapter 3 charts the major developments and transitions in the scientific and popular 
grief models and theories since the emergence of modern psychology up to 
contemporary suggestions to diagnose “complicated” or “prolonged” grief as a 
psychiatric disorder.  
Chapter 4 presents a review of the literature on parental bereavement, focusing 
primarily on qualitative studies of parental bereavement experiences after infant 
death. The review reveals that parental bereavement after infant loss is associated with 
experiences of uncertainty and ambivalence concerning the status of the lost child and 
how to grieve such a loss. Furthermore, it reveals that parental grief is an ongoing 
process that involves parental identity, the relationship to the lost child and to other 
people.  
In chapter 5, I outline and discuss some of the main methodological and ethical 
considerations that have been a part my research process.  
In chapter 6, I highlight some of the main themes regarding the informants’ 
experiences of participating in the activities provided by the Danish Infant Death 
Association. I argue that by offering a platform for shared experiences and mutual 
support, such communities may facilitate negotiations of cultural norms concerning 
grief and loss, and provide alternative sources for understanding and acting in relation 
to loss. Furthermore, I demonstrate the inherently normative nature of the practices 
                                                            
2 In Danish: Landsforeningen Spædbarnsdød 
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provided by the bereavement organization. Finally, I emphasize the importance of 
including critical reflections of the normative dilemmas that arise from such practices. 
Chapter 7 to 10 contains the four articles of the thesis. In the first article, “From 
morality to pathology: A brief historization of contemporary Western grief practices 
and understandings” (chapter 7) I present three ideal typical grief articulations drawn 
from three historical periods: 1) Grief as a moral practice in Ancient Greek virtue 
ethics, 2) Grief as an expression of an inner, authentic morality in the Romantic era, 
and, 3) Grief as a psychologized and increasingly pathologized phenomenon in 
modern psychology up to the present attempts to include separate diagnoses for 
pathological grief in the diagnostic manuals for mental disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013; World Health Organization, 2016). The purpose of this 
presentation is to shed light on current taken for granted notions of grief, and, by 
providing some historical background, challenge prevailing understandings that 
depict grief as an ahistorical, universal, intra-psychological and (potentially) medical 
condition that is analytically separate from historical, social, cultural and religious 
practices. Informed by a cultural psychological outlook (Brinkmann, 2016; Valsiner, 
2014), I argue that the relationship between grieving individuals and their cultures is 
dialectical, mutually constituting and inherently normative, and hence, that the 
diagnostic approach to grief as an individual, causal reaction to loss is flawed. On this 
background, I argue that an acknowledgement of the inherent normativity of grief (as 
presented by the historical accounts) can potentially inform and enrich contemporary 
understandings and practices related to bereavement, ultimately to the benefit of 
people who suffer from grief. 
In the second article, “Becoming a bereaved parent: Parental grief after infant loss” 
(chapter 8), I explore the connections between my own experiences as a bereaved 
mother and as a researcher interested in parental bereavement after infant loss. I 
describe my own struggle with integrating personal and professional encounters with 
loss, and discuss the ethical and epistemological significance of involving personal 
experiences with loss in my research on parental bereavement. I argue that while 
popular accounts depict normal grief as a transitory state, parental accounts present 
grief as a continuing and open-ended relationship with the dead child. In appreciation 
of this, this essay presents fragmentary, non-reifying narratives of the continuing 
realities of becoming a bereaved parent.  
In the third article (chapter 9), “Grief as a normative phenomenon: The diffuse and 
ambivalent normativity of infant loss and parental grieving in contemporary 
Western culture”, co-written with my Ph.D. supervisor, professor Svend Brinkmann, 
we draw upon empirical materials from the present interview study and analyze how 
grieving the loss of a small child in our culture is experienced, interpreted, and enacted 
within a diffuse and ambivalent, yet inescapable, moral framework. Further, we 
discuss some of the possible consequences for bereaved individuals when navigating 
the normative landscape of grieving in contemporary Western cultures: A landscape 
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in which suffering is increasingly dealt with in psychiatric and medical terms and 
understood as an adverse and unnecessary condition to be overcome in order to 
maximize personal health, happiness and well-being. 
In the fourth and final article, “Grief as a border diagnosis” (chapter 10), I explore 
how bereaved parents after infant loss relate to the current debates on diagnosing grief 
as a psychiatric disorder. Based on findings from my interviews with the bereaved 
parents participating in my study, I identify four different parental accounts 
concerning the question of diagnosing grief: (a) diagnosis as a legitimating and 
normalizing practice, (b) diagnosis as a demarcation practice, (c) diagnosis as 
pathologization, and (d) diagnosis as a normative ideal. Through the examples, I 
attempt to demonstrate how bereaved individuals do not merely passively adopt but 
reflectively use these kinds of understandings to deal with their grief. 
In chapter 11, I summarize the major contributions of this thesis to the research on 
parental bereavement after infant loss, and point to avenues for future research. 
  
 
 V 
DANSK RESUME 
Denne afhandling undersøger efterladte forældres sorgerfaringer efter tabet af et 
spædbarn, og hvorledes kulturelle repræsentationer, forventninger og normer 
medierer individuelle tabserfaringer. Afhandlingen udforsker, hvordan efterladte 
forældre fortolker og medierer deres sorg gennem fortolkningsmæssige repertoirer, 
der er tilgængelige gennem deres personlige baggrund, populærkultur, personlige 
beretninger, sorgfællesskaber, etc. I lyset af de seneste års debat om indførelsen af en 
diagnose for forlænget eller kompliceret sorg i de internationale diagnosemanualer, 
undersøger afhandlingen også, hvordan efterladte forældre forholder sig til 
professionelle og almene forståelser af sorg som en potentiel sygdom. 
Hvert år dør mere end 400 spædbørn i Danmark i løbet af sidste halvdel af graviditeten 
(efter 22 graviditetsuger), under fødslen og indenfor deres første leveår.3 Efterhånden 
som spædbarnsdødeligheden i de udviklede lande har faldet gennem det sidste 
århundrede, er de kulturelle forventninger vedrørende graviditeter blevet tiltagende 
optimistiske––i hvert fald efter de første uger, hvor abortrisikoen stadig er relativ høj. 
Derfor er chokket over at miste et spædbarn typisk desto større for de efterladte 
forældre og deres familier. Eksisterende forskning indikerer, at en stor andel af disse 
forældre oplever langvarig og gennemgribende sorg (Dyregrov et al., 2003; Kersting 
et al., 2011). En række forskere inden for området hævder, at en væsentlig andel af 
disse forældre er i risiko for at udvikle en psykiatrisk lidelse, såsom den foreslåede 
diagnose for kompliceret eller forlænget sorg. Til trods for en forøget viden om, 
hvordan efterladte forældre påvirkes af de symptomer, der beskrives i 
diagnoseforslagene, ved vi kun lidt om, hvordan disse diagnostiske forståelser i sig 
selv influerer på forældres sorgerfaringer. Ved at analysere, hvordan efterladte 
forældre forholder sig til professionelle og lægmandsopfattelser af sund, normal og 
passende versus patologisk, anormal og upassende sorg, forsøger denne afhandling at 
bidrage til en begrænset litteratur vedrørende efterladte forældres oplevelser af 
kulturelle normer for lidelse i almindelighed og sorg i særdeleshed. 
Analyserne er baserede på data fra et longitudinalt (ca. 2-årigt), kvalitativt studie med 
13 efterladte forældre i alderen 26-42 år (6 heteroseksuelle par og én kvinde, der 
deltog uden sin ægtefælde), der alle havde mistet et barn i sidste halvdel af 
graviditeten (>22 graviditetsuger), eller inden for den første uge af barnets liv. Med 
én undtagelse (et par, der deltog i ét interview ca. 2 år efter at de mistede deres barn), 
blev alle forældre interviewet min. 3 gange i løbet af perioden: (1), 1-2 måneder efter 
                                                            
3 I 2014 blev der fx registreret 242 dødfødsler (ud af 57.572 fødsler), og 229 børn døde I løbet 
af deres første leveår (Danmarks Statistik, 2017; Sundhedsdatastyrelsen, 2017. Avancerede 
søgninger, 9. januar 2017). 
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tabet; (2), 7-8 måneder efter tabet; og (3), ca. 2 år efter tabet. Alle informanter blev 
rekrutteret gennem min tidligere arbejdsplads, Landsforeningen Spædbarnsdød, der 
også har bidraget med finansiel støtte til projektet. Baseret på min egen baggrund i 
foreningen og mine personlige erfaringer med at miste et spædbarn, inddrager studiet 
også autoetnografiske undersøgelser af betydningerne af disse erfaringer for min 
forskning.  
Med afsæt i et kulturpsykologisk perspektiv forholder studiet sig til sorg som en 
historisk, kulturelt og materielt indlejret praksis. På den baggrund argumenterer jeg 
for, at sorg udfolder sig, gøres og erfares i relationer til den afdøde, til sig selv, til 
andre mennesker, og til historisk betingede forestillinger om liv og død, subjektivitet, 
tilknytning, lidelse og sygdom, såvel som til socio-materielle praksisser og 
teknologier som billeder, gravsteder, terapeutiske praksisser, sorgfællesskaber, etc. 
Afhandlingen er organiseret på følgende måde: Kapitel 1 beskriver projektets 
baggrund og afhandlingens struktur. 
Kapitel 2 beskriver studiets teoretiske afsæt i kulturpsykologien og relaterede 
perspektiver, der til sammen udgør en ramme for at begribe sorg som en situeret, 
normativ praksis. 
Kapitel 3 kortlægger væsentlige udviklingslinjer og overgange i de videnskabelige og 
populærpsykologiske sorgmodeller og –teorier fra fremkomsten af den moderne 
psykologi og frem til nutidige forslag om at diagnosticere ”kompliceret” eller 
”forlænget” sorg som en psykiatrisk lidelse. 
Kapitel 4 præsenterer en gennemgang af den eksisterende litteratur vedrørende 
forældres sorg, med fokus på kvalitative studier af efterladte forældres sorg ved tabet 
af et spædbarn. Litteraturgennemgangen demonstrerer, at forældres sorg over at miste 
et spædbarn er forbundet med oplevelser af normativ usikkerhed og ambivalens 
knyttet til tabets betydning og hvordan man sørger over denne form for tab. Derudover 
peger litteraturgennemgangen på, at forældres sorg er en vedvarende proces, der 
involverer forældreidentitet, forholdet til det afdøde barn og til omverdenen.  
I kapitel 5 redegør jeg for nogle af de væsentligste metodologiske og etiske 
overvejelser, der har indgået i min forskningsproces. 
I kapitel 6 belyser jeg centrale temaer vedrørende informanternes erfaringer med at 
deltage i Landsforeningen Spædbarnsdøds tilbud og aktiviteter. Jeg argumenterer for, 
at sådanne fællesskaber––ved at tilbyde en platform for erfaringsudveksling og 
gensidig støtte––kan facilitere forhandlinger af kulturelle normer vedrørende sorg og 
tab, og tilvejebringe alternative fortolknings- og handlingsrepertoirer for efterladte. 
Med udgangspunkt i etnografiske data vedrørende foreningens praksisser peger jeg 
desuden på disse praksissers iboende normativitet. Endelig argumenterer jeg for 
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nødvendigheden af, at inkludere kritiske refleksioner over de normative dilemmaer, 
der opstår i udformningen af denne form for praksisser. 
Kapitel 7 til 10 indeholder afhandlingens fire artikler. I den første artikel, “From 
morality to pathology: A brief historization of contemporary Western grief practices 
and understandings” (kapitel 7) præsenterer jeg tre idealtypologiske artikulationer af 
sorg hentet fra tre historiske perioder: 1) sorg som en moralsk praksis i Antikkens 
dydsetik, 2) sorg som udtryk for en indre, autentisk moralitet i Romantikken, og 3) 
sorg som et psykologiseret og tiltagende patologiseret fænomen i moderne psykologi 
og frem til nutidige forsøg på at inkludere en selvstændig diagnose for patologisk sorg 
i de diagnostiske manualer (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; World Health 
Organization, 2016). Ved at skitsere en historisk baggrund for samtidens 
sorgforståelser, er formålet at udfordre nutidige forestillinger om sorg som et 
ahistorisk, universelt, intrapsykologisk og (potentielt) patologisk fænomen adskilt fra 
historiske, sociale, kulturelle og religiøse praksisser. Med udgangspunkt i et 
kulturpsykologisk perspektiv (Brinkmann, 2016; Valsiner, 2014) hævder jeg, at en 
opmærksomhed på sorgens iboende normativitet (vist gennem de historiske 
fremstillinger) kan informere og berige samtidens sorgforståelser og –praksisser, i 
sidste ende til fordel for sørgende. 
I den anden artikel, “Becoming a bereaved parent: Parental grief after infant loss” 
(kapitel 8), udforsker jeg forbindelserne mellem mine egne erfaringer som efterladt 
mor og som en forsker, der interesserer mig for forældres sorg ved spædbarnsdød. Jeg 
beskriver min egen kamp for at integrere mine personlige og professionelle erfaringer 
med sorg og tab, og diskuterer de etiske og epistemologiske betydninger af at 
involvere egne tabserfaringer i mine studier af forældres sorg. I modsætning til 
almindelige forestillinger om sorg som en forbigående tilstand, beskriver jeg 
forældres perspektiver på sorg som et fortsat og foranderligt forhold til det døde barn. 
I anerkendelse af dette, præsenterer essayet fragmentariske og åbne narrativer om den 
vedvarende tilblivelsesproces det er at blive forældre til et dødt barn. 
I den tredje artikel, ”Grief as a normative phenomenon: The diffuse and ambivalent 
normativity of infant loss and parental grieving in contemporary Western culture” 
(kapitel 9), skrevet sammen med min ph.d.-vejleder, professor Svend Brinkmann, 
trækker vi på empirisk materiale fra det nærværende studie og analyserer, hvordan det 
at sørge over et lille barn i vores kultur erfares, fortolkes og gøres inden for en diffus 
og ambivalent, men uundgåelig moralsk horisont. Derudover diskuterer vi nogle 
mulige konsekvenser for efterladte forældre, der må navigere i samtidens normative 
sorglandskab: Et landskab hvori lidelse i tiltagende grad underkastes et psykiatrisk og 
medicinsk blik, og forstås som en ugunstig og unødvendig tilstand, der skal 
overkommes for at maksimere personlig sundhed, lykke og velbefindende.  
I den fjerde og sidste artikel, ”Grief as a border diagnosis” (kapitel 10), udforsker 
jeg, hvordan efterladte forældre efter spædbarnsdød forholder sig til de aktuelle 
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forslag om at indføre en selvstændig diagnose for sorg. Med udgangspunkt i analyser 
af interviewdata fra det nærværende studie identificerer jeg fire forskellige 
perspektiver fremsat af forældrene vedrørende spørgsmålet om at diagnosticere sorg: 
(a) diagnosen som en legitimerende og normaliserende praksis, (b), diagnosen som en 
demarkationspraksis, (c), diagnosen som sygeliggørelse og (d), diagnosen som et 
normativt ideal. Gennem de empiriske eksempler demonstrerer jeg, hvordan efterladte 
forældre ikke blot passivt tilegner sig de diagnostiske forståelser, men refleksivt 
forholder sig til og inddrager modsætningsfyldte of forskelligartede fortolkninger i 
deres egen sorg. 
I kapitel 11 opsummerer jeg afhandlingens væsentligste bidrag til forskningsområdet, 
og udpeger perspektiver for fremtidig forskning. 
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“No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, 
a part of the main” (Donne, 1624/1959, p. 108). 
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CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND AND 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
“I get so sad when people already start asking ‘do you feel better?’. I got 
that message yesterday, and I say “No! It’s been seven weeks––not even 
seven weeks––I do not feel better!” But the fact that they now––that I am 
now confronted with people believing I feel better… It makes me really, 
really sad. (…) And people beginning to look strangely at me already for 
not having returned to work yet. Seven weeks after… I can’t handle that. 
(…) I think it will be hard for me not to think of what other people think. 
Because it seems like people are beginning to think ‘she must be over it 
now!’. And I just can’t handle that.” 
When I met Emma and her husband John4 for the first time, it had been seven weeks 
since they lost their second child, Samuel, in a stillbirth. The pregnancy had been 
uncomplicated until the point where Emma noticed she could no longer feel the baby 
kicking in her belly. They went to the hospital “just to be sure everything was okay,” 
but as the ultrasound screen showed the pictures of their baby’s heart, everything stood 
still.  
Emma recalls the midwife’s unbearable words: “Your baby’s heart has stopped 
beating”. At first, John and Emma just wanted everything to go away as fast as 
possible: The pregnancy; the inescapable birth of a stillborn baby; everything.  
However, when I ask them about the birth and the time right after, Emma’s voice 
suddenly changes, she breathes out and says in a light voice: “It was so good! (…) It 
was so lovely because he was so warm and beautiful.” John affirms and adds that to 
him, the midwives’ guidance helped him realize that they had become parents, rather 
than just having had a “failed pregnancy.”5 
John and Emma were the first couple I interviewed as a part of this Ph.D. project. 
However, in my former work as a counselor for bereaved parents in The Danish Infant 
Death Association6, I have heard several stories of how giving birth to a stillborn baby, 
or to babies whom one knows will die shortly after birth, can be––in spite of the 
unbearable loss––a precious experience, after all. When I tell people about the 
                                                            
4 The names of the participating parents in this study are changed for reasons of confidentiality. 
5 This theme will be further explored in article 3, “Grief as a normative phenomenon: The 
diffuse and ambivalent normativity of infant loss and parental grieving in contemporary 
Western cultures.” 
6 In Danish: Landsforeningen Spædbarnsdød 
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regularity of these stories, I am met with astonishment and disbelief. How can a 
stillbirth or a birth of a baby that one knows will die be a precious experience? This 
is one of the many questions I address in this thesis. Like all of the stories of infant 
loss I have listened to during this Ph.D. study, Emma’s and John’s story reveals the 
complexity of parental grief as something that involves love, pride, and affection, as 
well as yearning, loss of meaning, struggles to come to terms with one’s identity as a 
bereaved parent, concerns about how to live with the loss, and concerns about how to 
deal with one’s own and other people’s expectations. When I met Emma and John for 
the first time, the latter were among Emma’s biggest concerns: As the introductory 
quote reveals, after seven weeks, people were beginning to ask if she was feeling 
better. In spite of the presumably good intentions behind this question, Emma 
immediately heard it as a demand; that she ought to feel better. However, by talking 
to her husband and other people with experiences of loss and crisis, Emma actively 
sought out alternative ways to interpret and act upon her grief experiences. In our 
conversations, she repeatedly stresses the importance of these people’s affirmations 
that what she is experiencing is normal and expectable. John is faced with a range of 
other challenges in his grief. While Emma is granted 14 weeks of maternity leave after 
their son’s death, John is expected to go back to work after 14 days. Emma is met with 
concerns about how she is doing, and so is he: He too is primarily met with concerns 
about how she is doing, and only few ask directly how he himself is affected by the 
loss of his son.  
Although each story of losing a child is unique, experiences of being met with certain 
beliefs about what grief is and ought to be, and how to understand the loss of a small 
infant, are present in multiple ways in all the stories of loss I have listened to. In this 
thesis, I explore the mutual relations between individual loss experiences and socio-
cultural practices, norms, and beliefs about infant death and parental grief. In addition 
to informing us about parental grief after infant loss, these examinations also shed 
light on the current conditions for human experiences of suffering in our culture. 
1.1. STUDYING PARENTAL GRIEF EXPERIENCES: HOW AND 
WHY? 
How can we understand the experience of losing a child that dies in the very beginning 
of life, or before birth? How can we understand the feeling of having lost a part of 
oneself, the yearning for a child one did not get the opportunity to know beyond the 
hopeful expectations of pregnancy, the kicks in the belly, the ultrasound images, or 
the first brief moments, hours, or days after birth? How can we understand the 
conflicting feelings of sadness, despair, guilt, anger, bitterness, fear, love, pride, and 
affection? How can we understand the loss of and search for meaning, or the sense of 
profound, yet unclear loss? How can we understand the fear of going crazy, of being 
stuck, of forgetting, or of other people forgetting? Within contemporary Western 
cultures, these experiences are increasingly being interpreted and understood within a 
medical, psychiatric and diagnostic language that draws borders between normal and 
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pathological grief responses, and that depicts grief as intrapsychic and physiological 
reactions within the bereaved individual. My first article, “From morality to 
pathology: A brief historization of contemporary Western grief practices and 
understandings,” provides some historical background to how these conceptions have 
emerged as not only conceivable, but also more or less taken for granted in 
contemporary Western cultures. 
Throughout the thesis, I explore how this contemporary tendency to depict grief as a 
question of the individual mourner’s health or illness mediates the experiences and 
practices of bereaved parents after infant loss, and how bereaved parents use, 
negotiate, and contest these understandings in their everyday lives. Drawing on 
empirical data from a longitudinal interview study with 13 bereaved parents (6 
heterosexual couples and one woman participating without her husband) who have 
lost children during pregnancy (3rd trimester) or in the first week of life, my aim is to 
develop sensitive and non-reifying accounts of how grief can be experienced, 
reflected, and acted upon within contemporary Danish culture.7 All of the informants 
were recruited through The Danish Infant Death Association (DIDA), who has also 
partially funded this Ph.D. project. Being interested in how culturally available 
repertoires for understanding and relating to the loss of a child inform grief 
experiences, I also explore how the bereavement organization’s services and activities 
provide sources for interpreting the loss, and how the parents draw upon these sources 
in their grief. As participation in these services and activities is intertwined with the 
everyday lives of the participants, it is difficult to make a clear-cut separation between 
the interpretive repertoires provided through these activities and those provided 
through other sources such as family, friends, and popular culture. Hence, the 
exploration of interpretive repertoires is guided by a first-person-perspective on how 
the participating parents experience and interpret their loss, which implicit or explicit 
assumptions and norms about grieving they encounter, and how they relate to, draw 
upon, and negotiate these understandings in their everyday lives. Accordingly, the 
exploration of the connections between parental experiences and socio-cultural 
repertoires of grief and infant loss runs as a red thread throughout the thesis.  
Furthermore, I entered this study from a position as a counsellor in DIDA, and as a 
bereaved parent myself. Hence, my role as a researcher was intertwined and mixed up 
in several ways with my role as a psychologist working professionally with 
bereavement, and as a parent with personal experiences of infant loss. The 
significance and meanings of this will be elaborated on in my second article, 
“Becoming a bereaved parent: Parental grief after infant death.” 
A substantial body of literature demonstrates the detrimental effects of infant loss on 
bereaved parents’ health and wellbeing (Badenhorst el al., 2006; Badenhorst & 
Hughes, 2007; Bennett et al., 2005; Dyregrov, 1990; Dyregrov et al., 2003; Murray & 
                                                            
7 Further details about the participants of the study can be found in chapter 5. 
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Callan, 1988; Nicol et al., 1986; Vance et al., 2002). However, there exists only little 
research that explicitly addresses how bereaved parents experience, use, and negotiate 
prevailing cultural understandings of infant loss and grief. The third article of this 
thesis, “Grief as a normative phenomenon: The diffuse and ambivalent normativity of 
infant loss and parental grieving in contemporary Western cultures,” represents an 
attempt to remedy this lack of research by analyzing how bereaved parents’ 
experiences of infant loss are mediated by diffuse, yet inescapable normative 
understandings concerning infant loss and parental grief. 
Even less research exists on how the contemporary debates on diagnosing grief as a 
psychiatric disorder are conceived of by bereaved individuals in general, or by 
bereaved parents in particular. As bereaved parents are among the subgroups of 
bereaved individuals who are assumed to be especially vulnerable to pathological 
grief reactions (Kersting et al., 2011), it is relevant to explore how these parents 
experience and relate to the issue of diagnosing grief. In this thesis, this is most 
directly addressed in the fourth article, “Grief as a border diagnosis,” where I outline 
and analyze four different parental perspectives on the question of diagnosing grief as 
a psychiatric disorder. 
1.2. RESEARCH FOCUS AND QUESTIONS: GRIEF AS A 
RELATIONAL AND SITUATED EXPERIENCE 
Starting from my initial interest in the connections between individual grief 
experiences and cultural norms and beliefs about grief, I developed three tentative 
research questions that have guided my exploratory inquiries: 
1. How do parents experience the loss of a child, and how are these experiences 
related to the practices and interpretative repertoires of grief that are 
available in our culture? 
2. How do the current psychological, health oriented and increasingly 
diagnostic understandings of grief inform individual grief experiences and 
practices? 
3. How do the parents engage in and draw upon the production and negotiation 
of meaning, identity practices and narratives about loss that are created 
within the grief support practices provided by DIDA? 
 
The first question is primarily dealt with in the third article (“Grief as a normative 
phenomenon”), the second question primarily in the fourth article (“Grief as a border 
diagnosis”), and the third is most explicitly addressed in chapter 5 (“‘Here everybody 
knew I was a parent’: Grief in the Danish Infant Death Association”). 
As the brief extract of Emma’s and John’s story in the opening lines of this chapter 
implies, grieving the loss of an infant is mediated by one’s own and other people’s 
implicit or explicit expectations––expectations that reflect cultural conceptions of 
normality and pathology, health and illness, as well as fundamental understandings of 
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suffering and what constitutes a good life for human beings. It also illustrates that 
grieving cannot conceivably be reduced to a passive, causal reaction to loss, insofar 
as the grief experience itself is inherently mediated and altered through more or less 
reflective processes of negotiating, interpreting, and acting upon it. Hence, when my 
first research question asks how parental experiences of infant loss are related to 
culturally available practices and interpretive repertoires, I am not approaching the 
latter as causal and external factors affecting the loss experiences. Rather, my 
conception of individual experiences and agency is informed by a cultural 
psychological outlook that stresses the dialectical and mutually constituting 
relationship between persons and cultures (Brinkmann, 2016; Valsiner, 2014).8 
Furthermore, John’s and Emma’s story illustrates that grieving is a fundamentally 
relational and situated experience that involves the on-going relationship to the lost 
loved one, to other people, and to oneself. Summed up, it illustrates one of the basic 
arguments of this thesis, namely that grieving is a normative practice that is 
inextricably linked to historical, socio-cultural, and material conditions.  
Through my reading of the literature as well as from the exploratory process of 
analyzing the interviews of this study, it has become increasingly obvious that the 
characteristics of the relationship to the lost child are crucial in parental grief 
experiences after infant loss. Hence, the initial research questions led to new questions 
and topics to explore, such as the significance of cultural conceptions of the 
personhood and human status of unborn and newborn children. In line with John’s 
statement in the introduction, many bereaved parents after infant loss tell stories of 
how such losses can be difficult to define. If you haven’t gotten to know your child, 
how can you know what you have lost, and how can you grieve such a loss? Can a 
child that dies before it has developed a distinct individuality and sense of self-
consciousness be unique and irreplaceable? And how do you reconcile your grief over 
this specific child with a wish for having another, living child? As these questions 
came to the front of my research, the initial focus on cultural grief understandings and 
practices did not disappear. It became clear, however, that my focus was becoming 
increasingly phenomenological in the sense that I was primarily interested in how 
bereaved parents experience, from a first-person-perspective, the loss of an infant. 
Hence, my aim throughout the thesis is to analyze how bereaved parents’ experiences 
of infant loss are situated in the phenomenological lifeworld of bereaved parents: A 
lifeworld that this thesis depicts as inherently normative.  
Furthermore, as the research process developed, it became increasingly urgent to 
address the significance of my own background as a bereaved parent myself and as 
bereavement counselor within the very organization whose activities I was studying. 
As I started out on this project, these connections between my own background and 
                                                            
8 The cultural psychological outlook will be further elaborated in chapter 2. 
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my research project was an unresolved topic which I primarily dealt with by 
underplaying and bracketing my own experiences. However, through the encounters 
with my informants, who often inquired into my own experiences, as well as in the 
analytical process of writing about parental loss and societal beliefs about loss and 
grief, it became clear that I needed to explore these issues. Hence, new topics to 
inquire emerged, as I tried to explore the cultural significance of my reluctance to 
include my personal experiences of loss in my research, as well as the ethical and 
epistemic significance of including these experiences in my relationship with the 
informants and consequently in my research. 
Summed up, my aim in this Ph.D. project is to examine individual experiences of 
infant loss among bereaved parents, mediated by and acted upon within a complex 
web of socio-cultural, normative, discursive, and material practices. Furthermore, 
through an autoethnographic inquiry of the relations between personal experiences, 
cultural assumptions, and research, my aim is to contribute to the existing literature 
on the ethical and epistemic significance of including personal experiences in 
qualitative research on experiences of suffering. The methodological, ethical, and 
analytical considerations that have informed this endeavor is outlined in chapter 5.  
1.3. RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND AFFILIATIONS: THE 
DANISH INFANT DEATH ASSOCIATION AND THE 
DIAGNOSTIC CULTURE RESEARCH PROJECT 
As already outlined, I embarked upon this project from a position as a psychologist 
working as a bereavement counselor in DIDA. The stories I listened to during my 
years in DIDA planted the seeds for this project. Listening to how people try to live 
with the loss of their children involved daily reminders of the complexity and diversity 
of grief, and made me weary about the prevailing tendency in our culture to judge 
grief by standards of normality, health, and appropriateness. As outlined in the 
previous section, this weariness was fueled and actualized by the developments within 
the diagnostic manuals at the time. As I took the initial steps into developing this 
project in 2012, there were heated debates on the expected introduction of a separate 
grief diagnosis in the forthcoming fifth revision of The American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the DSM-5 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Due to my interest in the cultural distributions of psychological, diagnostic and 
psychiatric understandings of grief, my attention was directed to Svend Brinkmann’s 
recent works on how psychiatric diagnoses shape experiences and practices of 
suffering in contemporary Western cultures (Brinkmann, 2010.). Briefly put, I 
contacted Brinkmann who soon offered to take on the role as a supervisor of the 
project, and helpfully assisted with the development of the project description and the 
process of applying for funding. Shortly after I started up on the Ph.D. project, 
Brinkmann received a Sapere Aude grant from the Danish Counsil for Independent 
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Research for a large, four-year-long research project on diagnostic cultures, and 
invited me to join the project as an associated researcher. The opportunity to join the 
Diagnostic Research group has meant immensely much throughout my research 
process. The group meetings have provided a safe and fun place to explore and 
develop ideas, and the analytical frameworks developed within the group have guided 
my research in several ways. The joint efforts and collaborations on analyzing the 
conditions and consequences of what we have termed “diagnostic cultures” 
(Brinkmann et al., 2014; Brinkmann, 2016) have been illuminating for my 
examinations of parental grief experiences in contemporary Danish culture. The 
concept “diagnostic cultures” designates cultures “in which psychiatric diagnoses and 
categories are disseminated and used by numerous actors as the most important means 
to understand various life problems and mental disorders” (Brinkmann et al., 2014, p. 
692). The concept points to macro-sociological developments in terms of the 
emergence of new diagnostic categories, the widening scope of existing diagnostic 
categories to include behaviors and experiences not previously defined as disordered, 
and the growing number of people who are “living under the description” of a 
diagnosis (Martin, 2007). It also refers to transformations on the level of individual 
experiences, insofar as people’s experiences of suffering and undesirable behaviors 
are increasingly mediated through medical and diagnostic understandings and 
practices. 
Even though grief is yet to be introduced as a separate diagnostic category in the 
diagnostic manuals (and, accordingly, none of my informants have been diagnosed 
with a grief diagnosis), the cultural distribution of diagnostic understandings and 
practices concerning grief have proliferated throughout the period of my research. 
Hence, the analytical perspectives developed within the diagnostic cultures group 
have been highly relevant for my analyses of how bereaved parents experience grief 
within a culture that increasingly addresses and deals with suffering in diagnostic and 
medical terms. However, during the course of my interviews with the informants, it 
has also become clear that the diagnostic and medical understandings are in no way 
monolithic in how they conceive of and act upon their loss experiences. Insofar as 
alternative interpretive repertoires are used alongside with, simultaneously competing 
with and complementing diagnostic understandings, I approach the concept of 
diagnostic cultures as a heuristic and “sensitizing concept” (Blumer, 1954) to focus 
my attention to the ways people are informed by, negotiate, and contest diagnostic 
and medical understandings of grief. In my last article, “Grief as a border diagnosis,” 
I analyze how the participating parents relate to the notion of grief as a mental disorder 
in multiple and sometimes contradictory ways. Rather than being passively 
subjectified by a monopolizing and repressing diagnostic language, the parents draw 
upon and negotiate diagnostic understandings in combination with other frames of 
references to deal with and understand their grief.  
 
PARENTAL GRIEF AFTER INFANT LOSS 
 
 
8 
 
1.4. DEFINING THE SUBJECT MATTER 
In the following, I will introduce some central concepts and definitions regarding the 
subject matter of this thesis, i.e., infant loss, bereavement, grief, mourning, etc. I will 
outline some commonly held positions concerning how to define these concepts, and 
clarify how I address and define these concepts in this thesis. 
Infant and perinatal death 
The World Health Organization (2006) defines perinatal death as the death of a fetus 
or infant occurring between 22 completed weeks of pregnancy and seven completed 
days after birth. Infant death is defined as the death of a child during the first year of 
life (Centers For Disease Control and Prevention, 2016). However, as this and several 
other studies demonstrate, once a couple define themselves as bereaved parents, it 
follows that they conceive of their loss as the loss of a child, regardless of the child’s 
age (Layne, 2000). In the Danish Infant Death Association, there is no lower or upper 
limit regarding the age of the deceased child, insofar as anyone who define themselves 
as having lost a child, regardless of the child’s age, are welcome to make use of the 
organization’s services. (In cases where the child is considered too old to be called an 
infant, the organization will sometimes suggest that the bereaved parents contact other 
organizations targeted to help bereaved parents of older children. However, this is not 
based on rigid age criteria, but on a concrete evaluation of the parents’ situation and 
opportunities.) As my informants are all recruited through the Danish Infant Death 
Association, I will adopt the organization’s flexible definition of infant loss. Hence, I 
do not make conceptual delineations between fetuses and children, or between live 
born and stillborn babies. As the participants of this study all define themselves as 
parents, I choose to refer to their children as children rather than fetuses, regardless of 
whether their child died before, during, or after birth. When I occasionally use terms 
such as perinatal loss, pregnancy loss, and infant death, this is typically in relation to 
studies that address these phenomena as such. When the parents talk about 
experiences of having lost during pregnancy as a miscarriage or spontaneous abortion 
(implicitly meaning the loss of what they define as a fetus rather than a child), I also 
use the parents’ definition. For example, in my second interview with Emma and John, 
Emma tells me she has miscarried since our last appointment. In contrast to the grief 
over the loss of their son, Emma refers to the miscarriage as a “disappointment”, not 
as a loss of a child. Other parents might experience such a loss differently, in which 
case I would stay true to their definition of the experience. 
Bereavement 
Within bereavement research, bereavement is typically defined as “the state of having 
lost someone we care about or love through death” (Attig, 2004, p. 343). Although 
other kinds of losses may also have profound impact on people’s lives (e.g., the loss 
of a pet, the loss of a relationship through divorce, the loss of mobility, health, etc.), 
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bereavement research is primarily concerned with losses of significant others (i.e., 
human beings) through death. While acknowledging the profound consequences such 
other losses may have on people’s lives, the scope of literature included in this thesis 
is also delimited to bereavement through death of significant other persons. However, 
the liminal status of early infant loss demonstrates that conceptions of personhood, 
and hence bereavement, are historically and culturally malleable (Lofland, 1985; 
Scheper-Hughes, 1993). As the American sociologist Lyn H. Lofland (1985) has 
argued, “societal patterns of relational investment are variable; that is, which others 
become significant and how significant they are change as time and space change” (p. 
175). Lofland argues that historical changes in the conceptions of infant death, due to 
changed patterns of infant mortality as well as parent-child relationships, are likely to 
be connected to changed experiences of bereavement and grief. Likewise, the 
American anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1993) has convincingly 
demonstrated that the processes of attributing human status and developing parental 
attachments to infants are shaped by socio-cultural and material conditions. 
Accordingly, the state of bereavement is arguably not as straight-forward as the initial 
definition implies. As demonstrated in the third article of this thesis (“Grief as a 
normative phenomenon”), how bereaved parents experience and deal with their grief 
is not only mediated by cultural norms about grieving in general. Rather, the latter are 
tightly connected to the cultural recognition of the legitimacy and significance of the 
loss as such, i.e., the extent to which a loss is socially acknowledged as a legitimate 
state of bereavement. The cultural acknowledgment of bereavement, and of the 
grieving individual’s legitimate status as bereaved is therefore intimately connected 
to the grief experience. The American theologian and prominent bereavement 
researcher Kenneth J. Doka (1989) refers to grief experiences where people’s loss “is 
not or cannot be openly acknowledged, publicly mourned, or socially supported” as 
disenfranchised grief (Ibid., p. 4). Due to the cultural uncertainty concerning the 
personhood of infants who die before or shortly after birth, the concept has been 
widely used within research on parental bereavement after perinatal loss (Cacciatore, 
DeFrain & Jones, 2008; Jones, 2010; Lang et al., 2011; McCreight, 2004). However, 
as I argue in my second article, “Becoming a bereaved parent,” social 
acknowledgment is not an either-or-matter, but an ongoing process in which the 
bereaved individual can be actively involved in shaping the local understandings of 
his or her bereavement. Nevertheless, disenfranchisement serves as a useful 
“sensitizing concept” (Blumer, 1954) for addressing the conditions for grieving a loss 
that is culturally contested. 
Grief 
The Canadian philosopher Thomas Attig (2004) outlines two meanings of the word 
grief: The first meaning designates grief as an emotional reaction, “a reactive agony 
that happens to us after bereavement happens to us” (Ibid., p. 343). The second refers 
to grief as an active response. Attig argues that while grief reactions are not matters 
of choice, grieving “as an active response is pervaded with choice” (Ibid.). Although 
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Attig’s analytical distinction resonates well with how many bereaved individuals 
describe their experiences of grief, the sharp distinction between involuntary and 
willed responses does not provide a comprehensive framework for analyzing the 
profound cultural mediation of our emotions asserted in this thesis. To this end, the 
American anthropologist Emily Martin’s (2007) account on the performative aspects 
of suffering provides a useful framework for understanding the intimate relationship 
between involuntary and unreflective reactions on the one side, and willed and 
reflective actions on the other. Martin’s ethnographic account of bipolar depression 
persuasively illustrates that people’s suffering is not entirely involuntary displayed, 
nor entirely a matter of active and reflective volition. Rather than accepting the 
cultural dichotomies between the rational and the irrational, Martin asserts that the 
lines between them are arbitrary and fuzzy (Ibid., p. 95). Inspired by her account, I 
analyze the relation between the involuntary and volitional aspects of grief as a 
continuum rather than a dichotomy. Grief experiences, I assert, exist in the space in 
between the two poles, i.e., they are not entirely causally or mechanically inflicted, 
nor entirely voluntary acts of interpretations that the grieving individual can 
immediately choose to alter. Furthermore, I am inspired by the American sociologist 
Arlie Hochschild’s (1979) emotion-management perspective on emotion. This 
perspective asserts that individuals’ attempts to mediate their emotions in light 
cultural norms do not only take place at the level of performance, but also mediates 
the phenomenological experiences and qualities of these emotions. Referring to the 
commonly held notion of emotions as a psychobiological means of adaptation 
(analogous to other adaptive mechanisms such as shivering when cold, or perspiring 
when hot), Hochschild argues that “emotion differs from these other adaptive 
mechanisms, in that thinking, perceiving, and imagining––themselves subject to the 
influence of norms and situations––are intrinsically involved” (Ibid., pp. 554-555). 
This perspective challenges the widespread distinction between grief and mourning, 
which is unfolded in the following paragraph.  
Mourning 
In the bereavement literature, grief is commonly designated as “the feelings (or feeling 
actions) of the bereaved”, while “mourning concerns the behavior socially prescribed 
in a culture as appropriate for those who have been bereaved” (Seale, 1998, p. 198). 
However, as the above presentations of bereavement and grief elucidate, this 
distinction is problematic. Firstly, historical, socio-cultural, and material conditions 
shape our understandings of what bereavement is, and grief experiences are in turn 
shaped by these understandings. Secondly, grief experiences are also mediated by 
cultural practices––including local practices of mourning. This does not mean that 
grief experiences and mourning can be conflated to one phenomenon. One might for 
example follow a sanctioned mourning practice such as appearing sad and grave at a 
funeral without actually feeling sad. However, this thesis asserts that the relationship 
between grief and mourning is dialectical rather than dualistic or dichotomous. As 
Arlie Hochschild’s (1979) analyses of emotional management suggest, quite often the 
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practices we are engaged in will actually involve an alignment of our experienced 
emotions in accordance with the normative demands of the situation. According to 
Hochschild, the social shaping of emotion involves a shaping of emotional 
experiences as “passively undergone” (e.g., the experience of being struck by sadness 
as one hears the organ prelude at a funeral), as well as how we interpret and act upon 
these experiences. In line with the dialectical argument of cultural psychology, 
Hochschild analyses these processes as continuously and mutually interacting. 
Likewise, I assert, the personal experiences of grief and the cultural mourning 
practices a grieving individual is involved in are intrinsically related and dependent 
upon each other.  
The British sociologist Tony Walter (1999) points to another issue concerning the 
relationship between mourning practices and grief experiences in contemporary 
Western cultures, namely that “[t]he grief process replaces social mourning as the 
framework within which grief is regulated” (p. 187). In other words, as secularization 
and individualization processes of modernity have eroded formerly shared mourning 
rituals and practices, the psychological and psychiatric notions of “the grief process” 
have to a great extent taken the role as a regulatory framework for how we deal with 
loss. In this sense, grief and mourning is actually to a certain extent conflated within 
contemporary Western cultures, insofar as we mourn according to culturally defined 
notions of healthy, normal and appropriate grief. 
Meaning and acceptance 
The loss of a child involves a loss of meaning, insofar as a child (in our culture) 
represents a very significant meaning and value to the parents. Grieving is often 
described as involving a search for meaning, either in terms of understanding how and 
why the loss happened, or by searching for ways to find new meaning in a life that 
has been bereft of meaning due to the significant loss. The questions concerning 
meaning and meaninglessness are complicated and value-laden, insofar as bereaved 
individuals may experience a cultural expectation to regain meaning, accept the loss, 
and move on with their lives. However, many bereaved parents reject the idea that 
there should be any meaning hidden in their children’s death, and maintain that the 
loss itself is meaningless (see e.g. Davis et al., 2000). Likewise, the concept of 
acceptance is often challenged and questioned among bereaved parents, insofar as it 
seems inconceivable or impossible to accept a loss that is experienced as meaningless. 
In a qualitative study on parental grief experiences, Joan Arnold and Penelope B. 
Gemma (2008) identify “two distinctly different descriptions of acceptance; death 
must be accepted because it could not be changed, and acceptance was not possible 
because the loss was intolerable” (p. 667).  
However, although the notions of meaning and acceptance might be rejected, the grief 
itself is not necessarily seen as a meaningless reaction to loss. In spite of the pain, 
most bereaved individuals stress that the grief makes sense, because it expresses the 
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significance of their loss. Also, many bereaved parents strive to find meaning in the 
existence after the loss of a child. Although the loss itself might be interpreted as 
meaningless, they may try to find a meaning in having experienced such a loss. While 
such meanings are sometimes discussed in literature on trauma and bereavement as 
“posttraumatic growth” (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2001), etc., it is important to stress that 
the meanings one might arrive at after a significant loss in no way needs to imply 
“closure” or “justification” of the loss, nor that these meanings are always present for 
the bereaved individual.  
Finally, meaning in this thesis is approached as a social and cultural phenomenon, that 
is, meaning is not something individuals make up in isolation, but something that is 
created and found in intersubjective relations, situated in a world that is always-
already shrouded in meanings and values. Grieving, in this perspective, cannot be 
satisfyingly accounted for as “problem solving” or completing “tasks”. As Attig 
frames it,  
“as we grieve we engage with some of the most profound mysteries of life, 
including finiteness and limitation, change and impermanence, uncertainty 
and not knowing, fallibility, vulnerability and suffering, death and 
mortality, others and ourselves, love and relationship, and the meaning of 
life. (…) None of these can be solved, answered definitively, controlled, 
managed, or mastered. (…) Some responses are more sustainable than 
others, some more suited to some grievers than others. Our responses are 
always provisional, subject to change” (Attig, 2004, p. 352).  
1.5. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is structured in ten chapters which, taken together, aim at presenting the 
project’s background, position it within the field of bereavement studies, and 
communicate my findings as well as the process that has led me to these findings.  
Chapter 2 outlines my theoretical outlook. Chapter 3 describes some of the major 
developments in academic and popular conceptions of bereavement within the last 
century. Chapter 4 presents a literature review of qualitative studies on parental 
bereavement following infant loss. Chapter 5 addresses the methodological, ethical 
and analytical considerations that have emerged during the research process. Chapter 
6 analyses some of the main themes regarding how the participating parents in this 
study experience participating in DIDA’s services and activities. Chapter 7 presents 
the first article of this thesis. In this article, I analyze current conceptions of grief in 
light of historical material. On this background, I discuss some potential consequences 
of the contemporary individualized and diagnostic approaches to grief, and articulate 
a historically and culturally situated, relational and normative perspective on grief. 
Chapter 8 consists of the second article, in which I explore the cultural, epistemic, and 
ethical significance of including my own personal and professional experiences with 
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loss in my research. Chapter 9 consists of the third article, co-written with my Ph.D. 
supervisor, Svend Brinkmann. Here, we draw upon empirical data from the present 
study to demonstrate that grief is a normative phenomenon, which does not only 
happen to people as an effect of bereavement, but which is done or enacted, relative 
to cultural norms. Chapter 10 presents the last article, in which I analyze interview 
data regarding how the bereaved parents in this study relate to the notion of grief as a 
potential psychiatric disorder. Chapter 11 summarizes the main findings and 
conclusions of this study and points to potential avenues for future research on 
parental bereavement.  
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL OUTLOOK 
From my many encounters with bereaved parents, I have heard stories of grief that 
involve experiences of fatigue, shortness of breath, sleeplessness, lack of appetite, 
sadness, emptiness, anger, despair, longing, yearning, lack of concentration, isolation, 
lack of meaning, and countless other experiences. In many books on bereavement, 
such experiences are charted in schemes of “normal grief reactions”, neatly organized 
into physical, emotional, cognitive, behavioral, social, and even spiritual reactions 
(see e.g., Machin, 2014). Although such schemes may prove valid for most people in 
grief, the enlisted symptoms and reactions of grief gravely fail to depict how such 
symptoms and reactions are entangled with the complex realities of people’s everyday 
lives. Indeed, I have often seen how symptom check lists themselves seem to shape 
bereavement experiences, by providing reassurance or creating doubts about whether 
one is reacting normally, by giving a language to communicate, understand, and act 
upon, and ultimately alter the experiences.  
Consequently, an examination of grief experiences needs to move beyond isolated 
symptoms and reaction. It requires a perspective that takes into account the mutual 
and complex relations between the phenomenological, socio-cultural, and semiotic-
discursive aspects of grief––that is, an outlook that can embrace how we 
simultaneously experience, enact, and interpret grief in our everyday lives. Such an 
outlook, I will argue, is provided by cultural psychology (see e.g., Brinkmann, 2016; 
Cole, 1996; Shweder, 1990; Valsiner, 2007, 2014), which serves as a meta-
perspective for the analyses of parental grief experiences in this thesis. 
Furthermore, I draw on theoretical insights from different perspectives regarding the 
role of culture, and the role of the human and social sciences, in the shaping of 
experiences and practices related to suffering, health, and illness. These include 
insights developed within anthropology, emotion history, and genealogical studies of 
subjectivity. Moreover, as this thesis seeks to explore the phenomenological 
experiences of parental grief from a first-person perspective, the phenomenological 
emphasis on the individual’s embodied, embedded, and intentional “being-in-the-
world” provides a framework for examining bereaved individuals’ situated 
experiences of grief. By addressing the mutual and co-constituting relationship 
between such individual experiences and socio-cultural practices, cultural psychology 
directs our attention to the inevitably culturally mediated and normative nature of 
human being in the world. 
2.1.  CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 
The origins of cultural psychology can be traced back to the works of the Soviet 
psychologist Lev Vygotsky who in the 1920’s called for a human science of 
psychology that “must understand human mental life as deeply connected to the 
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objects of human manufacture in the world around us” (White, 1996, xiii). Cultural 
psychology offers a perspective for examining how culture––manifest in human 
artifacts such as tools, words, routines and rituals––inherently mediate human 
activities, emotions, and experiences. Briefly put, cultural psychology is interested in 
analyzing psychological phenomena as mediated actions and experiences. 
2.1.1. A DIALECTIC APPROACH TO CULTURAL AND MENTAL 
PROCESSES 
Cultural psychology addresses the relationship between persons and cultures as 
dialectic rather than dualistic. In other words, instead of conceiving of the duality of 
cultures and persons as discrete entities interacting with each other on a causal level, 
cultural psychology is interested in how persons and cultures mutually constitute each 
other (Cole, 1996; Shweder, 1990; Valsiner, 2014). Hereby, a cultural psychological 
outlook directs our attention to the co-constructed nature of cultures and the minds of 
individuals. Related to this, cultural psychology conceives of cultural and mental 
phenomena as processes rather than entities, structures, or substances. These 
processes develop over time. In other words, cultural psychology emphasizes the 
historicity and processual character of mental and cultural phenomena. 
2.1.2. A PERSON-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 
From a cultural psychological perspective, neither cultures nor minds should be 
understood as variables with causal powers. Cultures (as well as any capacity of the 
human mind), are not “things” with agentive or causal power. Hence, cultural 
psychology rejects the notion of discrete “cultural” and “individual” variables that can 
be isolated and measured. Only persons––not cultures, brains or minds––are capable 
of thinking, feeling and acting (Brinkmann, 2011). Accordingly, cultural psychology 
asserts that psychological phenomena––i.e., phenomena such as cognition, emotion, 
motivation, and learning––apply to human beings as persons, rather than to entities, 
structures, or processes in their brains and bodies. Metaphorically speaking, our brains 
are no more capable of thinking than an oar is of rowing. However, we obviously 
cannot row without an oar (or some equivalent), or think without a brain. In Rom 
Harré’s (1997) words, our brains, our nervous system, our practices, technological 
artefacts, etc. are enabling conditions for human mental life (p. 175). 
2.1.3. CULTURES AS MEDIATORS OF HUMAN ACTIVITY 
Instead of conceiving of cultures as independent variables that causally affect human 
behavior, cultures are conceived of as mediators for thinking, feeling, and acting (or 
enabling conditions, to use Harré’s terminology). Brinkmann (2011) outlines four 
sources of mediators that need to be included in an integrative approach to the human 
mind: The brain, the body, social practices, and technological artefacts (Ibid., p. 1).  
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Accordingly, a cultural psychological outlook does not represent a social 
constructionist reductionism of reality to “whatever we say it is” (Harré, 1997, p. 174). 
The enabling conditions represented by physical as well as social and discursive 
conditions “afford each its own range of possible actions” (Ibid., p. 175). 
Understanding human intentionality, experiences, actions and emotions, i.e., 
psychological phenomena, requires an analytical framework, or a language, that 
makes such phenomena conceivable. As Brinkmann asserts, 
 “We employ ontologies relative to the interests that we have, so when we 
are interested in neurophysiological aspects of human beings, we operate 
with the Molecular grammar, and when we are interested in humans as 
intentional creatures, we operate with the Person grammar” (Ibid.).9 
In this thesis, I am interested in human beings as intentional, experiencing, 
“compulsive meaning-makers” (Valsiner, 2014, p. 1). Accordingly, my main frame 
of reference is the language of intentionality, phenomenology, and interpretation, 
rather than of e.g. causation or correlations. Without disregarding the impact of brain 
chemistry, neurological processes, genetics, upbringing, social and cultural 
circumstances, etc. on grief, my interest is mainly directed to how bereaved people 
perceive, experience, interpret, and act upon themselves in their daily lives. As Jaan 
Valsiner (Ibid.) states,  
“whatever we encounter in our lives we need to make sense of, rather than 
only react to or act upon. Or even more precisely, as we react to and act 
upon the world in the middle of which we live, we construct it as 
meaningful for ourselves. And it is that meaningful way of living that is 
central to us” (p. 1). 
Without cultural resources in terms of languages, signs, tools, social practices, and 
technologies, we would not be capable of reflecting upon, acting upon, or making 
sense of our experiences. Language in particular makes us capable of creating a 
reflective distance to the immediate context of experience and our immediate 
impulses. Language enables semiotic mediation (Valsiner, 2007), i.e., the ability to 
reflect upon, interpret, and direct our actions instead of merely reacting upon stimuli 
and impulses. Meanings and intentions are mediated and enabled through language, 
or, as Wittgenstein stated, “When I think in words, I don’t have ‘meanings’ in my 
                                                            
9 Brinkmann refers to Rom Harré’s Wittgensteinian concept of grammars, i.e., “clusters of rules 
for how to express oneself meaningfully, and, as rules, (...) are normative and social” (Harré, 
2002, cited in Brinkmann, 2011, p. 9). According to Brinkmann, “[the] Person grammar is 
always primary in psychology” (Ibid.), insofar as psychological phenomena are normative and 
intentional. (See also section 2.1.4., “The normativity of human practices and mental 
phenomena”.) 
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mind in addition to the verbal expressions: rather, the language itself is the vehicle of 
thought” (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 329).  
The enabling capacities of mediators are not entirely equivalent to a means-to-and-
end logic, insofar as the latter designates the enabling of a priori intentions, “whereas 
mediators at once constitute and transform the intentions that they carry” (Brinkmann, 
2016, p. 16). For example, I cannot conceivably have an intention of converting to 
Islam without the preexistence of a Muslim tradition (maintained by language, 
religious practices, communities, beliefs, writings, etc.). I might consider creating a 
new religion, but the intention of doing so presupposes (and is informed by) the 
preexistence of religious languages and practices to make such an intention available 
and conceivable. Likewise, in order to wonder if he or she is grieving normally, a 
bereaved individual must have access to a certain language that renders the notions of 
“normality” and “normal grief” meaningful. This obviously does not imply that 
normality is merely a linguistic matter. Rather, the meanings of normality are bound 
up to a range of practices and technologies, such as counseling, self-measurements, 
rating scales, etc. which mediate individuals’ interpretations and actions. Rather than 
conceiving of discourses and languages as abstract representations of the world, this 
thesis conceives of language in a Wittgensteinian sense, i.e., as “part of an activity, or 
of a form of life” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §23). 
2.1.4. THE NORMATIVITY OF HUMAN PRACTICES AND MENTAL 
PHENOMENA 
Finally, and central to the objective of this thesis, cultural psychology conceives of 
the human mind as normative (an argument that is further developed in the third 
article, “Grief as a normative phenomenon”). Psychological phenomena like thinking, 
feeling, and acting differ from physiological phenomena insofar as only the former 
are (and can be) subjected to normative appraisal. In spite of common features such 
as physiological expressions and experiential qualities, only psychological 
phenomena can be judged by normative standards. E.g., while an emotion such as 
anger can be evaluated as legitimate or exaggerated, based on the circumstances in 
which it appears, it would be meaningless to attribute such evaluations to stomach 
aches. Although human emotions are sometimes experienced and conceived of as 
reactive, i.e., triggered by causal mechanisms, they are imbued with normative 
judgement. Our very concept of personhood involves a moral responsibility for our 
actions and emotions. Accordingly, a withdrawal of this responsibility (for example 
when an accused in a criminal prosecution is pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity) 
involves a withdrawal of moral agency and hence personhood. The normative 
evaluations of actions and emotions are based on “local moral orders” (Harré, 1983, 
cited in Brinkmann, 2011, p. 14), i.e., the norms and values of our practices through 
which “we learn to speak, to reflect, to act, to remember, to feel emotions, to discipline 
our bodies and exercise all the other skills that make up the mind” (Ibid.). 
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2.2. GRIEF AS EMOTIONAL PRACTICES 
“Because language, illness beliefs, personal significance of pain and 
suffering, and socially learned ways of behaving when ill are part of [the] 
process of mediation, the experience of illness (or distress) is always a 
culturally shaped phenomenon” (Kleinman, 1988, p. 7). 
By examining the historicity and situated variety of human emotions, emotion history 
and anthropological studies challenge claims of universality of emotions, as well as 
traditional dichotomies between mind and body, culture and nature, rationality and 
emotionality, etc.  
Relevant to the analytical aim of this thesis, the German historical and cultural 
anthropologist Monique Scheer’s (2012) concept of emotional practices offers a 
promising analytical tool for examining how emotions are not just something we have, 
but also something we do.  
Scheer argues that emotions are not just a consequence of human practices (i.e., that 
certain emotions are evoked by certain practices). Rather, she asserts, emotions are 
practices that involve “the self (as body and mind), language, material artifacts, the 
environment, and other people” (Ibid., p. 193). Emotional practices involve the 
mobilization, naming, communication, and regulation of emotions through embodied 
habits, rituals, and daily routines that sustain a community or culture. Inspired by 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, Scheer emphasizes the embodied nature of emotional 
practices, as well as the “socially situated, adaptive, trained, plastic, and thus 
historical” nature of the human body (Ibid.). Accordingly, she argues, 
“Emotions change over time not only because norms, expectations, words, 
and concepts that shape experience are modified, but also because the 
practices in which they are embodied, and bodies themselves, undergo 
transformation” (Ibid., p. 220). 
The practice perspective on emotions try to bridge the gap between structures and 
agents, and between culture and bodies, insofar as structures are maintained and 
changed through mundane and concrete human practices, while individual action and 
embodied experience on the other hand are enabled through these (embodied) 
practices. Our embodied subjectivity is thus shaped through historically and culturally 
specific practices.  
According to this perspective, the experience of grief emerges through embodied and 
situated practices. To paraphrase Scheer, “the [grieving] subject does not exist prior 
to, but emerges in the doing of the emotion” (Ibid., p. 209).  
Consistent with Scheer’s emotional practice perspective, a widely-held position 
within contemporary anthropology of emotions suggests that “without culture we 
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would simply not know how to feel” (Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1987, p. 28). Scheper-
Hughes & Lock calls for a “development of a new epistemology and metaphysics of 
the mindful body and of the emotional, social, and political sources of illness and 
healing” (p. 30). Their concept of the mindful body represents an analytic 
understanding of emotions as embodied, cognitively and morally oriented, culturally 
and socially situated (Ibid.). Seen through this lens, a grieving individual’s 
experiences of sadness “entail both feelings and cognitive orientations, public 
morality, and cultural ideology” (Ibid.). Hence, sadness is not merely a “reaction” to 
loss, but a morally directed and embodied response that is situated in the grieving 
individual’s social reality. In short, and significant for my argument in this thesis, 
grief is a normative and relational practice. 
A similar approach to emotion as an inherently social practice is represented by the 
French sociologist Eva Illouz (2008). In her analysis of contemporary therapeutic and 
emotional culture, she argues that 
“through emotion we enact cultural definitions of personhood as they are 
expressed in concrete and immediate but always culturally and socially 
defined relationships. The intense, compact compression of cultural 
meanings and social relationships also gives emotions their prereflexive, 
often semiconscious character. Emotions are deeply internalized and 
unreflexive aspects of action, not because they do not contain sufficient 
culture and society, but because they contain too much of them” (Illouz, 
2008, p. 11). 
Likewise, the German philosopher Jan Slaby (2016) argues that affective phenomena–
–spanning from emotional categories with specific intentional contents, such as fear, 
anger, etc., via pre-intentional, pre-reflexive intersubjective affectivity, to unspecific 
moods, affective atmospheres, etc., 
“are never merely matters of ‘internal mental states,’ nor just narrow ways 
of being affected, but usually encompass sequences of active 
engagement with the world, usually in highly social and relational ways” 
(p. 3, italics in original). 
The directed nature of affective phenomena, Slaby asserts, places them in the field of 
normative evaluations, insofar as they can be assessed by the extent to which they 
realize the purpose of or holds significance to “what is ultimately at issue and at stake 
in the domain,” (i.e., practice), the latter also being open to normative evaluation and 
negotiation (Ibid.). Slaby further criticizes the implicit user-resource model often 
asserted by situated perspectives on the human mind, i.e., the assumption “of a fully 
conscious individual cognizer (‘user’) who sets about pursuing a well-defined task 
through intentional employment of a piece of equipment or exploitation of an 
environmental structure (‘resource’) (Ibid., p. 5). Instead, he emphasizes the 
dialectical relationship between individual subjectivity and our socio-cultural reality, 
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i.e., our subjectivity and personhood simultaneously shape and are shaped by our “in-
medias-res human sociality” (Ibid., p. 9), a point that echoes the cultural psychological 
notion of mediation as a process that simultaneously shape and are shaped by the 
intentions they carry (see section 2.1.3 above). Slaby hereby articulates a radical unity 
between the normative and performative aspects of human practices and subjectivity, 
insofar as “[norms] exist only as concretely enacted and situated, while there are no 
acts which are outside the ambit of social rules and normative patterns” (Ibid., p. 8). 
Taken together, the practice perspective of emotions highlights the inherent 
connections between our emotional experiences and the normative socio-material 
realities they are part of. Conceiving of emotionality and affectivity as enacted 
phenomena implies that they are imbued with normativity, insofar as such phenomena 
are only conceivable within normatively structured practices. 
2.3. SOCIO-MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF GRIEF 
As I was collecting notes to develop my arguments in this section, I coincidentally 
overheard a conversation between two young female Danish students about new-born 
babies: “They are fully developed when they are born,” one of them stated. “They 
know their mother’s voice even before they are born, and immediately after birth, they 
prefer to look at her and hear her voice rather than any others.” Maintained through a 
web of cultural and material practices and technologies, such understandings are 
prevailing in contemporary Western societies, and hence, I as a researcher am 
arguably as much informed by such understandings as anyone else.  
However, Nancy Scheper-Hughes’ (1993) ethnographic studies of infant loss among 
people of the Alto, a poor rural community in Northeastern Brazil, have profoundly 
stimulated my awareness to the significance of the socio-material conditions of our 
beliefs and practices. Her sensitive and respectful account of parenting practices, 
attachment, concepts of personhood, and emotions in this community represent an 
illuminating contrast to “our” (Western) ways of relating to these phenomena. 
Through her sensitive and contextualized account of the people of the Alto and their 
brutal life conditions, Scheper-Hughes manages to make sense of practices and 
experiences that seem almost incomprehensible from the point of view of a Western, 
secularized, and privileged position. In the Alto, violence, poverty, illness, and, not 
the least, infant death is prevailing. Instead of analyzing these as causal factors that 
affect people’s behavior, Scheper-Hughes explores how people’s actions and 
understandings make sense within these conditions. From the point of view of the 
Alto’s, infant death is not something to grieve, as dead infants are seen as privileged 
to escape the brutality of life in favor of eternal divine life. Moreover, she 
demonstrates how notions of personhood develops within cultural and material 
circumstances, and how these notions in turn inform our experiences and practices 
concerning parenthood, attachment, loss, and grief. As described in the previous 
chapter, infant mortality rates, cultural conceptions of life and death, material and 
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technological practices inherently shape our experiences of loss. Furthermore, 
Scheper-Hughes argues, the relations between these phenomena are dialectical, 
insofar as our beliefs and experiences also shape infant mortality rates (a case she 
makes by examining the tragic circumstances and consequences of “the mortal neglect 
of certain soon-to-be-doomed babies” (Ibid., p. 20)). 
Hence, socio-material conditions, cultural beliefs and practices mutually shape our 
emotions towards our children, our way of relating to them, and our way of grieving 
over them. In contrast to the encouraged practices concerning parental attachment and 
grief among the parents of my study (all citizens of the highly developed Danish well-
fare state), the mothers10 in Scheper-Hughes’ study face infant death with resignation 
and accept, and even relief. In line with Scheper-Hughes’ analyses––as well as with 
the overarching cultural psychological framework of this thesis–– I conceive of these 
cultural differences as radically mediating not only our overt “behaviors,” but in the 
most profound way our experiences and subjectivities. 
2.4. GRIEF AS SELF-TECHNOLOGICAL PRACTICES 
Michel Foucault’s analyses of the mutual relations between power, knowledge and 
subjectivity inform my analyses of the bereavement literature and of my empirical 
material beyond what it is justifiably credited throughout this project. Likewise, the 
British sociologist Nikolas Rose’s extensive analyses of the role of the human 
sciences in “making up people” (Hacking, 1986) informs my understanding of how 
the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry in particular have come to shape how we 
understand and act upon ourselves in relation to loss.  
Rose’s (1998) genealogy of contemporary notions of selfhood and subjectivity direct 
our attention to “the conditions under which our present ways of thinking about and 
acting upon human beings have taken shape” (p. 1). Throughout his academic career, 
Rose has examined how contemporary notions of subjectivity have been developed, 
first within what he has designated the psy disciplines (i.e., psychology, psychiatry, 
and related practices), and increasingly within the biomedical sciences (Rose, 1998, 
2007). The leading question throughout his work is perhaps best formulated as “[How 
is] subjectivity (…) affected by the categories and technologies of modern society?” 
(Brinkmann, 2016, p. 132). In the following, I will focus on Rose’s early analyses of 
how the psy disciplines shape contemporary practices and conceptions of subjectivity, 
which, I will argue, continues to be of relevance to the study of how bereaved 
individuals relate to and act upon themselves in the context of loss. 
Rose’s work give detailed descriptions of how individuals in contemporary Western 
societies are encouraged to “govern themselves” in light of scientific knowledge 
                                                            
10 Scheper-Hughes primarily address the loss experiences of the mothers, as infant care among 
the Altos is primarily a maternal task. 
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concerning normality and pathology, risk and prevention, etc. In his analyses, Rose 
draw upon a Foucauldian perspective of how subjectivity is constituted through 
historical, material, and social practices, and how the subject constitutes itself in an 
active fashion through “technologies of the self” (Foucault, 1988). These practices are 
“not something invented by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in 
his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, 
and his social group” (Foucault, 1997, p. 291).  
Rose (1998) analyses how subjectivity in contemporary Western “enterprise culture” 
is constituted in complex relations between a political level of “governmentality” 
(“mentalities of governments”), an institutional level (“human technologies”), and an 
“ethical level” (“technologies of the self”) (Ibid., p. 152 ff). Through this process, a 
certain kind of subjectivity is constituted that embodies “the presupposition that 
humans are, could be, or should be enterprising individuals, striving for fulfillment, 
excellence, and achievement” (Ibid., p. 154). In order to realize such subjectivity, 
individuals make use of technologies offered by therapeutic practices, self-help 
practices, coaching, etc. Through these practices, Rose contends, suffering is 
interpreted and acted upon as something “not to be endured but to be reframed by 
expertise, to be managed as a challenge and stimulus to the powers of the self” (Ibid., 
p. 159). This approach to suffering, I will argue, permeates contemporary 
understandings and practices related to grief as well, and provides a frame of reference 
for understanding how grief is currently being accounted for as a potentially mental 
illness that can and should be a target of medical and therapeutic interventions. 
2.5. EXPERIENCES AS INTERACTIONS WITH CATEGORIES 
The British philosopher Ian Hacking’s (1995) concept of “the looping effects of 
human kinds” has informed my comprehension of the dynamic relationship between 
(scientific) concepts and categories (such as “pathological grief”) and individual 
experiences and enactments of suffering. Like Foucault, Hacking is interested in how 
the human and social sciences “make up people” through interacting with the 
categories they study, i.e., “kinds of people, their behaviour, their condition, kinds of 
action, kinds of temperament or tendency, kinds of emotion, and kinds of experience” 
(Ibid., pp. 351–352). These “human kinds”, Hacking argues, differ from the “natural 
kinds” studied in the natural sciences in important ways.  
 
While natural kinds (like quarks, genes, sunsets, and common colds) are indifferent 
to the discursive descriptions applied to them, human kinds take an interest in how 
they are described and categorized because human kinds are “laden with values” 
(Ibid., p. 366). Unlike natural kinds, who can only be “good or bad” depending on 
what we use them for, human kinds are “kinds that people may want to be or not to 
be, not in order to attend some end but because the human kinds have intrinsic moral 
value” (Ibid., p. 367). Thus, while molecules behave independently of our 
categorizations, human kinds respond to and interact with, mirror, and oppose to the 
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categorical descriptions of them, hereby altering the category, which, in turn, alters 
the ways we see ourselves, act “under the descriptions” given to us, and so forth (Ibid., 
p. 368). It is this interactive process between categorical descriptions and human kinds 
that Hacking terms looping effects.  
 
In the case of grief, scientific categorizations of grief distributed into popular culture, 
clinical practices, etc. interact with the human kinds under description, as people come 
to see themselves as grieving normally or abnormally, act upon themselves to avoid 
or achieve certain categorizations, etc. In this process, not only individual behavior 
and self-interpretations are altered, but the category itself, which, in turn, makes us 
alter our categorizations. For example, at the moment, the bereavement literature 
suggests that approximately 10-20% of all bereaved individuals will meet the criteria 
for complicated or prolonged grief (Bonanno et al., 2002; Bonanno & Kaltman, 2001; 
Prigerson et al., 2009; Shear et al., 2011). However, as the category becomes more 
widely known and used, it is likely that bereaved individuals increasingly will be 
interacting with the category; describing themselves under it, distancing themselves 
from it, experiencing their grief through it, etc. Through this process, the category as 
we know it changes. That is, our knowledge of the category changes because the 
category is changed. (E.g., the current estimated prevalence rates might need to be 
altered). This, in turn, feeds back into the self-understandings and practices of the 
kinds of people it describes, and so forth. 
 
2.6. GRIEF AS PHENOMENOLOGICAL BEING-IN-THE-WORLD 
The anthropologist Michael Jackson (1996) defines phenomenology simply as “the 
scientific study of experience” (p. 2). In accordance with a cultural psychological 
perspective, phenomenologically oriented research is not concerned with explaining 
human behavior as a result of causal factors (culture, the brain, genetics, etc.), but of 
examining and describing experience as an embodied, directed, intersubjective, and 
situated phenomenon. Following this definition, the ambition of studying grief 
experiences is inherently phenomenological.  
However, the nature of experience and how experiences can be studied are inevitably 
contested topics. As the previous section should have made clear, the concept of 
experience used in this thesis is informed by the cultural psychological emphasis on 
how experiences are inherently mediated. However, it is important to stress that 
mediation is not to be understood exclusively or primarily as reflective and conscious 
acts of interpretation. As Martin Heidegger’s (1962) hermeneutically oriented 
existential phenomenology stresses, our existence as human beings (Dasein) is 
characterized by thrown-ness: We are thrown into existence in a preexisting world 
with other human beings whom we are always-already dependent upon. In our 
everyday lives, we are absorbed in a world that is always-already meaningful to us, 
and most of the time, our being in the world is characterized by a straightforward 
engagement with other people, places, things, and activities that immediately present 
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themselves as meaningful to us. Heidegger understands this as another matter than 
individual entities merely “interacting” with the world as an environment. As Attig 
(2004) puts it, “[we] are primarily practical beings intentionally alive within our 
surroundings and capable of self-awareness and reflection when necessary. Knowing 
how grounds us in reality and shapes our lives” (p. 348). Only when our immediate, 
everyday being-in-the-world breaks down, we are involved in reflective attempts to 
interpret the world and ourselves. Obviously, bereavement might often represent such 
a breakdown, and consequently, grief often involves strenuous attempts to make sense 
of a world no longer experienced as immediately meaningful.  
Moreover, our existence is also fundamentally constituted by our mortality; the fact 
that we live our lives towards an inevitable death. In Heidegger’s own words: “Death 
is something that stands before us––something impending” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 294, 
italics in original). Drawing on Heidegger’s thinking, Attig argues that “[because] 
caring engagement is the nature of our being, we are vulnerable to the loss of 
wholeness that bereavement entails” (Attig, 2004, p. 348). Such a perspective points 
to the fact that human life is inescapably constituted by vulnerability, mortality, and 
interdependence, all of which shape the conditions for human grieving. In sum, an 
existential-phenomenological perspective reminds us that grief is an experience that 
is constituted (but not determined) by the inescapable conditions of being thrown into 
a vulnerable and interdependent existence we have not chosen, but in which we must 
choose to live our lives and face our common mortality. 
2.7. GRIEF AND SELFHOOD 
The conception of selfhood that emerges from the theoretical outlook presented here 
emphasizes the interdependent and mediated nature of human selfhood. Bereavement 
throws our selfhood into sharp relief by highlighting the interdependent nature of our 
being in the world with others. Following Heidegger (1962), our most basic state of 
being is our caring engagement with the world (Ibid., p. 293). In this light, grieving is 
more than a reactive process leading to resolution and returning to a former status quo. 
Grieving challenges the concept of a bounded, unitary self, interacting with other 
selves. Like many bereaved individuals describe the phenomenology of grief, the loss 
of a significant other is often experienced as an amputation––a loss of a vital part of 
oneself. As such, grief sheds light on the intersubjective and interdependent nature of 
our selfhood.  
Furthermore, human selfhood is inevitably an interpretive activity, insofar as we make 
sense of who we are through inherently normative socio-cultural and material 
practices. Self-interpretation is not an individual and purely mental achievement, but 
a socially situated, embodied practice. The socio-cultural and material conditions we 
are situated in simultaneously enables and restricts the range of possible and 
meaningful ways of experiencing, interpreting, and enacting ourselves in relation to 
what we conceive of as valuable, good, and meaningful. For the most part, this goes 
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on in a rather habitual and pre-reflexive manner, as a part of our embodied, intentional, 
and affectively attuned being in the world as we know it (Attig, 2004; Scheer, 2012; 
Slaby, 2016). However, under certain circumstances, the matter-of-factly practical 
consciousness with which we go about in our everyday lives, breaks down. Significant 
losses often represent such circumstances. Through bereavement, our sense of 
ourselves and the world, our life stories and meanings are challenged, altered, and 
revised. This is mediated by historically specific socio-cultural and material practices, 
which in our time and culture are increasingly informed by the human and social 
sciences (Hacking, 1995; Rose, 1998). Concerning grief, former traditional beliefs 
and practices concerning death, grief, and mourning have to some extent been 
replaced by psychological notions of “healthy and normal” grief processes, etc. 
(Walter, 1999). Beyond mediating our ways of grieving, such understandings 
arguably also interact with how we experience, conceive of, and act upon ourselves, 
i.e., with our very selfhood and personal identity. 
Summed up, this thesis comprehends selfhood as an embodied, affective, and 
interpretive practice. Furthermore, selfhood is intersubjectively, materially, and socio-
culturally situated and mediated. Finally, selfhood entails pre-reflexive as well as 
reflexive experiences, interpretations and enactments. Bereavement represents an 
existential condition that threatens our everyday sense of identity and meaning. On 
this background, this thesis comprehends grief and personal identity as intrinsically 
related, insofar as significant losses profoundly alters our world and how we find 
ourselves in it. 
2.8. SUMMARY: GRIEF AS SITUATED AND EMBODIED 
EXPERIENCES, INTERPRETATIONS, AND ENACTMENTS 
In sum, the analytical outlook that informs this study stresses the interrelated and 
normative nature of psychological and cultural processes, and insists that neither can 
be understood as independent variables with causal agency. From this perspective, the 
cultural is a fundamental precondition for mental life as such. Indeed, Jaan Valsiner 
(2014) asserts, the cultural “is part of the general psychological system of a person, 
and belongs to the higher level of psychological phenomena” (p. 40). Without cultural 
resources in terms of historically developed languages, signs, tools, technologies, etc., 
human mental life would be inconceivable.  
Furthermore, by insisting on a person-centered concept of agency and experience, 
cultural psychology distances itself from other psychological and neuroscientific 
approaches that attribute mental phenomena to (structural or processual aspects of) 
the minds or brains of human beings. Likewise, it distances itself from certain 
sociological approaches that see the social and cultural as structures or entities with 
agentive powers (Brinkmann, 2016, p. 16). From a cultural psychological perspective, 
only persons are capable of thinking, experiencing, and acting, and such higher mental 
phenomena are inherently normative. By conceptualizing human mental life as 
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mediated and normative activity, cultural psychology provides a framework for 
analyzing human experiences as radically situated within historical, socio-cultural, 
and material conditions.  
The cultural psychological outlook of this thesis is further expanded and informed by 
historical and anthropological studies of emotions that highlights the enacted, 
embodied, situated, and inherently normative nature of human emotion and 
affectivity. Furthermore, the Foucauldian line of thinking of human subjectivity as 
constituted through socio-material practices, and the emphasis on the role of the 
human sciences in the shaping of contemporary practices and conceptions of 
subjectivity, offers important insights into the current condition for grieving 
individuals in our culture. Likewise, Hacking’s analyses of the looping effects of 
human kinds direct our attention to the inherent normativity involved in the scientific 
endeavor of comprehending the human condition. Finally, a Heideggerian 
attentiveness to the human condition of thrown-ness, interdependency, and finitude 
sensitizes us to the profoundly existential and relational dimensions of grieving. 
Informed by the outlined perspectives in this chapter, this thesis comprehends grief as 
a radically situated and mediated experience and practice. Our personal experiences 
of grief are not prior to and isolated from our social reality of norms, beliefs and 
practices, but “dwells within it” (Jacoby, 1997, p. 104). Bluntly put, our “immediate 
experiences” are “immediately mediated”, insofar as experiences are radically 
situated within a socio-material reality constituted by inherently normative practices. 
Experiences belong to the person, but cannot be reduced to events or essences within 
the person, isolated from their concrete and situated manifestations within the 
person’s life situation. To illustrate this claim, a bereaved individual’s embodied 
experiences of, for example, fatigue is manifest in relations to bodily sensations, prior 
experiences, intersubjective relations (including distributed roles and obligations 
within a family), socio-cultural norms and practices (e.g., medical practices that 
provide medical treatments and interpretations, norms concerning appropriate rest and 
activity patterns, perceptions of illness and health, normal and abnormal grief, etc.). 
Fatigue is thus not something that exists as an isolated experiential entity within the 
grieving individual, but something that is unfolded in a complex reality of bodily, 
intersubjective, material, and socio-cultural processes. Taken together, the present 
study examines grief as a simultaneously experienced, interpreted, and enacted 
phenomenon, situated within and conceived through normative socio-material 
practices that constitute our human condition.  
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CHAPTER 3. MODELS AND THEORIES 
OF GRIEF 
In the opening lines of her ethnographic work on death, dying, and bereavement in 
contemporary British society, the social anthropologist Mary Bradbury (1999) states 
that “[the] last decade of the twentieth century has witnessed a quiet revolution in our 
relationship with mortality” (p. 1). In the wake of an historical era characterized by 
death-denial and taboo (Ariés, 1974; Becker, 1973; Gorer, 1955; Kübler-Ross, 1969; 
Littlewood, 1992), Bradbury finds herself writing in a time where death is (once 
again?) discussed and analyzed. With the reservation that my observations might be 
skewed by my own interest in the subject, I think it is fair to claim that a similar 
development is occurring in Denmark at the moment. Recently, two national research 
centers on grief are about to be established11, the Crown prince and princess of 
Denmark’s annual social prize for 2016 was awarded to the non-governmental grief 
support organization “Children, Youth & Grief” [“Børn, Unge & Sorg”], and a 
veritable flood of books about death and grief, primarily based on personal 
experiences, has been published.12 Insofar as these many initiatives have a shared 
focus, it seems to be that grief is acknowledged as something that concerns us all. 
Research into death and bereavement in the last decades has taken on new 
perspectives and abandoned old ones. For example, Christine Valentine (2006) 
identifies a current “resocializing” of grief (p. 58). This resocializing is evident in the 
growing interest in death and grief within the social sciences, and in new models of 
bereavement that move beyond presumptions of universal emotional reaction to 
include such phenomena as the social construction of narratives, and continuation of 
bonds with the deceased. Valentine ties this resocializing up to what she sees as the 
                                                            
11 In 2016, the Danish Health Authority [“Sundhedsstyrelsen”] has granted 8 mill. Danish 
Kroner to the non-governmental organization “Children, Youth & Grief” [“Børn, Unge & 
Sorg”] to the establishment of a national center for complicated grief, and the private foundation 
“The Obel Family Foundation” has granted 12,6 mill. Danish Kroner to a 5-year-long research 
project on grief culture (http://www.kommunikation.aau.dk/nyheder/Nyhed/forskningsprojekt-
om-sorg-modtager-12-6-mio.-kr.-i-stoette-fra-det-obelske-familiefond.cid282321).  
12 See e.g., Dagbladet Politiken, March 26th 2016: “Tendency: The many landscapes of grief in 
the literature” [“Tendens: Litteraturens mange landskaber af sorg”] 
(http://politiken.dk/kultur/boger/article5616395.ece); Kristeligt Dagblad, October 7th, 2016: 
“Should we all have a children’s book about grief?” [“Bør alle have en børnebog om sorg?”] 
(http:// http://www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/kultur/boer-alle-boern-have-en-boernebog-om-sorg); 
and forlagsliv.dk, April 11th, 2016: ”Trend: Books about death tops the best seller lists” 
[”Tendens: Bøger om døden til tops på bestsellerlisterne”] (http://forlagsliv.dk/boeger-om-
doeden/). 
PARENTAL GRIEF AFTER INFANT LOSS 
 
 
30 
 
inadequacy of medicalizing and pathologizing approaches to grief (Ibid.). Likewise, 
Bradbury (1999) finds that the psychiatric and psychological bereavement research 
“from the perspective of the medical model became not just unfashionable: it became 
unresearchable” (p. 169). However, although Bradbury’s and Valentine’s analyses 
still ring true in terms of the upsurge in a wider academic and public interest in death 
and grief, the medical model again seems to be gaining ground in contemporary 
bereavement research. In my first article, “From morality to pathology”, I attempt to 
trace the historical conditions that have made such a model feasible and, I assert, 
dominant, in contemporary Western understandings of grief. 
In the following, I will outline some of the main developments and controversies 
within bereavement research throughout the last century. The review of the literature 
is organized by two conflicting narratives of grief: One that primarily addresses grief 
as an individual and potentially medical, pathological phenomenon, and one that 
emphasizes the shared existential, social and cultural aspect of grief. Although such a 
structure is overly simplistic, it may emphasize some of the crucial controversies 
concerning how to deal with grief as a medical and cultural phenomenon in 
contemporary Western societies. 
3.1. GRIEF AS AN INDIVIDUAL PROCESS 
The 20th century’s grand narratives of grief have been shaped by psychological, 
psychiatric, and clinical approaches to grief as an emotional, individual, and universal 
phenomenon. Inspired by Freudian notions of grief as an emotional process of 
severing ties to the deceased, theories and models of asserted universal phases, stages, 
and tasks have been developed on the basis of clinical observations and empirical 
studies. By the end of the century, these models were met by a growing body of 
critique, questioning the universality as well as the prescriptive assumptions of these 
approaches to grief (Valentine, 2006). However, in spite of this critique, the search 
for universally applicable criteria to delineate between normal and pathological grief 
is currently emerging as one of the most prevalent themes within contemporary 
bereavement research. 
3.1.1. THE GRIEF WORK HYPOTHESIS  
Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytical theory provided a central theoretical framework 
for the academic and popular conceptualizations of grief within Western cultures 
throughout the 20th century (for a review of Freud’s influence on academic and 
popular understandings of grief, see article 1, “From morality to pathology”). In his 
famous essay Mourning and Melancholia, first published in 1917, Freud (1957) 
introduced the concept of “grief work” (“Trauerarbeit”) to designate the process of 
accepting the reality of loss (in Freudian terms, obeying to “the command of reality”) 
and withdrawing the attachments from the lost loved one. This process, Freud asserts, 
is  
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“carried out bit by bit, at great expense of time and cathectic energy, and 
in the meantime the existence of the lost object is psychically prolonged. 
(…) Why this compromise by which the command of reality is carried out 
piecemeal should be so extraordinarily painful is not at all easy to explain 
in terms of economics. It is remarkable that this painful unpleasure is taken 
as a matter of course by us. The fact is, however, that when the work of 
mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again” (Ibid., 
p. 244). 
Although not explicitly formulated by Freud, the grief work hypothesis has been 
developed by his successors to involve an implicit suggestion of pathology as a 
consequence of failed or “unresolved” grief work. Thus, the “painful unpleasure” 
Freud asserted is taken as “a matter of course” has been subjected to a large body of 
research into the nature and course of normal and pathological grief. In the following, 
I will outline a selection of the theoretical positions and models in which the grief 
work hypothesis is implicitly represented (for further elaboration, see “From morality 
to pathology”). Subsequently, I will turn to one more recent model that incorporates 
elements from the grief work hypothesis, but rejects the general idea that “one needs 
to bring the reality of loss into one’s awareness as much as possible and that 
suppression is a pathological phenomenon” (Stroebe, 1993, p. 20). Although building 
on different theoretical and empirical foundations, the presented perspectives have a 
shared focus on the individual process of grief, how to distinguish between normal 
and pathological grief, and how to predict, prevent, and treat pathological grief 
reactions.  
 
3.1.2. PHASES, STAGES, AND TASKS OF GRIEF 
The phase model of grief was originally developed from John Bowlby’s attachment 
theory, building on a theoretical framework of Freudian psychoanalysis13 and 
observational studies of young children’s reactions to maternal separation (Parkes, 
1998). In collaboration with James Robertson, Bowlby developed a descriptive model 
of the sequence of reactions in a group of hospitalized children between 18 and 24 
months during maternal separation. The original model involved three phases: (1), 
“Angry pining”, (2), “depression and despair”, and (3), “detachment” (Ibid., p. 21). 
Bowlby and his colleague Collin Murray Parkes subsequently applied the model to 
bereaved adults and added an initial phase of “numbness or blunting” (Ibid.).14  
                                                            
13 Although Bowlby’s initial work was informed by a psychoanalytical framework, he later 
departed from many of the central theoretical assumptions in psychoanalytical theory (e.g., the 
idea that feeding and sex should be the principal sources of human motivation) (Bowlby, 1982). 
14 Other researchers and clinicians have developed similar models of grief, e.g. Elisabeth 
Kübler-Ross (1969). Kübler-Ross’ model describes five stages: (1) Denial and isolation, (2), 
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With its theoretical foundation in attachment theory, Bowlby’s phase model depicts 
grief as a relational phenomenon, insofar as attachment theory stresses the ability and 
need to form attachment as a fundamental pre-condition for survival and development. 
The theory asserts that the ability to form attachment is developed as a biological 
instinct through evolutionary history, and accordingly, the model is relevant to 
describe patterns of attachment (and reactions to separation) not only among humans, 
but also among other species (Bowlby, 1980, 1982).  
 
Moreover, the theory asserts that the process of grieving depends on the quality of the 
attachment to the deceased loved one. This implies that healthy grieving is more likely 
to occur if the individual has had a secure attachment to the deceased, which, 
according to Bowlby, is founded in the early infant-parental attachment. In other 
words, individuals are likely to reproduce early taught patterns of attachment in later 
relationships, and, consequentially, their reactions to loss are shaped by these primary 
attachment experiences. This means that the grieving process can be healthy or 
disordered, depending on a combination of prior attachment experiences as well as 
the attachment to the lost loved one. Individuals who have experienced secure 
attachment to their primary attachment figures are likely to develop a secure 
attachment style that helps them to adjust to separation later in life, including 
separation through loss. Conversely, individuals who have been insecurely attached 
to their primary attachment figures are more vulnerable to separation distress and 
dysfunctional coping mechanisms in the face of loss (e.g., by anxiously clinging to 
the lost relationship, or by detaching from and avoiding the emotional pain caused by 
the loss). 
 
In spite of the relational foundation in attachment theory, Bowlby’s phase model 
depicts grief as an individual adaptation process that is more or less determined by 
previous attachment experiences. That is, relationships are depicted as mentally 
integrated in the coping styles of individuals, which tend to be reproduced during the 
developmental course of the individual life-span. Hence, relationships to other people 
during the life-course are seen as strongly determined by early attachment 
experiences, leading to developmental trajectories in positive or negative ways. This 
implicitly leads to individualized understandings of grief experiences, insofar as 
experiences of supportive or unsupportive social networks are seen as strongly 
determined by the individual’s prior attachment experiences. Accordingly, attachment 
theory does not provide a framework for analyzing how cultural conceptions and 
practices related to grief and loss mediate individual grief experiences. Nevertheless, 
Bowlby’s work on the significance of attachment experiences in grief (as well as in 
                                                            
anger, (3), bargaining, (4) depression, and (5), acceptance. Although originally developed as a 
description of individuals’ responses to dying, it has been widely applied as a model to describe 
and understand grief following bereavement as well. 
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mental suffering in general) indisputably represents one of the most influential and 
impressive contributions to contemporary understandings of grief.  
 
However, the sophisticated and nuanced conceptualizations of the relationship 
between attachment and grief experiences in Bowlby’s work have to a large extent 
been “lost in translation” on its journey into clinical and popular understandings. This 
“translation problem” does not only apply to Bowlby’s work, but to a large extent to 
all of the traditional grief theories that depict grief as a series of phases, stages or 
tasks.15 Although not explicitly intended as prescriptive models, and in spite of the 
original authors reservations against interpreting the models too rigidly, once the 
models have travelled into popular culture and clinical practices, these reservations 
have been largely dismissed. Indeed, the models’ appeal seems to be precisely their 
ability to provide a structured and predictable framework for understanding and 
dealing with grief. Hence, the attempted descriptive models have been translated into 
prescriptive norms for healthy grieving, both for individuals trying to deal with their 
grief, for their networks, and for clinicians trying to help grieving individuals 
(Valentine, 2006). However, as bereaved individuals (as well as clinicians and 
researchers in the field of bereavement) have begun to question the implications of 
these models, the models have in turn been modified (e.g., by emphasizing that the 
phases, stages or tasks are not to be understood too rigidly, and by modifying the 
conceptualizations of how the bonds to the deceased are transformed in grieving). In 
other words, as Hacking’s (1995) concept of looping effects suggests, the models’ 
descriptions constantly interact with the ways we normatively understand and deal 
with our grief.  
As argued above, one of the main reasons for the traditional grief models’ large impact 
has probably been their ability to provide a framework for understanding and 
predicting the often terrifying, incomprehensible, and unpredictable experiences of 
grief.  
                                                            
15 Like the phase and stage models of grief, task models of grief (e.g., Worden, 1982) depict 
grief as an individual process of “grief work” that needs to be dealt with in order to resolve 
grief and move on with life. For a brief description of Worden’s and related task models, see 
“From morality to pathology”. By designating the grief work as “tasks”, these models 
emphasize the active and effortful process of grief, as opposed to the implicitly passive 
depiction of grief represented in the concept of phases and stages. However, the difference is 
arguably more on a semantic level than an actual theoretical discrepancy, insofar as the phase 
and stage models also generally describe grief as an active and strenuous process. However, the 
active notion is modified by the assumed predictability of grief, i.e., the assumption that grief 
involves a series of universally applicable stages, phases or tasks which the bereaved individual 
must go through in order to adjust to the loss without pathological outcomes.  
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However, as Tony Walter (1999) has argued, with the “postmodern turn” in Western 
cultures, these very same qualities have been challenged and problematized.16 
Bereaved individuals, as well as researchers and practitioners within bereavement, 
have begun to stress the individual variation of grieving. The grief work hypothesis’ 
emphasis on the necessity to break the bonds with the deceased, and the very idea that 
grief work is necessarily beneficial for all have been challenged. However, in spite of 
this new awareness of the individual variation in grieving, the quest for understanding 
and differentiating between normal and pathological grief has not been abandoned. I 
will now turn to one of the more recent models of bereavement that attempts to take 
into account the individual (and cultural) variation in grief, while simultaneously 
providing a conceptual framework for understanding normal and pathological grief. 
3.1.3. THE DUAL PROCESS MODEL OF COPING WITH BEREAVEMENT 
Margaret Stroebe’s and Henk Schut’s (1999) dual process model of coping with 
bereavement provides a descriptive model of how bereaved individuals cope with loss 
over time in the context of their everyday lives. While the traditional grief models 
described above primarily focus on the emotional management of the loss, Stroebe’s 
and Schut’s model “identifies two types of stressors, loss- and restoration-oriented, 
and a dynamic, regulatory coping process of oscillation, whereby the grieving 
individual at times confronts, at other times avoids, the different tasks of grieving” 
(Ibid., p. 197). The inclusion of restoration oriented processes involves a broadening 
of the scope of the traditional grief work models. In addition to grief work (i.e., 
confrontation with the reality of the loss, transformation of the relationship with the 
deceased, etc.), Stroebe & Schut’s model emphasizes the equally strenuous tasks of 
attending to life changes brought about by bereavement, doing new things, managing 
new roles and identities, etc. 
Inspired by trauma theories, Stroebe & Schut’s model depicts how avoidance and 
intrusion are typical responses to traumatic events. However, while trauma theories 
describe avoidance and intrusion as related to the traumatic event specifically, the dual 
process model sees avoidance and intrusion as responses related to the loss itself as 
well as to the restoration oriented tasks (i.e., whether intruding or voluntarily attended 
to, the efforts involved in coping with the loss requires a provisional avoidance of 
restoration tasks, and vice versa).  
Furthermore, the model is informed by the distinction between emotion focused and 
problem focused coping described in cognitive stress theory. However, the dual 
process model does not equate loss oriented and emotion focused coping, or 
restoration oriented and problem focused coping. In bereavement, Stroebe & Schut 
assert, “emotion itself becomes the stressor” (Ibid., p. 206), and accordingly, dealing 
with distressing emotions (i.e., emotion focused coping) can be done in apparently 
                                                            
16 This argument is outlined in “Grief as a normative phenomenon.” 
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problem focused ways (e.g., by distracting oneself from difficult emotions by 
attending to problems that can be solved). 
While the grief work models emphasize the importance of confrontation with the 
reality of loss, the dual process model stresses that successful coping with loss also 
involves active avoidance of the emotional processes in grief in order to cope with the 
challenges of managing the changed life circumstances after bereavement. Instead of 
viewing avoidance per se as detrimental, Stroebe & Schut argue that maladaptive 
coping can be manifest as excessive avoidance––as well as excessive emotional 
confrontation with the loss. In other words, adaptive coping, they assert, is 
characterized by an ability to “oscillate” flexibly between loss and restoration oriented 
coping, while maladaptive coping involves a skewed focus on one of the two.  
Stroebe & Schut argue that the model can account for personal and cultural variation 
in grief, e.g., women in our culture are typically more loss oriented, while men are 
more restoration oriented, reflecting cultural gender expectations and roles. Likewise, 
they assert, cultural grieving patterns can vary accordingly. Given the assumption that 
flexibility is pivotal for functional coping, it is not entirely clear how the authors 
interpret such variations. With regards to gender differences, they tentatively suggest 
that ”bereaved men and women may indeed follow their gender specific way, to the 
detriment of their health” (Ibid., 218). Whether the same assumption goes for cultures 
as well is not clear (i.e., given that cultural prescriptions favor one type of coping at 
the expense of the other, the outcome would be detrimental to the health of the 
individual grievers in that culture). On the one side, Stroebe & Schut criticize the grief 
work hypothesis for lacking universal application, and stress that “different 
conceptualizations of acceptable or ‘healthy’ ways of coping are to be found in non-
Western cultures” (Ibid., pp. 203-204). In other words, “our” conceptualizations of 
health and normality are not universally applicable. On the other side, they argue that 
“[although] grief is essentially a universal human reaction to loss of a significant other, 
cultural prescriptions impact on the way that grief is manifested” (Ibid., pp. 219-220). 
Here it becomes unclear whether there are, after all, universally healthy ways of 
grieving, that can be supported or suppressed by cultural prescriptions. If the model 
is used merely descriptive, cultural (and individual) variation can be described 
according to the ways cultural prescriptions or individual coping styles vary in terms 
of loss oriented and restoration oriented focus. On the other side, the central (and 
normative) concept of oscillation implies that healthy/functional and 
unhealthy/dysfunctional grief can be universally defined. Indeed, Stroebe & Schut’s 
dual process model is extensively used in research and clinical developments 
regarding pathological grief (see e.g., Lund et al., 2010; Richardson, 2006; Shear et 
al., 2005), which I will turn to now. 
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3.1.4. GRIEF AS A DIAGNOSTIC CATEGORY 
As we have seen, the Freudian grief work hypothesis suggests that unprocessed grief, 
i.e., grief in which the bereaved individual avoids confrontation with the loss, has 
detrimental health consequences. Bowlby’s attachment theory provides a framework 
for understanding how such maladaptive responses occur as a consequence of 
detrimental attachment experiences. Stroebe & Schut’s (1999) dual process model 
challenges the grief work theory by claiming that confrontation as well as avoidance 
are equally necessary, and that pathological grief can be described in terms of 
inflexibility (lack of oscillation) in the grief response. In different ways, all of these 
understandings have shaped and informed the recent suggestions to conceptualize 
grief as a mental disorder. In my first article, “From morality to pathology”, I chart 
some of the developments within modern psychological and psychiatric bereavement 
research that have led to these understandings. Throughout the years, pathological 
grief has been conceptualized as delayed grief, chronic grief, traumatic grief reactions, 
adjustment disorder related to bereavement (this suggestion was withdrawn in the 
final process of the recent DSM revision), etc. In the following, I will briefly outline 
two of the most influential current suggestions to conceptualize pathological grief17 
(Prigerson et al., 2009; Shear, 2012), and how these are represented in the recent 
proposals to introduce a separate diagnosis for complicated or prolonged grief in the 
diagnostic manuals.  
Mirroring the developments within the diagnostic manuals, the proposed diagnoses 
are intended to be based on empirical evidence, independent of theoretical 
frameworks. However, one fundamental premise for the current diagnostic 
understanding of pathological grief is that it represents an individual dysfunction that 
manifests itself through a range of clearly delimited symptoms. The presumed 
dysfunction underlying pathological grief (or any other mental disorder) is yet to be 
discovered. Moreover, the proposals to diagnose certain grief reactions as 
pathological are heavily debated and contested (see e.g., Thieleman & Cacciatore, 
2014; Wakefield, 2012; Walter, 2006). However, at this moment there are good 
reasons to expect that a diagnosis of prolonged grief will be introduced in the next 
version of the ICD system (and, most probably, in some version in the next revision 
of DSM). In spite of the debates and critical objections, there seems to be a growing 
consensus concerning the symptoms of pathological grief among the proponents of a 
grief diagnosis. 
 
The suggestions to introduce a grief diagnosis are based on empirical research that 
argues that pathological grief has distinctive symptoms, etiology and prognosis which 
differ from related disorders such as depressive disorders, posttraumatic stress 
                                                            
17 When addressing these different proposals together, I prefer the term “pathological grief”, 
insofar as all of the suggestions imply that the grief reactions at stake represent a disorder or 
pathology. 
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disorders, and adjustment disorders, as well as from normal grief (Bonanno et al., 
2007; Prigerson et al., 2009). Normal grief is depicted as a process that enables the 
individual to be “re-engaged in daily life, reconnected to others, and able to experience 
hope for a future with potential for joy and satisfaction” (Shear, 2012, p. 121). In 
contrast, complicated or prolonged grief is associated with prolonged and overly 
intense grief symptoms, suicidality, detrimental mental and physical health 
consequences, and reduced quality of life (Prigerson et al., 2009; Shear, 2012). On 
this basis, a grief diagnosis is advocated as a means to prevent, target and treat these 
kinds of debilitating, prolonged and intense grief reactions. 
One of the two suggestions that are currently most supported is developed by Holly 
G. Prigerson and colleagues (Ibid.). The diagnostic criteria put forth by Prigerson and 
colleagues for prolonged grief disorder (hereafter referred to as PGD) include (a) an 
event (bereavement), (b) separation distress, (c) cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
symptoms, (d) timing (min. 6 months after the bereavement), (e) impairment, and (f) 
differential diagnostics (i.e., “[the] disturbance is not better accounted for by major 
depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, or posttraumatic stress disorder” 
(Ibid., p. 9). (For full list of diagnostic criteria, see table 1). 
Another much-supported diagnostic suggestion is developed by Katherine Shear and 
her research group, who suggests a range of similar criteria for complicated grief (CG; 
see table 2). Like Prigerson and colleagues, Shear’s proposed criteria for complicated 
grief stress the duration (min. 6 months since the loss) and intensity of the suggested 
symptoms criteria. Both suggestions describe symptoms of separation distress; 
difficulty accepting the loss, avoidance of reminders of the loss (in complicated grief: 
avoidance and/or proximity seeking); inability to trust others since the; bitterness or 
anger related to the death; difficulty moving on with life; feeling that life is 
unfulfilling, empty, or meaningless since the loss, and feeling stunned, dazed, 
shocked, or numbed since the loss. 
While PGD lists confusion about one’s role in life or diminished sense of self (i.e., 
feeling that a part of oneself has died) as the first on the list of emotional, cognitive 
and behavioral symptoms, such symptoms are not described in CG. On the other hand, 
CG describe symptoms of rumination about circumstances or consequences of the 
death; experiencing pain or other symptoms that the deceased person had, or hearing 
the voice or seeing the deceased person; experiencing intense emotional or 
physiological reactivity to memories of the person who died or to reminders of the 
loss. Finally, while PGD describe relations to other mental disorders, CG presupposes 
that “impairment is not better explained as a culturally appropriate response.”  
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Category Definition 
A. Event: Bereavement (loss of a significant 
other) 
B. 
 
Separation distress: The bereaved person 
experiences yearning (e.g., craving, pining, 
or longing for the deceased; physical or 
emotional suffering as a result of the desired, 
but unfulfilled, reunion with the deceased) 
daily or to a disabling degree. 
C. Cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
symptoms: The bereaved person must have 
five (or more) of the following symptoms 
experienced daily or to a disabling degree: 
1. Confusion about one’s role in life or a 
diminished sense of self (i.e., feeling 
that a part of oneself has died) 
2. Difficulty accepting the loss 
3. Avoidance of reminders of the reality 
of the loss 
4. Inability to trust others since the loss 
5. Bitterness or anger related to the loss 
6. Difficulty moving on with life (e.g., 
making new friends, pursuing 
interests) 
7. Numbness (absence of emotions since 
the loss) 
8. Feeling that life is unfulfilling, empty, 
or meaningless since the loss 
9. Feeling stunned, dazed, or shocked by 
the loss 
D. Timing: Diagnosis should not be made until 
at least six months have elapsed since the 
death. 
E. Impairment: The disturbance causes 
clinically significant impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of 
functioning (e.g., domestic responsibilities). 
F. Relation to other mental disorders: The 
disturbance is not better accounted for by 
major depressive disorder, generalized 
anxiety disorder, or posttraumatic stress 
disorder. 
Table 1. “Criteria for prolonged grief disorder proposed for DSM-V and ICD-11” (Prigerson 
et al., 2009, p. 9). 
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1. The person has been bereaved, i.e., experienced the death of a loved one, for at 
least 6 months 
2. At least one of the following symptoms of persistent intense acute grief has been 
present for a period longer than is expected by others in the person’s social or 
cultural environment: 
• Persistent intense yearning or longing for the person who died 
• Frequent intense feelings of loneliness or like life is empty or meaningless 
without the person who died 
• Recurrent thoughts that it is unfair, meaningless or unbearable to have to 
live when a loved one has died, or a recurrent urge to die in order to find or 
to join the deceased 
• Frequent preoccupying thoughts about the person who died, e.g., thoughts or 
images of the person intrude on usual activities or interfere with functioning 
3. At least 2 of the following symptoms are present for at least 1 month: 
• Frequent troubling rumination about circumstances or consequences of the 
death, e.g., concerns about how or why the person died, or about not being 
able to manage without their loved one, thoughts of having let the deceased 
person down, etc. 
• Recurrent feeling of disbelief or inability to accept the death, like the person 
can’t believe or accept that their loved one is really gone 
• Persistent feeling of being shocked, stunned, dazed, or emotionally numb 
since the death 
• Recurrent feelings of anger or bitterness related to the death 
• Persistent difficulty trusting or caring about other people or feeling intensely 
envious of others who haven’t experienced a similar loss 
• Frequently experiencing pain or other symptoms that the deceased person 
had, or hearing the voice or seeing the deceased person 
• Experiencing intense emotional or physiological reactivity to memories of 
the person who died or to reminders of the loss 
• Change in behavior due to excessive avoidance or the opposite, excessive 
proximity seeking, e.g, refraining from going places, doing things, or having 
contact with things that are reminders of the loss, or feeling drawn to 
reminders of the person, such as wanting to see, touch, hear, or smell things 
to feel close to the person who died. (Note: sometimes people experience 
both of these seemingly contradictory symptoms.) 
4. The duration of symptoms and impairment is at least 1 month 
5. The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational or other important areas of functioning, where impairment is not 
better explained as a culturally appropriate response 
Table 2. “Proposed criteria for complicated grief” (Shear, 2012, p. 124). 
In spite of these differences, the two suggestions are in agreement on central issues 
concerning the duration, intensity, and core symptoms of prolonged or complicated 
grief. Both proposals suggest that intense longing and yearning, and/or preoccupation 
with the deceased or with the circumstances of the loss that lasts for more than six 
months after the loss indicates pathology, provided that it is associated with clinically 
significant distress or impairment. While DSM-5’s category of persistent complex 
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bereavement disorder sets the duration criterion to twelve months, the current 
diagnostic proposal for prolonged grief disorder in the ICD-11 Beta Draft follow 
Prigerson et al.’s and Shear’s six months’ duration criterion (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013; World Health Organization, 2016). 
Drawing on Prigerson et al.’s and Shear’s proposals, WHO currently suggest the 
following criteria for prolonged grief disorder, which is expected to be introduced in 
ICD-11 (scheduled for release in 2018):  
“Prolonged grief disorder is a disturbance in which, following the death of 
a partner, parent, child, or other person close to the bereaved, there is 
persistent and pervasive grief response characterized by longing for the 
deceased or persistent preoccupation with the deceased accompanied by 
intense emotional pain (e.g. sadness, guilt, anger, denial, blame, difficulty 
accepting the death, feeling one has lost a part of one’s self, an inability to 
experience positive mood, emotional numbness, difficulty in engaging 
with social or other activities). The grief response has persisted for an 
atypically long period of time following the loss (more than 6 months at a 
minimum) and clearly exceeds expected social, cultural or religious norms 
for the individual’s culture and context. Grief reactions that have persisted 
for longer periods that are within a normative period of grieving given the 
person’s cultural and religious context are viewed as normal bereavement 
responses and are not assigned a diagnosis. The disturbance causes 
significant impairment in personal, family, social, educational, 
occupational or other important areas of functioning” (World Health 
Organization, 2016). 
 
3.1.5. CRITICISM OF THE GRIEF DIAGNOSES 
Although it is expected at this point that the diagnosis will be introduced in ICD-11, 
the suggestions have been met with critique and objections to what some see as an 
illegitimate pathologization of grief. For example, Jerome Wakefield (2012) has 
critically examined the arguments for introducing a diagnosis of prolonged or 
complicated grief in the diagnostic manuals. While acknowledging the basic 
assumption that grief reactions can indeed represent a mental disorder or dysfunction, 
Wakefield argue that the current suggestions “fail to discriminate disorder from 
intense normal grief and are likely to yield massive false-positive diagnoses” (Ibid., 
p. 499). Wakefield argues that there are no qualitative differences between normal 
grief and the current criteria for complicated or prolonged grief. Moreover, he argues, 
the diagnostic suggestions cannot distinguish between slow/long-lasting, but normal 
grief and asserted chronic cases of grief. Furthermore, he emphasizes that negative 
outcomes do not logically imply earlier pathology. For example, he argues, although 
bad marriages can have detrimental health consequences, this does not imply that bad 
marriages represent a mental disorder. Confusing risk management with treatment of 
CHAPTER 3. MODELS AND THEORIES OF GRIEF 
 
 41 
disorders, he argues, leads to pathologization of life’s difficulties (Ibid., p. 507). 
Furthermore, he scrutinizes the often-asserted comparison of grief to a physical 
wound (i.e., the assumption that just as the healing of a wound can be complicated, so 
can grief). However, Wakefield argue, 
“a broken arm is not merely a consequence of an injury, it is itself an 
injury, and it is not a biologically designed response and has no 
biologically designed function. In contrast, grief is a biologically designed 
emotional response to an altered mental structure. The pain one feels as a 
result of an injury, for example, is not a disorder and is an adaptive part of 
the overall healing process. Grief is more analogous to that pain than to 
the injury itself” (Ibid., p. 509). 
Kara Thieleman and Joanne Cacciatore (2014) have critically analyzed the 
implications of the diagnostic proposals with focus on bereaved parent (and other 
traumatically bereaved groups). Instead of accepting the validity of the high 
prevalence rates of complicated grief reactions among bereaved parents, they refer to 
a rich body of literature that demonstrates the long-lasting nature of parental grief. 
Hence, they argue, instead of being especially at risk for pathological grief, bereaved 
parents’ normally long-lasting and intense grief is especially vulnerable to 
pathologization and medicalization. 
Although not directly addressing the consequences of a grief diagnosis, Emma L. 
Penman, Lauren J. Breen, Lauren Y. Hewitt and Holly G. Prigerson’s (2014) study of 
public attitudes to normal and pathological grief also touches upon how individual 
grief experiences are likely to be affected by public norms. Based on a sample of 348 
participants from different countries (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, 
United States, Canada, Finland, Norway, Indonesia, Turkey, and Iran), they found a 
pervasive expectation of grief to decline steadily between 2 weeks and 6 months, 
regardless of the circumstances of the loss (p. 510). The authors argue that, due to the 
pervasiveness of these expectations, “it is expected that bereaved people may 
internalize these norms, shaping their perceptions of how well they are coping and 
their overall experience of grief” (Ibid., p. 514). Based on these findings, it is 
expectable that a grief diagnosis will reinforce the public expectations of grief as a 
relatively transient state. This, in turn, is likely to contribute to pathologization and 
self-pathologization of bereaved individuals whose grief does not fit the expectations 
of a steady decline within the first months after bereavement. 
Tony Walter (2006) offers a social constructionist perspective of complicated grief as 
a multi-faceted and socially negotiated phenomenon. By outlining a range of 
“apparently competing, but perhaps ultimately complementary” (p. 71) perspectives 
on complicated grief, he challenges the assumption that complicated grief is (merely) 
an individual disorder. Instead, he asserts, complicated grief may also be 
conceptualized as a psychiatric construct developed to distinguish between normality 
and pathology; a necessary tool for bereavement agencies etc.; a disciplining concept, 
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a label applied to those who resist cultural norms about grief; a product of 
contemporary “risk society”; and ultimately, a result of negotiations between different 
interests in the bereavement field (Ibid.). Accordingly, he argues,  
“the roots of complicated grief lie not just in the individual mourner’s 
psyche, but also in the concern of family and friends to reduce suffering, 
to get the mourner back to autonomy and happiness, to reduce their own 
inconvenience and worry, to replace chaos and guilt with order and 
predictability. Without such concern, there would be no concept of 
complicated grief” (Ibid., p. 78). 
Hence, Walter points to how the experience of grief is radically socially situated––a 
perspective that has yielded a line of research that challenges the traditional models 
of grief as well as the attempts to establish universal criteria for normal and 
pathological grief reactions in individuals. In the following, I will briefly outline some 
of these perspectives, and address how these perspectives conceptualize and 
understand the suffering involved in grief. 
3.2. GRIEF AS A SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND RELATIONAL 
PHENOMENON 
Over the last decades, a range of studies has challenged the 20th Century’s positivist, 
individualized and medicalized approaches to grief (see e.g., Averill & Nunley, 2006; 
Bradbury, 1999; Charmaz & Milligan, 2006; Granek, 2010; Jakoby, 2012; Valentine, 
2008; Walter, 1996, 1999). As a part of the asserted “quiet revolution” within death 
and bereavement research (Bradbury, 1999), these studies have analyzed grief as a 
socially, culturally, materially and historically embedded. Two prominent and 
interrelated themes have emerged from these studies: examinations of bereaved 
individuals’ continuing bonds to the deceased, and examinations of the social and 
intersubjective processes of grief. Both lines of research pose a range of challenges to 
the traditional grief models, e.g., the assumptions that grief resolution must involve 
detachment from the deceased, and that grief is a universal emotional reaction of the 
individual mourner. 
3.2.1. CONTINUING BONDS 
As we have seen, the traditional grief work models stressed that successful grieving 
involves a painful, but necessary process of breaking the bonds to the deceased loved 
one. Attempts to “hold on” to the deceased, and experiences such as sensing the 
presence of the deceased have been depicted as symptoms of acute grief, or as signs 
of pathology (Lindemann, 1963; Gorer, 1965, Marris, 1958). However, in personal 
writing, Freud himself actually challenged this presumption. In a letter to his friend 
Ludwig Binswanger, who like Freud himself had lost a child, Freud wrote,  
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“Although we know that after such a loss the acute state of mourning will 
subside, we also know we shall remain inconsolable and will never find a 
substitute. No matter what may fill the gap, even if it be filled completely, 
it nevertheless remains something else. And actually this is how it should 
be. It is the only way of perpetuating that love which we do not want to 
relinquish” (Freud, 1992, p. 386). 
Likewise, although Bowlby’s (1980) phase model of grief describes detachment from 
the bereaved loved one as a precondition for resolving grief, he also stressed that,  
“half or more of widows and widowers reach a state of mind in which they 
retain a strong sense of the continuing presence of their partner without the 
turmoils of hope and disappointment, search and frustration, anger and 
blame that are present earlier” (p. 96). 
Moreover, Bowlby underlines that this sense of presence, unlike “most of the other 
components of the early phases of mourning” tends to “persist at its original intensity,” 
and that most bereaved individuals find it comforting (Ibid.). 
This emphasis on the commonality and potentially comforting aspects of continuing 
bonds has been taken up in a range of studies on grief throughout the last decades. 
Most prominently, the concept of continuing bonds has been elaborated in the work 
of Dennis Klass and his colleagues (see e.g., Klass, 1993a; Klass, Silverman & 
Nickman, 1996). In his ethnographic work on parental bereavement, Klass (1988, 
1993a, 1993b, 1999) demonstrates that the parents in his study regularly continue a 
relationship with their dead children. The parental narratives he has collected includes 
experiences of sensing the dead child’s presence, hallucinations, and feelings that the 
dead child still has an active influence in the parents’ and families’ continuing lives. 
Rather than interpreting these experiences as abnormal and detrimental to parental 
health and well-being, Klass and his colleagues suggest that the continuation of bonds 
to the deceased are common and often treasured experiences in grief that can be 
helpful in the process of adjusting to the loss.  
Ironically, just like the original authors of the traditional grief models were translated 
into clinical practice and popular culture as prescriptive models of bereavement, 
Klass’ and his colleagues’ model has been subject to the same kind of translation. As 
the concept of continuing bonds has been applied in empirical research and clinical 
practice, Klass et al.’s attempts to describe and demonstrate how bereaved individuals 
continue bonds to the deceased have been interpreted as a causal explanation of 
“healthy adjustment”, and hence, as a goal for bereavement interventions (Klass, 
2006, p. 844). However, Klass stresses that continuing bonds is not a matter of bonds 
being present or absent, as the quality of these bonds can vary in multiple ways. When 
initially introducing the concept, Klass and his colleagues were writing against a 
predominant belief that continuation of bonds was inherently harmful. However, in 
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their attempts to demonstrate that it is a common and potentially helpful phenomenon 
in grief, their findings have been interpreted as if this is always the case. 
Moreover, Klass argues, the possible benefits of continuing bonds are not exclusively 
dependent on the bereaved individual’s isolated relationship to the deceased, but also 
on whether these bonds are acknowledged and reinforced within the family and the 
wider cultural practices. While the clinical use of continuing bonds has been prone to 
individualize the phenomenon, Klass emphasizes that it is crucial to “include the 
cultural narratives in which conversations with both the living and the dead are set” 
(Ibid., p. 852). 
The concept of continuing bonds has been widely applied in studies on parental 
bereavement within the last decades (see e.g., Riches & Dawson, 1998; Rosenblatt, 
2000; Talbot, 2002). It has also led to revisions within the traditional grief models’ 
understandings of the process of transforming the relationship to the deceased (see 
e.g., Worden, 2008, pp. 50-53). In the next chapter, I will outline how the concept of 
continuing bonds have been applied in qualitative studies on parental grief after infant 
loss, and address how my own findings relate to the findings in these studies. 
3.2.2. GRIEF AS A CULTURAL PHENOMENON 
As described in the introduction to this chapter, within the last decades, several voices 
within the field of bereavement studies have challenged the medical and 
individualized perspectives on grief. For example, Mary Bradbury (1999) has argued 
that the medical model’s implicit conceptions of the mind as an asocial entity and of 
cultures as “poorly defined variables” (p. 171) provides little hope for understanding 
“the profound nature of loss” (Ibid.). The new interest in death and bereavement 
within the social sciences has revealed a tension within the 20th century’s bereavement 
literature between the psychologized and medicalized grief of modern Westerners, 
represented in the psychological and psychiatric bereavement literature, and the 
exoticized and romanticized mourning practices of pre-modern and non-Western 
others (Hockey, 1996; Valentine, 2008; Walter, 1999). Challenging this presumption 
of grief as an a-historical and pre-cultural psychological process, Walter (1999) has 
drawn attention to how the very notion of “the grief process”, developed within 
psychology and psychiatry, shapes bereavement practices in contemporary Western 
grief culture. 
Likewise, Robert A. Neimeyer, Dennis Klass & Michael Robert Dennis (2014) 
position their work “[in] contrast to dominant Western conceptions of bereavement in 
largely intrapsychic terms” (p. 485). In line with the perspective in this thesis, 
Neimeyer and his colleagues stress the intrinsically social and relational character of 
grieving, “as the bereaved commonly seek meaning (…) in not only personal and 
familial, but also broader community and even cultural spheres” (Ibid.). Mourning, 
they assert, “is a situated interpretive and communicative activity charged with 
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establishing the meaning of the deceased’s life and death, as well as the postdeath 
status of the bereaved within the broader community concerned with the loss” (Ibid.). 
Building on these assumptions, Neimeyer et al. advocate a social constructionist 
approach to grief that conceives of grieving as a relational process of narrative 
meaning making.  
Furthermore, Neimeyer et al. briefly address how “contemporary psychotherapeutic 
culture” is prone to pathologize “those who are seen as grieving too much (prolonged 
or chronic grief), at the wrong time (delayed grief), or not at all (absent grief)”. (Ibid., 
p. 493). Rather than exploring or elaborating on the multiple ways bereaved 
individuals may use, negotiate, interpret, and contest such understandings, the authors 
assert that the bereaved individual must “conform to, or actively resist, the dominant 
cultural narratives that script the ‘proper’ performance of grief in a manner coherent 
with the prevailing social order” (Ibid., p. 496). It is a bit unclear how they conceive 
of grieving individuals’ possibilities to reflectively relate to, draw upon, and negotiate 
such dominating narratives, but the latter quote suggests a rather strong social shaping 
of bereavement experiences towards maintaining social order.   
In contrast, Christine Valentine (2008) draws attention to “the way people use 
available cultural scripts to construct and express meanings that are particular and 
personal to them” (Ibid., p. 2). In line with the present study, Valentine emphasizes 
the multiple and highly individual ways bereaved individuals mediate their loss 
experiences through available cultural scripts. Drawing on narrative analyses of 
interviews with bereaved individuals in contemporary British society, her work 
carefully examines the social, intersubjective, and negotiated nature of death and 
bereavement experiences. By exploring how deceased loved ones “may retain a 
significant social presence in the life of survivors” (Ibid., p. 1), Valentine situates grief 
within relationships to the lost loved ones, to the bereaved individuals’ social realities, 
as well as to the intersubjective context of the research situation. Her analyses embrace 
the experiences of the loved ones’ dying, as well as of grieving the loss following 
bereavement. In the context of dying, she examines how discourses of medicalization 
are used and contested in highly individual ways, that “could be both supportive of 
human value and dignity as well as dehumanizing” (Ibid., p. 22). Likewise, her study 
emphasizes the diversity in peoples’ interpretations of their experiences of loss, as 
well as the situated character of bereavement, insofar as grief constantly “interacts 
with other agendas and priorities to form part of their day to day social life and sense 
of identity” (Ibid., p. 15). Valentine also addresses how competing discourses are 
involved in the social negotiations of grief, e.g. when grieving individuals’ enduring 
distress and preoccupation with the deceased invoke a competing discourse of ‘letting 
go’ (Ibid., p. 107). Although medicalization and pathologization of grief is not a 
prevalent theme in her analyses of the loss narratives, such observations do indeed 
inform us about how contemporary understandings of grief mediate bereavement 
experiences. 
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3.3. SUMMARY 
The growing critique of the traditional grief models has led in at least two directions. 
Stroebe & Schut’s (1999) dual process model of bereavement maintains a universal 
frame for grieving, but does so by broadening the scope of the traditional grief models 
and by allowing for more individual and cultural variation of grief. However, although 
allowing for more variation than the traditional models, their concept of oscillation 
nevertheless implies a universalist model for healthy and functional grief. Other 
perspectives abandon the search for universal mechanisms altogether, and analyze 
grief as a radically situated phenomenon, i.e., the experiences of grief are not only 
affected by the relational circumstances of grief, but intrinsically embedded and 
created in and through these circumstances.  
 
In spite of the growing critique of the universalist and individualized presuppositions 
within traditional bereavement research, the search for a universal model of normal 
versus pathological grief has recently emerged as the most prominent theme within 
contemporary bereavement research. This is most evident in the recent developments 
within the diagnostic manuals. In the recent revision of the DSM, the proposed 
diagnosis of “persistent complex bereavement disorder” was included in section III as 
a condition for further studies. This happened after much debate. At the moment, it is 
expected that prolonged grief disorder will be included in the forthcoming revision of 
WHO’s diagnostic manual, the ICD-11, due in 2018. Controversies concerning grief 
as a potential individual mental disorder persists, not the least when it comes to 
bereaved parents. One question is whether it is valid to infer a concept of health and 
functionality from a statistical normality, i.e., even though most people will 
experience a decline within the first six months in the symptoms described in the 
diagnostic proposals, this does not necessarily imply that symptoms lasting longer 
indicate pathology. Instead, as Wakefield (2012) has argued, it might simply mean 
that people who experience more symptoms are dealing with more complex losses, 
more complex circumstances, or other aspects that may involve a more intense and 
lasting grief response (personality, prior loss experiences, cultural differences, etc.). 
As Breen & O’Connor (2007) argue, “[we] need to emphasize that what is a 
description of a bereaved individual or sample is not necessarily a prescription for 
others” (p. 208). However, as this review has demonstrated, attempts to avoid such a 
Humean fallacy of moving from “is” to “ought” has repeatedly failed throughout the 
history of bereavement research. Informed by the cultural psychological outlook of 
this thesis, this is not surprising. Knowledge about human kinds is intrinsically 
normative, and, as Hacking (1995) demonstrates, we cannot describe human 
functioning without implying normativity, and without interacting with the normative 
practices and interpretations of human beings in their everyday lives.  
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CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE REVIEW: 
QUALITATIVE STUDIES OF PARENTAL 
GRIEF AFTER INFANT LOSS 
In spite of a proliferating literature on parental grief after infant loss, literature that 
explicitly address the relationship between individual grief experiences and societal 
expectations and norms about grief is limited. Studies that do address this relationship 
tend to do so in ways that imply a causal relationship between external factors and 
individual reactions, for example by examining the impact of social support on 
individual grief reactions (see e.g., Hutti, 2005; Lasker & Toedter, 1991; Thuen, 
1997). Considering the rich body of literature on complicated or prolonged grief 
reactions in bereaved parents, as well as the general proliferation of studies examining 
parental grief experiences, research on how bereaved individuals experience, use, and 
negotiate culturally distributed notions of grief is notably sparse. It is widely 
acknowledged that parental bereavement is associated with long-lasting and pervasive 
grief reactions (Bowlby, 1980; Keese, Currier & Neimeyer, 2008; Klass, 1988, 1999; 
Rando, 1985; Rogers et al., 2008; Rosenblatt, 2000). Likewise, a growing body of 
literature documents high levels of complicated grief reactions among bereaved 
parents (Dyregrov, Nordanger & Dyregrov, 2003; Kersting et al., 2011; Zetumer et 
al., 2015). On this background, bereaved parents are arguably among the groups most 
likely to be affected by the “diagnostic gaze” (Rose, 2006, p. 475) on grief, regardless 
of whether they meet the criteria for a specific grief diagnosis or not. Strikingly, 
however, remarkably few studies have examined how bereaved parents experience, 
use, and negotiate cultural notions of grief as a pathological and medical phenomenon. 
To illustrate, a search in APA PsychNET on a combination of “grief”, different words 
related to medicalization or pathologization (separated with “or” to include any 
version used in the text) and “parents” or “parental” (appearing in any field, published 
any year) generate three results, one of which is my own article “Grief as a border 
diagnosis” (Kofod, 2015), one article on raising kids with problems (Francis, 2009), 
and one article which critically examines professional interventions for traumatically 
bereaved populations (Dyregrov, 2004b). By modifying the search and repeating the 
search process in other databases, a few more studies appear, of which a couple are 
included in the present review (Malacrida, 1998; McCreight, 2008).  
 
While the literature on bereaved parents’ experiences of pathologization and 
medicalization is limited, a line of qualitative studies on parental grief after infant 
death has provided rich accounts of how cultural conceptions of infant loss shape 
bereavement experiences. As I have argued in chapter 1, cultural conceptions about 
loss are inherently connected to conceptions about grief, insofar as cultural 
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understandings of loss feed into the cultural understandings of which losses that are 
legitimate to grieve. 
 
In the following, I will create an overview over some of the most relevant qualitative 
studies of parental bereavement experiences that include the experiences of societal 
norms and practices in individual grief. I choose to include research that implicitly or 
explicitly addresses how bereaved parents experience, interpret and deal with the loss 
of a child in light of societal norms and expectations. Consequentially, studies that 
focus on the “effects” of e.g. bereavement interventions, social support, marital 
intimacy, etc. on individual “outcome” of bereavement are omitted from the review. 
This is because I am not primarily interested in the symptoms of grief as isolated 
consequences of loss, but in how bereaved parents interpret, experience and act in 
relation to loss. Furthermore, studies that exclusively focus on parental experiences 
of health care professionals’ attitudes and models of care in the medical situation are 
also omitted, unless these experiences are situated within a wider context of the 
parents’ everyday lives. With this in mind, the included studies are assessed by the 
extent to which they situate individual grief experiences within the social reality of 
the bereaved individuals; how they analyze the relations between individual grief and 
e.g. family values, socio-cultural practices and expectations, etc., and to which extent 
they address the ways in which bereaved individuals use, negotiate and contest the 
understandings of bereavement represented in the professional and lay accounts of 
bereavement in general, or the diagnostic understandings in particular. 
 
The studies have been found through repeated searches on databases such as 
Psychinfo, The Danish National Research Database, Google Scholar, ProQuest, and 
EBSCOhost. The process of searching and reading literature has been an integrated 
and continuous part of my entire research process. This process is best described as 
an iterative hermeneutic process, in which my research interests, developing data, 
literature searches, reading, analyzing, and writing has simultaneously informed and 
directed each other (Boell & Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2010). Accordingly, the present 
relatively narrow review of qualitative studies of (situated) parental bereavement 
experiences following infant loss has emerged from a much broader, messier, and 
long-stretched process of orienting myself within the overwhelmingly huge body of 
literature on death and bereavement in general, and parental experiences of infant loss 
in particular. To target studies for the present review, I have read through a huge 
amount of qualitative studies on parental bereavement experiences, directed my 
attention to studies that focus on the situated character of grief experiences, followed 
references and citations that have led me to further studies, and so forth. Through a 
hermeneutic circle, the reading of specific studies has informed my understanding of 
the body of literature as well as my own data, which in turn has guided the scope of 
my literature searches, and vice versa, until I have reached a provisional level of 
saturation. In the following, I limit myself to present prevalent themes within the 
literature on perinatal loss and parental grief, with focus on studies that relate to my 
own findings in this thesis. The aim is not to present a fully exhaustive overview over 
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the complete literature on parental bereavement experiences, but rather to reflect some 
of the main themes within the literature of particular relevance to the present study18. 
Hereby, my aim is to position my own work within the existing literature, and to 
outline how the present study contributes to the literature on parental grief after infant 
loss. 
 
4.1. AMBIGUOUS LOSS AND DISENFRANCHISED GRIEF 
Several studies have explored how ambiguity and/or disenfranchisement mediate 
parental grief experiences following infant loss (Cacciatore, DeFrain & Jones, 2008; 
Golan, Leichtentritt & Ronit, 2016; Lang et al., 2011; McCreight, 2008; Sawicka, 
2016). In a retrospective analysis of anonymous data collected by two bereavement 
organizations, Joanne Cacciatore19, John DeFrain & Kara L. C. Jones (2008) explore 
how the loss of a stillborn baby is experienced by the parents and their families as an 
ambiguous loss. Moreover, they assert that grieving such losses are shaped by a social 
environment that rarely legitimizes such losses as real loss (Ibid., p. 440). On this 
background, they describe how families’ grief following stillbirth may involve years 
of struggling to find answers to inherently unanswerable, existential questions raised 
by the loss (e.g., “Why did our baby die?”; “Did I contribute to the death of my baby?”, 
”Can good be found in the midst of such tragedy?”, etc.). Rather than addressing such 
questions as “tasks” that can be completed and solved, Cacciatore et al. draw upon 
Pauline Boss’ (1999) conceptual framework of “ambiguous loss” to highlight how 
“[the] death of a baby is a horrendous event that generates an endless cascade of 
profound and essentially impossible questions” (Cacciatore et al., 2008, p. 453). The 
authors stress the ambiguity as inherent in “the experience of the baby’s physical 
absence and psychological presence” (Ibid., p. 451). While any grief following death 
arguably involves such coexisting experiences of physical absence and psychological 
presence, the authors stress that the lack of social acknowledgement of stillbirth as a 
real loss adds to the complexity of the grief. However, instead of interpreting this 
complexity as pathological reactions, Cacciatore et al. advocates a perspective on 
parental grief after stillbirth and infant loss that embraces “the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of ambiguous loss” (Ibid., p. 444). 
 
In a longitudinal interview study with 13 bereaved couples at 2, 6, and 13 months 
following the death of an unborn child or infant, the Canadian bereavement researcher 
and nurse scientist Ariella Lang and her colleagues (2011) “explore sources of 
ambiguity and disenfranchised grief related to perinatal loss” (p. 183). The majority 
of the parents in their study had lost children during pregnancy (mean gestational age 
                                                            
18 A schematic overview of the studies is presented by the end of the chapter. 
19 Joanne Cacciatore is, beyond being a professor in psychology and a much-cited researcher 
on perinatal bereavement, also the founder of the MISS Foundation, an American NGO for 
bereaved parents after infant loss, and a bereaved mother herself. 
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17 weeks); one child died shortly after birth, and one died 3 weeks old while still in 
hospital. Lang et al. identify different sources of ambiguity and disenfranchisement 
emerging from the bereaved parents’ encounters with family, friends, society, and 
health care professionals (Ibid.). Like Cacciatore et al., they draw on Boss’ framework 
of ambiguous loss to designate “the concurrent physical absence and psychological 
presence” (Ibid., 184) characteristic for perinatal losses, as well as Kenneth Doka’s 
(1989) concept of disenfranchised grief, i.e., the experience of loss that is “not openly 
acknowledged, publicly mourned or socially supported” (p. 4). A prevalent theme 
among the parents in their study is the experience of insufficient information, support 
and acknowledgment of the loss from the health care professionals during the course 
of the loss. This relates to the physical process of loss as well as to how to make 
“arrangements for the remains” (Lang et al., 2011, p. 189). Also, the parents’ sense of 
ambiguous loss involved difficulties related to telling other people about the loss, due 
to uncertainty concerning the meanings and significance of the loss, their role as 
parents, etc. (Ibid., p. 190). This, again, is related to their experiences of 
disenfranchisement, in the sense that health care professionals, family, friends, and 
society at large are perceived as not acknowledging the loss. Under these 
circumstances, the parents grieve in private, “in keeping with the perceived social 
norms that undermine the expression of grief surrounding perinatal loss” (Ibid., p. 
192).  
 
In her book Mourning the Dreams: How Parents Create Meaning from Miscarriage, 
Stillbirth, and Early Infant Death, the Canadian psychologist Claudia Malacrida 
(1998) explores “the connection between private loss and other dimensions of human 
life such as public acknowledgement, social support and prevailing social norms” (p. 
viii). Her data are based on personal experiences with perinatal loss, participant 
observations in a support group for parents after perinatal loss, focus group interviews, 
personal writing, and, most prominently, in-depth interviews with 25 bereaved parents 
following perinatal loss. Informed by Therese Rando’s conceptual framework for 
complicated mourning, Malacrida argues that parental loss experiences after perinatal 
loss may often be complicated, not as an effect of complications within the mourner, 
but rather because of “some circumstances of death and some postdeath variables that 
in and of themselves complicate mourning regardless of the premorbid psychological 
health of the mourner” (Rando, 1992, p. 44). Grief after perinatal loss, Malacrida 
(1998) asserts, is complicated by a range of interrelated personal, relational, and social 
factors, such as cultural values of parenthood, lack of social recognition of early infant 
loss, and lack of well-established mourning practices and rituals in relation to these 
losses (Ibid., pp. 5-6). Malacrida describes how cultural conceptions of pathological 
grief may indeed complicate the mourning, as when expressions of grief are “deemed 
pathological” instead of being met with support (p. 68). In other words, rather than 
facilitating support, other people’s interpretations of the grief as pathological adds to 
the grieving individual’s feeling of isolation and lack of understanding, and hence 
“can make grief resolution very difficult” (Ibid.). In general, Malacrida’s analysis 
amounts to a cultural critique of how social and cultural practices and beliefs work 
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against the individual mourner’s attempts to come to terms with his or her loss (Ibid., 
p. 104). 
In a qualitative study of women’s experiences of perinatal loss in Northern Ireland, 
the sociologist Bernadette S. McCreight (2008) explores emotional responses to loss 
and care received from the hospital staff. Based on narrative analyses of interviews 
with 23 women participating in pregnancy loss self-help groups, McCreight highlight 
how the women create spaces of resistance against medicalization and 
disenfranchisement by participating in these self-help groups. While the medical 
profession, family and wider community are described as devaluing the loss and 
disallowing the women’s grief, the mutual help groups are portrayed as providing a 
space for embracing and giving meaning to the emotional turmoil of perinatal loss. 
How parents may actively position themselves as bereaved parents after pregnancy 
loss and early infant death is examined in detail in the American anthropologist Linda 
Layne’s (2000) ethnographic work on pregnancy loss and early infant death in 
contemporary American culture. Focusing primarily on mothers’ experiences, Layne 
argues that women who experience such losses are “caught in the middle of two 
contradictory sets of cultural forces – the increasingly important role of the fetus in 
the public imaginary, and a deep-seated cultural taboo concerning pregnancy loss” (p. 
322). Layne explores how members of pregnancy loss support groups “actively 
construct their babies-to-be and would-have-been babies as ‘real babies’ and 
themselves as ‘real mothers’, worthy of the social recognition this role entails” (Ibid.). 
Such positioning, of course, needs to be understood on the background of the 
intangible and culturally contested nature of such losses.  Echoing the themes of 
ambiguous loss and disenfranchisement in the above-mentioned studies, Layne 
describes these losses as characterized by a “realness problem” (Ibid., p. 323). 
Furthermore, she describes how the bereaved mothers, mediated by material artefacts 
such as pictures, baby toys, etc., navigate between reinforcing and challenging cultural 
constructions of babies and parenthood. On the one hand, they accept and reproduce 
“dominant cultural constructions of babies as precious”, of parenthood as a desirable 
life trajectory, and of “possessive individualism”, insofar as the possession of baby 
things serve as a “powerful proof that ‘a baby’ existed” (Ibid., p. 339). On the other 
hand, by insisting on the right to define their dead babies as “real babies” and 
themselves as “real parents”, they “challenge prevailing notions as to what qualifies 
for inclusion in this narrative structure” (Ibid.).  
A recent study by the Polish sociologist Maja Sawicka (2016) also identifies how 
perinatal loss is socially disenfranchised, ambiguous, and “disembedded” (p. 1). 
However, based on content analysis of online communities for bereaved parents and 
interviews with the moderators of these communities, Sawicka’s study also addresses 
how participation in such communities may lead to “the creation of local definitions 
of the situation of loss and formation of subcultural feeling and display rules of grief 
(…) that agents use to transform the existing emotional culture of grief” (Ibid.). 
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Hence, her study challenges the conception of disenfranchisement as a static cultural 
condition which bereaved individuals are passively repressed by. Instead, her study 
demonstrates how bereaved individuals collectively may resist disenfranchisement by 
negotiating and challenging the normative interpretations and practices surrounding 
grief. 
Summed up, most of the above-mentioned studies emphasize how the lack of societal 
recognition of early infant loss may lead to experiences of ambiguity and 
disenfranchised grief. However, as Leslie A. Grout and Bronna D. Romanoff (2000) 
point out, the very brevity of these children’s existence may in itself add to the 
conflictual experience of reality and unreality of the loss––here expressed by a 
bereaved father:  
“It's always hard for us, for me to deal with it because on the one hand she 
was a living being, she was our daughter. I certainly bonded with her, the 
minute I saw her and held her. But on the other hand... she never lived 
really. She only lived to die. She lived while she was in Susan's belly.... so 
I have these mixed feelings, and one of them is that she's just part of our 
imagination, our hopes, which is I guess what kids are anyway in a lot of 
ways .... It's a strange grief to deal with.... so that the grief, in effect, is 
grieving a little bit more for ourselves and for what we had lost than for 
the actual person” (Grout & Romanoff., p. 104-105). 
Taken together, the societal lack of acknowledgement and the ambiguous feelings of 
having lost something profound, yet indefinable, poses a difficult challenge to 
bereaved parents in terms of how to deal with this ambiguity. I will address this topic 
by the end of this chapter, where I outline how my own study contributes to the 
existing research on parental grief experiences following infant loss. 
4.2. PARENTAL GRIEF AS A CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH 
THE DEAD CHILD 
As noted in the previous chapter, Dennis Klass’ observations of how bereaved 
individuals regularly continue to have a relationship to their lost loved ones emerged 
from ethnographic studies of bereaved parents (Klass, 1988, 1993a, 1993b, 1999). 
Since then, continuing bonds has become a prominent theme within the bereavement 
literature. This is also evident in the literature on parental grief following infant loss.  
 
In his ethnographic studies of bereaved parents participating in a chapter of the 
American self-help organization the Compassionate Friends, Klass examines how 
parents continue their interactions with an “inner representation” of their dead 
children (Klass, 1988, 1993a, 1993b). Klass describes how the parents interact with 
these inner representations through sensing the child’s presence, hallucinations, 
memory, use of linking objects, or through conscious incorporations of the child’s 
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characteristics into the self (Klass, 1993b, p. 255). He also stresses how shared inner 
representations represent a significant element in social support (Klass, 1993a, p. 
346). Although his study is not limited to parental grief following infant loss, he 
addresses how the lack of societal recognition of such losses affects parental grief. 
Accordingly, he argues, “when the inner representation [of the dead child] is not social 
reality, it is difficult to use it for solace” (Klass, 1993a, p. 364). In his later works, the 
situated character of parental bonds to their dead children is further emphasized, 
which is reflected in the change of vocabulary from “inner representations” to 
“continuing bonds” (Klass, 1999).  
Several studies address how the unclear and ambivalent cultural meanings of early 
infant loss are reflected in parental experiences and enactments of the continuation of 
the bonds to their dead infants. For example, in her Ph.D. dissertation on parental grief 
experiences after stillbirth and perinatal death, the British sociologist Kerry Jones 
(2010) argues that bereaved parents “experience not only the emotional pain of loss 
but also struggle with their embodied identity as a parent” (p. i). This identity, she 
argues, is mediated by social networks and dominant discourses of e.g. medicine, 
parenthood, etc., as well as “wider political and social structures” (Ibid.). Jones argues 
that some of the struggles experienced by bereaved parents are related to a 
“dissonance between mainstream culture and the culture of bereavement” (Ibid., p. 
220). More specifically, she finds that the parents in her study continue their bonds to 
their dead children in spite of a dominant cultural discourse of grief as a process of 
breaking bonds to the bereaved. In line with Layne’s study outlined above, Jones 
describes how the parents in her study struggle for acceptance of their children as real 
children and, accordingly, themselves as real parents. Like in Layne’s study, this 
involves an active use of material artefacts such as photos of the dead child (Ibid.). 
Jones describes the parents’ experiences of continuing bonds as “a transition from 
loving in presence to loving in absence” (Ibid., p. 222). The parents in Jones’ study 
challenge cultural assumptions that imply that the parents would have preferred not 
having experienced their dead children, so that they could have been spared the pain 
of loss. For example, one of the parents in Jones’ study states that “the joy of having 
had him [her stillborn baby boy] outweighs the loss of having lost him” (Ibid., p. 223). 
 
Several studies have examined how parents use physical artifacts, online media etc. 
to maintain a continuing bond to their dead children in their everyday lives (see e.g., 
Blood & Cacciatore, 2014; Christensen & Sandvik, 2015; Layne, 2000; Riches & 
Dawson, 1998). For example, in an ethnographic interview study with bereaved 
parents in support groups, Gordon Riches & Pamela Dawson (1998) illustrate how 
bereaved parents after infant loss use photographs and other memorabilia to introduce 
their children in conversations with others, confirm their children’s real existence (as 
well as their parenthood), and as a means to keep the memory of their children alive. 
Riches and Dawson address how the social uncertainty concerning perinatal loss is 
reflected in parental narratives. For example, when showing pictures of her 
prematurely born (stillborn) twins to the researchers, one of the bereaved mothers 
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apologetically exclaims: “They don’t look like proper babies, really” (Ibid., p. 129). 
However, “the photographs, the locks of hair, the name tags and the markers in the 
cemetery each helped [her] represent the existence of the twins in time and in space–
–as real presences whose loss could be mourned rather than as potential children who 
never lived” (Ibid., p. 130).   
 
In a qualitative study of Japanese women who had all lost a baby in stillbirth, Akemi 
Yamazaki (2010) examines how these mothers “raise” their dead children through 
“the development process of becoming a parent”, as she phrases it (p. 933). Based on 
interviews with 17 women who had experienced a stillbirth, Yamazaki points to how 
socio-cultural conditions such as “a weakening of the bonds between the family and 
the local community” contribute to women being alone with their experience (Ibid., 
p. 924). From a Western point of view, the ways the women matter-of-factly describe 
how they “raise the [dead] child” through daily routines such as offering rise and water 
to a Buddhist altar, talking to the child, modifying a chair into a high-chair, etc. are 
remarkable and interesting (Ibid., p. 929). Japanese ancestor worship plays an integral 
part of these mothers’ grief practices, e.g. by finding consolation in the faith that the 
child is with the ancestors, by striving for a meaningful life in order to avoid feeling 
shame when meeting the child in the afterlife, etc. While “continuing bonds” from a 
Western point of view is somehow “in spite” of the cultural understanding of grief as 
a separation process, Yamazaki stresses how “[the] Japanese have a lesser sense of 
self and others, and thus they have an instilled mindset of not quite accepting the 
separation by death with an important person as an absolute separation” (Ibid., p. 935). 
Finally, Yamazaki’s study highlights differences in terms of how bereaved parents 
cope with other people’s reactions and expectations regarding stillbirths and perinatal 
deaths. Although her findings echo findings from similar studies conducted in 
Western countries concerning experiences of other peoples’ lacking 
acknowledgement of the dead child’s existence, the bereaved mothers in her study 
worked with the loss by “coming to terms with the pace of other family members in 
accepting the loss” (Ibid, p. 930).  
 
While most of the studies I have come across assert the widespread occurrence and 
potentially beneficial consequences of continuing bonds in parental bereavement, a 
study by Grout and Romanoff (2000) demonstrates that parental narratives of perinatal 
loss are highly variated in terms of the meanings attributed to the child’s place in the 
family narratives. The authors (who, by the way, both reveal personal as well as 
professional experiences and interests in the study of bereavement) identify three main 
patterns of family narratives among the bereaved parents participating in their study: 
(1) Maintaining the connection by preserving the space, in which the parents maintain 
the absence of the lost child as a continuing reality in the family structure (“someone 
is missing”) (Ibid., p. 100), (2) Maintaining the connection by continuing the 
relationship, e.g., through memorials, rituals, and storytelling (i.e., the dead child 
“inhabits a different space, but is still an important family member”) (Ibid., p. 101), 
and (3) Replacing the loss (“I never really got to know her”), in which the parents’ 
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story represent the dead child primarily as “the loss of possibility, of parenthood, of 
potential relationship rather than existing relationship” (Ibid., p. 104). Hence, rather 
than the continuation of bonds with the dead child being interpreted as an 
unambiguous phenomenon, their study reveals that continuation of bonds can be 
experienced as an absence (“preserving the space”) as well as a presence (“continuing 
the relationship”). Furthermore, it highlights that not all parents construct a narrative 
in which continuation of bonds to the dead child is prominent. While previous studies 
have addressed parents’ wish to “replace” a dead child as a pathological phenomenon 
(Cain & Cain, 1964; Kirkley-Best & Kellner, 1982), Grout’s and Romanoff’s study 
challenges this presumption by nuancing the analyses of parental experiences of the 
loss. Instead of asserting that parents ought to bond with their dead infants, they solicit 
the parents’ interpretations of what the loss means to them. For some, the loss 
represents something concretely missing, for others, the child continues to be an 
important family member, albeit in a “different space”. However, for those who 
interpret the loss most of all as a loss of opportunity and potential parenthood, there 
notion of continuing bonds might seem less meaningful. 
4.3. GRIEVING WITHIN THE COUPLE: RELATIONAL AND 
GENDER DYNAMICS IN PARENTAL GRIEF 
In this section I will outline studies that examine the relationship between the bereaved 
parents, the significance of gender differences for the couple dynamics in grief, and 
the cultural aspects of engendered grief.  
In a qualitative case study of a bereaved couple after the loss of their infant daughter, 
An Hooghe, Robert A. Neimeyer and Peter Rober (2012) examine how this couple 
individually and relationally deal with their grief in a “dialectic tension between the 
need to be close to the deceased child and the need for distance from the pain of the 
loss” (p. 1220). Drawing on Stroebe’s and Schut’s (1999) emphasize on the oscillation 
between confrontation and avoidance on the loss, Hooghe et al. examine how this 
couple describes their individual and relational grief experiences through a recurrent 
metaphor of “cycling around an emotional core of sadness” (Hooghe et al., 2012, p. 
1220). Through this metaphor, they argue, the couple deals with the dialectical need 
“to stay close to their deceased child, while at the same time staying at a bearable 
distance from the agonizing pain associated with the loss of their child” (Ibid., p. 
1229). By stressing how this dynamic represents a challenge for both parents 
individually as well as relationally, Hooghe et al.’s study demonstrates that emotion 
regulation is (also) a relational process (Ibid.). However, the analysis does not move 
beyond the couple dynamics by addressing how these dynamics are situated within 
relations to other people, cultural norms and expectations. 
A range of studies address the relative absence of attention to fathers’ grief following 
perinatal losses, reflected in bereaved parents’ experiences as well as in the literature 
on parental bereavement (see e.g., Bonnette & Broom, 2011; McCreight, 2004; 
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O’Leary & Thorwick, 2006; O’Neill, 1998; Samuelsson et al., 2001; Weaver-
Hightower, 2012). A recurrent observation in these studies is the prevalence of 
experiences of conflicting normative expectations among bereaved fathers. On the 
one side, they perceive a set of cultural expectations to be “strong” and supportive vis-
à-vis their female partners in relation to their loss, while on the other side, their wives 
expect them to share and express their grief. With reference to Karl Tomm’s systemic 
approach to family communication, Lang and her colleagues (2011) describe a 
common pattern of (mis)communication unfolding between bereaved couples: “the 
more the wife shows her grief, the more the husband tends to withhold showing his 
grief, to suffer internally or silently in order to protect or comfort his wife. The more 
he withholds and suffers internally or silently, the more isolated and misunderstood 
the wife may feel which increases her suffering” (p. 193). Such a pattern of 
communication is described in strikingly similar ways in several studies (see e.g., 
Malacrida, 1998; McCreight, 2004; Samuelsson et al., 2001; Weaver-Hightower, 
2012). For example, Malacrida (1998) describes how “[men] are consistently told to 
be strong for their wives, locking them into a supportive rather than primary role, and 
sending a message that this is the wife’s loss and men have no grief of their own to 
resolve. Thus, stoicism is socially reinforced for men, perhaps accounting for some of 
the silence that causes wives to feel isolated” (p. 65).  
 
While Malacrida (1998) primarily focuses on the significance of such gender 
expectations for mothers’ grief, others more explicitly address the consequences of 
such expectations for bereaved fathers. For example, based on observations within 
pregnancy loss support groups and interviews with 14 bereaved fathers participating 
in these groups, McCreight (2004) argues that “the perception that men have only a 
supportive role in pregnancy loss is unjustified, as it ignores the actual life-world 
experiences of the men, and the meanings they attach to their loss, in what may be a 
very personal emotional tragedy for them where they have limited support available” 
(p. 326). Likewise, Marcus B. Weaver-Hightower’s (2012) simultaneously evocative 
and analytical autoethnography of living with the loss of his stillborn daughter 
examines how cultural conceptions of masculinity mediate fathers’ experiences of 
parenthood in general, and bereaved parenthood specifically. Like several of the 
above-mentioned studies, he highlights how a cultural norm of “silent, stoic 
masculinity” (p. 481) mediated his way of relating to his loss, to himself, and to other 
people in the time following his daughter’s death.  
 
Such cultural expectations concerning gender are arguably connected to the 
disenfranchisement and lack of societal recognition in parental bereavement. While 
the grief following perinatal loss is sometimes described as a “forgotten grief” 
(Samuelsson et al., 2001), the grieving fathers after such losses are similarly referred 
to as “the forgotten mourners” (Ibid.). However, as this review has demonstrated, 
neither fathers nor mothers are prone to forget their loss. Instead, parental grief 
involves continuous and interrelated processes of interpreting and negotiating the 
significance of the loss, struggling for social recognition, and integrating the loss in 
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one’s individual and family narrative. None of these processes occur in a vacuum. 
Rather, they are embedded in cultural practices and beliefs concerning infant death, 
parental grief, gender differences, etc., all of which mediate the grief experiences and 
enactments of bereaved parents after infant loss. 
 
4.1. POSITIONING MY STUDY IN THE LITERATURE ON 
PARENTAL GRIEF AFTER INFANT LOSS 
The literature on parental grief after early infant loss informs us about how unclear 
and ambiguous cultural expectations concerning these losses contribute to experiences 
of ambiguity and disenfranchisement. Furthermore, some of the studies address how 
parents actively position themselves vis-à-vis such cultural conceptions by asserting 
the realness of their children and their parenthood. The traditional grief models’ 
assumptions of grief as a process of severing ties to the deceased, reflected in public 
understandings of grief, are equally challenged by the multiple ways in which parents 
continue their bonds to their dead children. Finally, parental grief is described as 
involving not only personal emotions, but also dynamic processes of sharing, 
withholding, and interpreting each other’s emotions and actions. I recognize all of 
these themes in my own research, as well as from my previous experiences as a 
counselor in DIDA. The parents in my study also struggle with other people’s (or their 
own) implicit or explicit assumptions of early infant loss as less significant than other 
losses. They too struggle with feelings of ambiguous or unclear loss, and with finding 
a “proper place” for their dead children in their continuing lives. They too report 
patterns of miscommunications and misunderstandings within the couple (as well as 
with other people).   
However, while most of the studies I have encountered tend to describe cultural beliefs 
and practices as working “against” bereaved parents need to express their grief, only 
few address how bereaved parents may also reflectively draw upon, resist and 
negotiate such beliefs in their daily lives. For example, although Lang et al. (2011) 
briefly address how the parents in their study contest cultural perceptions of early 
pregnancy loss, e.g., by protesting against health care professionals’ use of medical 
terms such as “spontaneous abortion”, “miscarriage” or “fetal tissue” (p. 191), the 
significance of such resistance is not elaborated on in their study. Instead, the study 
implicitly portrays the bereaved parents as passive victims of ambiguous loss and 
disenfranchisement, rather than as active participants in the shaping of their social 
realities. 
Similarly, in spite of Malacrida’s (1998) sensitive and highly reflective analyses of 
how contemporary cultural practices and beliefs shape parental grief experiences, her 
study does not elaborate on whether or how bereaved parents engage with such 
practices and beliefs. Instead, cultural and societal circumstances are largely described 
as detrimental to parental grieving. “In fact,” Malacrida asserts, “because the 
possibilities for complications are so extensive, it is likely that any parent who has 
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lost a child to perinatal death is at risk for at least some complications in resolving 
their grief” (Ibid., p. 81). 
Indeed, such findings of how disenfranchisement and pathologization negatively 
affect parental grief experiences were what I expected to find when embarking upon 
this study. However, although I do find that the parents of my study also struggle with 
such problems, this does not represent the complete story. Instead, I have been 
surprised by the multiple and highly individual ways the parents draw upon, negotiate, 
and contest cultural conceptions of infant loss, parental grief, and pathologization.  
Rather than confirming the findings from previous studies of pathologization and 
medicalization as unambiguously repressing or stigmatizing mechanisms, the present 
study echoes Anne-Marie Jutel and Sarah Nettleton’s (2011) observations of 
diagnoses (and, arguably, other prevailing cultural practices and conceptions) as 
something that “can vindicate and blame, can legitimise or stigmatise, can facilitate 
access to resources just as it can restrict opportunities” (p. 797). Inspired by Jutel and 
Nettleson’s observations, I wish to contribute to the existing literature on parental 
bereavement experiences by examining how bereaved parents relate to the culturally 
available repertoires of grief and infant loss. Informed by a cultural psychological and 
situated approach to bereavement, my aim is to contribute to the literature on parental 
grief by examining how individual grief is mediated through (rather than caused by) 
cultural norms, beliefs, and practices. Grief can neither be reduced to essences within 
the suffering individual, nor to socio-cultural and material factors or social 
constructions. Instead, this study argues a view of suffering as a dialectical process of 
situated experiences, interpretations, and actions. Rather than being causally inflicted 
by biological, material, or cultural factors, grieving is enabled and constrained, 
experienced and enacted, within the socio-cultural and material realities the grieving 
individual belongs to.  
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Study: Design: Relevant themes and findings 
for the present study: 
Cacciatore, 
DeFrain & Jones 
(2008) 
Retrospective analysis of 
anonymous data collected by two 
bereavement organizations. (US) 
Ambiguous loss 
Disenfranchised grief 
Existential questions 
Golan, 
Leichtentritt & 
Ronit (2016) 
In-depth phenomenological 
interviews with 10 women 
following stillbirth. (Israel) 
“ambiguity, uncertainty, and 
doubt infused women’s 
experience of [stillbirth]” 
Lang et al. (2011) Longitudinal interview study with 
13 bereaved couples 2, 6, and 13 
months after perinatal/infant loss. 
(Canada) 
Sources of ambiguity and 
disenfranchised grief 
Malacrida (1998) Autoethnography and 
ethnographic observations within 
pregnancy loss support groups; 
focus-group and individual 
interviews with 25 bereaved 
parents following perinatal loss. 
(Canada) 
Disenfranchisement and 
pathologization leads to 
complicated grief. 
McCreight (2008) Narrative analyses of interviews 
with 23 women participating in 
pregnancy loss self-help groups 
(Northern Ireland) 
Bereavement self-help groups 
as spaces of resistance against 
medicalization and 
disenfranchisement 
Layne (2000) Longitudinal ethnographic study 
of pregnancy loss support 
organization, interviews with key 
members of these groups, textual 
analysis of support organizations’ 
newsletters (US) 
“The realness problem of 
pregnancy loss”; material 
artefacts in the social 
negotiation the dead child’s 
significance and parental 
identity. 
Sawicka (2016) Content analysis of selected Polish 
discussion lists for bereaved 
parents after miscarriage and 
stillbirth, and interviews with 
moderators of these list (Poland) 
Perinatal grief as culturally 
disembedded and 
disenfranchised; bereavement 
communities as subcultures 
providing alternative, local 
definitions of loss and grief. 
Klass (1988, 
1993a, 1993b, 
1999) 
Longitudinal ethnographic study 
of communities of bereaved 
parents (the Compassionate 
Friends) and interviews with 
bereaved parents participating in 
the organization. (US) 
Parents continue bonds with 
“inner representations” of their 
dead children. Social validation 
of continuing bonds represents a 
significant element in social 
support. 
Jones (2010) Qualitative interviews with 21 
bereaved mothers and 6 bereaved 
fathers following perinatal and 
neonatal loss, recruited through a 
SANDS (a British support 
organization for bereaved parents 
after infant loss) (UK) 
Social negotiations and 
struggles with embodied 
parental identity. Continuing 
bonds in spite of a dominant 
cultural discourse of grief as a 
process of breaking bonds. 
Table 1: Schematic overview of the reviewed studies (continues next page). 
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Riches & Dawson 
(1998) 
(see also Blood & 
Cacciatore, 2014; 
Christensen & 
Sandvik, 2015; 
Layne, 2000) 
Ethnographic interview study with 
36 bereaved parents in support 
groups (age of the dead children 
ranged from prenatal to grown-
ups). (US) 
Significance of physical 
artefacts (photographs etc.) for 
continuing bonds within the 
parents’ social realities. 
 
Yamazaki (2010) Qualitative interviews with 17 
mothers after stillbirth (Japan) 
Socio-cultural conditions 
influence the experience of 
“raising a dead child”; 
continuing bonds through 
everyday practices; Japanese 
conceptions of the 
connectedness of self and other 
encourages continuing bonds. 
Grout & Romanoff 
(2000) 
Qualitative interviews with 10 
parents of seven families (3 
couples, 1 father, and 3 mothers) 
who had lost a child in the 
perinatal period and had gotten 
living children subsequently (US) 
Three main family narratives of 
infant loss: (1) maintaining the 
connection by preserving the 
space; (2) maintaining the 
connection by continuing the 
relationship; (3) replacing the 
loss 
Hooghe, Neimeyer 
& Rober (2012) 
A qualitative case study based on 
interviews with and written 
feedback from a bereaved couple 
after the loss of their infant 
daughter (Belgium) 
Individual and relational 
coping with grief in a 
dialectical tension (oscillation) 
between a need for proximity 
to the dead child and distance 
from the pain of loss (“cycling 
around an emotional core of 
sadness”) 
Lang et al. (2011) 
 
Longitudinal interview study 
(Canada) 
 
Gender expectations mediate 
couples’ relational and 
individual ways of dealing with 
the loss; miscommunication 
within bereaved couples. 
McCreight (2004)  
 
Observations and interviews with 
fathers in a pregnancy loss support 
group (Northern Ireland) 
 
Cultural masculinity norms and 
expectations leads to limited 
support and misunderstandings 
of bereaved fathers’ grief after 
infant loss. 
Samuelsson et al. 
(2001) 
 
Phenomenological analyses of 
interviews with 11 men after 3rd 
trimester pregnancy loss (Sweden) 
 
Bereaved fathers after infant 
loss described as “forgotten 
mourners.” The fathers 
emphasized the importance of 
“being able to protect their 
partner and to grieve in their 
own way.” 
Weaver-
Hightower (2012) 
Autoethnography of a father’s 
grief following stillbirth (US) 
Examines how cultural norms 
of “stoic masculinity” mediate 
paternal grief after infant loss. 
Table 1: Schematic overview of the reviewed studies. 
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CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGICAL, 
ANALYTICAL, AND ETHICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
“[Meaning-making] occurs within the everyday flow of events, speech and 
behaviour or discursive activity through which we define and structure our 
social reality. Social discourse then becomes the primary field of study and 
the research endeavour an interactive, intersubjective process, rather than 
the researcher being separate from the field of study” (Valentine, 2008, pp. 
5-6). 
This study set out with an ambition of examining grief as a personal and individual, 
yet simultaneously socially and culturally situated and intersubjective experience. 
This called for a methodology that could grasp the complexity of how experiences, 
interpretations, and meaningful actions unfold and intertwine within people’s social 
realities. Furthermore, my own background as a bereaved parent and bereavement 
counselor emphasized the need for an approach that acknowledges the researcher as 
an inherent part of the field of study.  
In the following, I will describe the process of choosing an approach to the field, 
selecting design, finding suitable informants, developing interview guides, and 
conducting interviews. I will discuss some of the ethical and analytical concerns I 
have been faced with in the research process, and how I have sought to deal with them. 
I will reflect on how talking and writing about grief can be done in ways that give 
space to and acknowledge the inherently connected experiences of love and grief. I 
will describe the process of analyzing and writing up my findings, and how I have 
attempted to balance between the evocative and the analytical in order to create 
sensitive accounts of parental grief after infant loss. Finally, I will end the chapter 
with presenting the participating parents through brief stories of love, loss, and grief. 
5.1. APPROACHING THE FIELD 
Motivated by my interest in the situated, normative, and intersubjective aspects of 
parental grief, I was interested to talk to parents about their experiences, thoughts, and 
actions related to their loss. This could be done in several ways. One opportunity I 
considered was to visit some of the parental support groups organized by DIDA. This 
would provide an opportunity to listen to the conversation as it unfolds within the 
context of a small “community of bereaved parents”, and combine participant 
observation with focus group interviewing. This would in particular address the 
situatedness of grief processes. 
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However, I was also interested in exploring the parental loss narratives in more detail, 
how they experienced their everyday lives, and their experiences of participating in 
DIDA’s services. Especially the latter would be difficult to achieve within the context 
of DIDA’s services, as it is likely that the parents would feel uncomfortable with 
sharing these experiences with the group. For this reason, and due to the time-
consuming nature of pursuing both approaches, I prioritized interviewing bereaved 
couples together in dyadic interviews (Morgan et al., 2013). This allowed for each 
couple to tell their story, and enabled explorations of the individual and intersubjective 
meanings of their loss. Whether one chooses to interview the partners in a couple 
together or separately, each approach yields different advantages as well as 
limitations. While individual interviews allow participants to express views and 
experiences they might have withheld in a couple interview, the latter enables the 
participants to dynamically explore, challenge, corroborate, and stimulate different 
aspects of their shared and individual perspectives (Morgan et al., 2013; Taylor & 
DeVocht, 2011). From the perspective of cultural psychology, the opportunity to 
explore the shared, negotiated, and co-constructed meanings as they unfold in the 
interview conversation provides a valuable insight into the situated nature of grief 
experiences. By enabling such joint explorations of the shared and individual 
meanings, experiences, and relationships, dyadic interviews represent “a viable third 
alternative to individual interviews and focus groups” (Morgan et al., 2013, p. 1276). 
The interview approach used with the informants can best be described as informal, 
conversational and exploratory. A semi-structured design allowed me to 
simultaneously explore my research interests as well as inquiring into topics emerging 
during the flow of conversation. Although interviews thus became my primary source 
of data, my own background made it obvious to include autoethnographic inquiries of 
my relationship to the field and to the informants. Nevertheless, as unfolded in my 
second article, “Becoming a bereaved parent”, this was not a straight-forward process. 
In the beginning, I was reluctant to elaborate on my background in the interview 
setting. Although I did tell the parents that I had entered this project from a 
background as a counselor in DIDA, my own loss was only mentioned if the parents 
asked into it. When they did (most often because the parents knew that all counselors 
working in DIDA at that time had a personal loss experience), I was very aware of not 
centering my loss, and chose my words very carefully. However, as the study 
progressed, and I gradually became more confident with my own background in the 
context of the research, I ventured on exploring the significance of this for my 
relationship to the field and to my informants. While some of the parents from the 
very beginning of the study had stressed the significance of me being “someone who 
know what it’s all about” because I have experienced it myself, others did not seem 
to put too much into it. Bereaved or not, I obviously knew enough about the world of 
bereaved parents to pose relevant questions and, I hope, avoid stupid misconceptions 
about grief and infant loss. Only one of the couples were surprised to hear that I too 
had lost a child. This was revealed in my third interview with them, and it was indeed 
a rather awkward moment. I had mistakenly assumed that they knew, as they had been 
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quite involved in DIDA’s activities (we had even run into each other coincidentally at 
a couple of DIDA’s arrangements). However, the fact that I had not been explicit 
about my loss felt like I had withheld important information from them. Once we had 
talked about it, they said it would have been nice to know, although they did not think 
it would have meant a huge difference in terms of how they had related to me during 
the interviews. Nevertheless, I did indeed feel that I owed them an apology for my 
messy process of “coming out” as a bereaved bereavement researcher.  
Unflattering and embarrassing as it may be, the above example clearly illustrates that 
knowledge developed throughout the research process cannot be reduced to 
preexisting data obtained through a stringent use of neutral methodologies (Holstein 
& Gumbrium, 2004). First, any method used in research will interact in multiple ways 
with the subject of research. This is particularly true when the subject of research is 
human beings and their experiences, interpretations and meaningful actions. Whether 
I use observations, structured, or open interviews to inquire into the phenomenon I am 
interested in studying, the choice of methods will interact with the phenomenon I am 
studying in several ways (e.g., asking about grief symptoms arguably will create 
different kinds of knowledge than asking people to tell their story). Second, through 
the research process, I am myself an inherent part of the process, insofar as I interact 
with my field in multiple, and sometimes unintended ways. This is evident in the 
encounters with the informants, as well as in the analytical process of understanding, 
interpreting, orienting myself within the literature, and in writing about my findings. 
Throughout the entire process, I draw upon preexisting and developing experiences, 
beliefs, and knowledge about the field I am studying. I interact with the field, involve 
myself in the lives of the informants, and just like expectant parents may see pregnant 
women everywhere, my attention is constantly drawn to aspects of everyday life that 
inform or challenge my emerging understandings of the field I am studying. The point 
is that rather than trying to “minimize distortion” of preexisting data, it is crucial to 
include a reflective stance towards my own position within the field of study. As 
James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gumbrium points out in relation to interviewing, “both 
parties to the interview are necessarily and unavoidably active. Meaning is not merely 
elicited by apt questioning, nor simply transported through respondent replies; it is 
actively and communicatively assembled in the interview encounter” (Ibid., p. 141, 
italics in original).  
5.2. SELECTING DESIGN AND RECRUITING INFORMANTS 
In order to explore how bereaved parents relate to their loss over time, I planned to 
conduct a series of interviews with the same informants across different points of time 
since their loss. Due to my interest in parental experiences of DIDA’s services, all 
informants were recruited in collaboration with DIDA’s counselors. While most of 
the informants were enrolled in the longitudinal study, an additional couple was later 
included for a single interview, two years after their loss. This was done in order to 
gain in-depth knowledge of how participation in DIDA’s activities were experienced 
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in retrospect by someone who had used the services to an extensive degree. For the 
participants in the longitudinal study, I aimed at conducting three interviews, 
respectively 1-2 months, 7-8 months, and 19-20 months after the loss of their child. 
This plan was followed (for one of the participants, the second interview was split up 
into two interviews, due to familial circumstances). None of the participants 
withdrew, although they were repeatedly informed of their opportunity for doing so 
at any point in the process. 
The search for appropriate informants to participate in the research project was 
initiated early on, in close collaboration with the counselors at DIDA. The parents 
were sampled in order to create variation in the participants’ geographical origin (e.g. 
urban vs. rural districts, different parts of Denmark), as well as different kinds of loss 
(early and late pregnancy, stillborn and born alive). Further, if possible, I wanted to 
talk with parents who had different fertility histories – including time used for 
planning pregnancy, fertility problems, etc. I wanted to talk to parents who had lost 
their first child, as well as parents who had children in advance. These criteria were 
not based on an ambition of examining the effects of demographic, social, or 
individual variables on loss experiences. Instead, my intention was to include a rather 
broad range of informants, reflecting the variety of parents who typically make use of 
DIDA’s services. Except for the couple invited later for a single interview, a crucial 
aspect was the recency of loss, as I wanted to explore grief as it is experienced in the 
immediacy of loss as well as over time. In the process of selecting couples to ask, one 
couple was excluded because of language issues (interviews would have to be carried 
out via an interpreter). Based on the above-mentioned criteria, the counselors in DIDA 
presented me with anonymized data on potential informants, and after selecting those 
most relevant, the counselors informed the parents about my study. If the parents were 
interested, they were sent an e-mail invitation with more information about the study, 
including a request for consent if they wanted to be contacted by me for further 
information. All of the invited parents accepted the invitation. The parents, including 
the couple invited later on, are presented briefly in table 1. 
It is important to stress that bereaved parents who use DIDA’s services not necessarily 
reflect what is “typical for his or her society, or may represent the perspective of a 
particular group” (Otto, 1997, p. 98). For several reasons, for example related to the 
ambiguous conceptions of early infant loss in our culture, it is likely that some 
bereaved parents following such losses are more reluctant to identify themselves with 
the “community of bereaved parents”. However, as the research process developed, it 
became evident that the participating parents, although they all had some kind of 
relationship with DIDA, they surely could not be seen as representing a unitary and 
uniform community. For some of the parents, DIDA became an important community, 
central to their identity as bereaved parents. For others, DIDA most of all served as 
an “outstanding source of first aid”, as Chris phrases it. For Rita, the thought of having 
to relate to other people’s grief and loss was too overwhelming, and apart from a single  
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Aliases: Age  
(1st 
inter-
view): 
Loss: Living 
childre
n at the 
time of 
loss: 
Fertility 
history: 
Education/ 
occupation
: 
Lives in: Inter-
views: 
Sarah 
& Paul 
37, 33 Eva  
(stillborn. 
3rd tri-
mester) 
No 1,5 years 
of trying to 
conceive, 
uncom-
plicated 
pregnancy 
Nurse, 
officer 
Town in 
Northern 
Zealand 
3 
Jacob 
& Mia 
26, 30 Sophie 
(stillborn, 
3rd tri-
mester) 
No Spontan-
eous, 
uncom-
plicated 
pregnancy 
Student, 
pharmacist 
Copenhagen 3 
Emma 
& John 
32, 33 Samuel 
(stillborn, 
3rd tri-
mester) 
Yes 
(boy, 
2,5 
years) 
Uncomplic
ated, 
planned 
pregnancy 
Curator, 
archivist 
Town in 
Northern 
Jutland 
3 
Thomas 
& Anna 
29, 26 Oliver 
(stillborn, 
3rd tri-
mester) 
No Uncomplic
ated, 
planned 
pregnancy 
Teachers Aarhus 3 
Linda 
& Chris 
30, 31 Lucas 
(died 4 
days old 
of con-
genital 
disease) 
No 2 years of 
fertility 
treatment, 
uncom-
plicated 
pregnancy 
Office 
assistant, 
student 
counselor 
Copenhagen 
metropolitan 
area 
3 
Rita 
(hus-
band 
not 
partici-
pating 
in the 
study) 
42  Lily 
(died 
shortly 
after a 
pre-
mature 
birth (2nd 
trimester)
) 
No Fertility 
treatment 
due to 
Rita’s age, 
complicati
ons in the 
latter 
weeks of 
pregnancy 
Business 
consultant 
Northern 
Zealand 
(rural area) 
4 
Eric & 
Diana 
38, 36 William 
(died one 
week old 
of con-
genital 
disease) 
No Not known Manager, 
insurance 
analyst 
Copenhagen 1  
(approx. 
2 years 
after the 
loss) 
Table 1: Participants in the interview study20 
  
                                                            
20 The parents are also presented with brief loss narratives by the end of this chapter. 
PARENTAL GRIEF AFTER INFANT LOSS 
 
 
66 
 
conversation with a counselor from DIDA, she ended up not using any of the 
organization’s services (although she and her husband did sign a membership). These 
differences in the parents’ relationship to DIDA highlight that such services serve 
different functions and are used in multiple and individual ways. Accordingly, the 
parents are neither entirely representative for bereaved parents as such, nor for 
bereaved parents involved in DIDA. On the other hand, in spite of the huge variety of 
their experiences, the study also reveals themes that cut across the differences (several 
of which echo findings from previous studies), and that are arguably common to many 
bereaved parents in our culture, regardless of how or whether they are enrolled in 
specific communities such as DIDA. 
5.3. INTERVIEWING 
Except from Rita, whose husband did not want to participate in the study, all of the 
parents were interviewed together with their partner. As described previously, this 
dyadic approach allowed conversations and mutual reflections to unfold during the 
interviews, and gave me an opportunity to explore how the parents narrated their 
stories within the couple.  
All interviews were conducted in the parents’ homes. This was primarily done for 
practical reasons (as the couples lived in different parts of the country, it would be 
inconvenient for them to travel to the university, and it would be equally inconvenient 
for me to find suitable locations across the country). However, by being allowed into 
their homes, I also had the opportunity to experience some of the circumstances of the 
everyday lives in which their children were missing. In some homes, I was presented 
with pictures on the walls of their dead children. I could see the empty baby room, 
where boxes of baby items were collected for a baby that never got the opportunity to 
come home. Being exposed to these physical realities creates a sense of what they are 
missing in a different way than just hearing about it. However, inviting others into 
your home might also be experienced as exposing oneself, and as such, it can be a 
vulnerable experience. Accordingly, my being in their homes was as a guest, not as 
an inquisitor, and I had no intention of using their homes as a source of interpretation 
“behind their backs”, for example by interpreting the presence of absence of pictures 
on the wall as a sign of how they dealt with their loss. Nevertheless, being in their 
homes created a different sense of getting to know them and their dead children than 
I think would have been possible if we met on neutral ground. As time went by, I saw 
rooms emptied of baby items, being arranged as provisional storage or work spaces, 
and, finally, rearranged into nurseries when a little baby sister or brother was born 
into the family. In the last round of interviews, these little babies created lots of 
delightful disruptions along the way, tangibly demonstrating the coexistence of joy 
and grief, presence and absence, in bereaved families. 
The entire interview study consisted of 20 interviews ranging from approx. 1,5 to 3 
hours. I initiated each interview by thanking for their willingness to participate, 
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introducing myself and my relationship to DIDA, presenting the overall themes and 
aims of the project as well as the suggested topics and duration of the pending 
interview. I asked for permission to start audiotaping, and repeated information about 
confidentiality, informed consent, their right to withdraw their participation at any 
time, that they were not obliged to answer questions, etc. I also encouraged them to 
give feedback on how they experienced the interview situation, and to contact me if 
they had any further comments or questions after the interview. The interviews were 
loosely structured by an interview guide developed for each round of interviews. 
However, I encouraged the parents to talk freely, and used the guide more as a 
heuristic tool for remembering possible themes to explore in the flow of conversation. 
That is, rather than going through the questions in an orderly sequence, the guide was 
a useful tool to orient myself in along the way. An example of questions from an 
interview guide (from the first round of interviews) is presented in table 2 at the next 
page. 
For the second and third round of interviews, I developed new interview guides that 
made room for addressing issues from the prior interviews, and follow up on events I 
knew had happened since last time we talked (e.g., new pregnancy, getting back to 
work, having another baby). Some of the general questions for the second round of 
interviews were, e.g., “Can you tell me a bit of how things have been for you since 
last time we talked?”, “How do your experiences with loss fit with your prior thoughts 
about loss and grief?”, “How do they fit with the expectations you meet from others?”, 
”Are there anything that has become more important after you lost (...)?”, “(How) has 
this changed over time?”, “Which role, if any, has DIDA played?”, “What has been 
most important?, “Have you missed anything – if so, what?” (related to previous 
question about DIDA), etc. In the final round of interviews, all of the couples had 
gone through a subsequent pregnancy, and all had become parents to a living child. 
Hence, the relationship between being bereaved parents and parents of a living child 
became a natural focal point. Some of the questions for the third round of interviews 
were, e.g., “Do you want to tell me about the pregnancy, the birth, and the first time 
with (…)?”, “How would you describe how your loss of (…) is placed in your life 
now?”, “Has anything changed? (“What?”, “How is that?”), “Which place do you 
hope it (your child/your loss) will have in your future life?”, “Is there anything you 
would like to tell others in a similar situation, that you would have appreciated to have 
heard when you had just lost (…)?”, “Do you think one can become ill of grief?”, “If 
so: How do you think this is expressed?”, “What do you think of the suggestion to 
introduce grief as a psychiatric diagnosis?” (Asked after a brief introduction to the 
suggested criteria.). Finally, I had prepared some questions for the final interview 
addressing how they had experienced participating in the interviews, whether they 
thought my background as a counselor in DIDA and a bereaved parent had any 
significance for their experience of the interviews, and what had been their main 
motivation for participating. 
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Introduce topics for the interview: 
The pregnancy and the time preceding the loss 
The story about your child and about your loss 
Your experiences of the time following the loss 
Your experiences with DIDA 
Topics Research questions Interview questions 
The time before the loss 
 
Emerging parental identity 
 
Expectations and narratives 
of parenthood, children, and 
family life 
 
How does parental 
identity and narratives 
about the child develop 
before birth? 
 
 
Can you tell me a bit of the 
time before you lost (...) 
Was it an unexpected or 
planned pregnancy? (If 
planned, how was the waiting 
time? How long did it take to 
get pregnant?) 
How did you experience and 
relate to the pregnancy and to 
your expected child? 
(expectations, thoughts about 
the future?) 
What about your family and 
friends – (how) were they 
involved in the pregnancy?  
The story about the loss 
 
Receiving the message 
Disruption of the expected 
life narrative 
 
How do parents 
experience and interpret 
the situation of getting to 
know that one’s baby is 
dead or dying? 
 
Can you tell me about how you 
got to know that (...) was dead? 
(or would/might die?) 
How do you recall: 
- time and place? 
- who was present? 
- what was said and done? 
- how did you respond? (What 
did you think, feel, say, do?) 
Did you contact your family? 
How, whom, what was said, 
etc. 
The time with the child 
 
Narratives of the child, 
attachment, and parenthood 
 
How does narratives of the 
child, attachment, and 
parenthood develop in the 
interactions between 
parents, health care 
professional, material, and 
discursive practices? 
 
(How) were you prepared for 
what was going to happen?  
How was the birth? 
What happened when the child 
was born? How was that? 
(What did you think, feel, and 
do?) 
How did you experience the 
healthcare professional’s (the 
midwives’) role? 
Is there anything you 
remember as particularly 
helpful or not so helpful in the 
situation?  
Can you tell me a bit about the 
first days after the birth/loss? 
(What preoccupied you most? 
E.g., feelings, thoughts, 
decisions, communication 
with others, etc.) 
Table 2: Excerpt from interview guide (1st interviews). 
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All in all, the longitudinal design gave me an opportunity to get to know the parents, 
follow their lives and the development in how they experienced and related to their 
grief over time, follow up and further explore themes from previous interviews, and 
get their feedback on my emerging, tentative analyses. For example, during our 
second interview, Linda said she could imagine herself striving for a grief diagnosis 
in order to prove her love for her dead son (see article 4, “Grief as a border diagnosis). 
After the interview, I was uncertain of whether this interpretation was merely 
something she had arrived at rather coincidentally during the course of our 
conversation, or whether it would still hold significance for her. In our third 
conversation, a year later and approximately two years after the loss of their son, I ask 
Linda and Chris whether they think it is possible to become ill from grief. Both 
emphatically affirmed this possibility, and both supported the idea of a grief diagnosis 
as a valuable means for bereaved individuals to get recognition and support for their 
grief. Linda pointed to how a grief diagnosis would have felt more appropriate than 
the depression diagnosis she had recently been given as a consequence of reaching 
out for help to cope with her grief in relation to mothering their second child (born 
one year after the loss of Lucas). After talking about this, she spontaneously returned 
to her thoughts about how not getting such a diagnosis would have made her question 
the depth of her love for their dead son. She states: “I would feel that I ought to hit 
rock bottom at some point, in order to prove to myself that I loved my child so much”. 
Although Linda’s unprompted return to this perspective suggests that this held 
significance to her beyond the fleeting flow of our prior conversation, it is important 
to stress that I do not consider this as an argument for interviews as a neutral method 
for “digging out” experiences and thoughts from the informants (Brinkmann, 2013, p. 
11). Linda’s reflections on this matter had emerged in the context of our conversation, 
and, as such, it demonstrates the socially negotiated and contextually situated nature 
of meanings. This does not imply that the account Linda arrives at in our conversation 
stands in opposition to some preexisting, more “real” or authentic, immediate 
experience. Instead, I argue a perspective on interviewing as an intersubjective 
process of exploring and developing meaningful accounts of personal and 
intersubjective experiences, interpretations, and actions. This involves a recognition 
of the significance of my own participation in the research process, and highlights the 
ethical responsibility inherent in the interview situation.  
5.1. ETHICAL AND ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Talking about sensitive matters like grief can and will most often be an emotionally 
exhausting experience. For this reason, I was aware of giving space for emotion, 
contemplation, and silence in the interview situations. This requires a careful attention 
to what is going on in the informants, knowing when to be silent, expressing empathy 
and recognition with words, bodily gestures, and sounds, and carefully assessing when 
to pursue or change a topic. Being sad and emotional is an inherent part of being in 
grief, and the interview “invite[s] people to tell stories of events from which they have 
suffered or are suffering” (McIntosh & Morse, 2009, p. 85). Thus, emotional distress 
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is expected and anticipated in interviews about loss and grief. Moreover, when people 
are asked how they experience participating in interviews on emotionally distressing 
experiences, they often state that they find it relieving to share their experiences and 
emotions with someone who is willing to listen and acknowledge the pain (Dyregrov, 
2004a; McIntosh & Morse, 2009). Rather than being a necessarily adverse side-effect 
or by-product of the interview situation,  
“[emotional] distress is integral to emotionally distressing circumstances; 
emotional distress is likewise integral to the telling of these circumstances 
in interviews that invite them. But more than this, emotional distress is 
integral to participants’ responses to interview participation; it underpins 
and interconnects all the dimensions of participants’ participation in 
interviews. Emotional distress motivates purposeful participation, creates 
relational connections, facilitates self-knowledge of participants’ and their 
experiences, and expresses its voice in the emotional space afforded by the 
interview” (McIntosh & Morse, 2009, p. 91). 
In my interviews in this project, as well as through my many conversations with 
bereaved parents in my role as a counselor in DIDA, the relieving potential of sharing 
emotionally distressing experiences has repeatedly been confirmed. Several of the 
informants explicitly state that, apart from being motivated by a wish to help others, 
one of their main motivations for participating in the interviews is the opportunity to 
talk about their painful experiences with someone who is willing to listen respectfully.  
Nevertheless, as Paul C. Rosenblatt has argued,  
“[qualitative] interviews have an unpredictable, unfolding quality that 
makes it impossible to warn people of everything that will occur during 
them. It is also impossible to inform people fully about what they might 
experience during a qualitative interview because they cannot truly 
understand all that they read or are told, because they can only be told 
abstractly about what they will have to deal with, and because nobody can 
fully anticipate their reactions in the research situation” (Rosenblatt, 1995, 
p. 148). 
Due to this unpredictable and unfolding nature of qualitative interviewing, Rosenblatt 
suggests that interviewers supplement the consent procedure at the beginning of the 
interview with a “processual consent” procedure during the interviews in order to give 
people an opportunity to stop or change the direction of the interview (Ibid.). In my 
own interviews, I involved such a procedure by including questions and comments 
such as, “I don’t know if this is an appropriate question to ask, but…”, “Could I ask 
you..?”, “Please let me know if this is not okay for you to talk about right now”, “Do 
you need a break?”, etc. Likewise, at the end of each interview, I repeated that the 
parents were always welcome to write or call me in case anything came up after the 
interview which they wanted to ask or talk to me about. However, in spite of such 
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precautions, emotional distress is likely to occur in the interview situation, and it takes 
careful considerations along the way to deal with.  
Although the sensitive nature of interviewing people in grief poses ethical challenges 
to the interviewer, it is not so much the presence of emotional distress that has been 
my main challenges in the interview situations. The greatest ethical dilemmas I have 
encountered have been of a less obvious character. For example, how and what to 
share of my personal experiences has involved a range of ethical as well as analytical 
considerations. On the one side, revealing that I am a bereaved parent myself 
potentially gave access to a privileged position as a member of an invisible community 
of bereaved parents. However, as already addressed, I was hesitant to explicitly 
address my own loss in the context of my research. Regardless of how I chose to 
include (or try not to include) my own story, I was faced with ethical and analytical 
dilemmas: How would sharing or not sharing my own story affect the parents’ 
experiences of the interview situation, and how might it affect what was told or not 
told? My brief and unelaborated answers to their occasional questions about my 
situation was motivated by an ambition to decenter my own loss, and to avoid 
implicitly presenting “my way” of dealing with loss as a normative standard. Indeed, 
the conversations with the informants were about their loss––not mine. Nevertheless, 
for some of the informants, I was one of the first bereaved parents they had ever talked 
to, and they were eager to know about my loss, and how it shaped my life after all the 
years that have passed. The latter posed another ethical dilemma, insofar as I 
intuitively sensed that they were searching for positive images of how their grief might 
become an integrated and natural part of their continuing life. And there I was, a 
bereaved parent to a nameless premature girl, whose grave is seldom visited, whose 
existence is not forgotten, but seldom mentioned. Moreover, I was researching 
parental bereavement while trying to downplay the connections between this 
professional endeavor and my personal life. Taken together, I did certainly not feel 
like a good role model. At the same time, however, I believe that being more explicit 
about these doubts (while still keeping a focus on their experiences), might have 
opened for further explorations into their doubts about being bereaved parents. My 
choice of eventually including my personal experiences in the context of research was 
not merely motivated by an ambition to create transparency and build rapport with my 
informants. As argued in my second article, “Becoming a bereaved parent”, my 
reluctance to include my personal loss experiences in the context of research reflects 
a wider, cultural conception of grief as a private, emotional process with a goal of 
resolution and normalization (Walter, 1999). Accordingly, I have included my 
personal experiences not only because it sheds light on the research process, but also 
because I believe my process of integrating personal and professional loss experiences 
sheds light on some of the cultural assumptions surrounding grief in our society.  
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5.2. TALKING ABOUT THE LOSS: NOT ALWAYS KLEENEX AND 
CANDLE LIGHTS 
In everyday conversations as well as in research on sensitive matters such as grief, the 
emotional distress of the situation is often assumed to represent the greatest challenge 
to the involved parts. Bereaved individuals testify to the widespread cultural 
conception that avoiding emotional distress is a goal when talking about loss and grief. 
The bereavement literature as well as my many conversations with bereaved parents 
suggest that a vast majority of bereaved individuals have experiences of people in 
their network trying to avoid the topic of loss out of an intention to avoid “ripping up” 
the wound and provoke sadness and distress. However, bereaved individuals often 
appreciate to have the opportunity to talk about their lost loved ones, even if it might 
provoke sadness and distress (see e.g., Arnold & Gemma, 2008, Walter, 1996). 
Although the therapeutic ethos of contemporary Western societies may have created 
a change in terms of people being more acknowledging of the “necessity to talk” about 
emotional matters (Walter, 1999), this seems to be shrouded in beliefs about this kind 
of talk as something potentially dangerous, something that requires extraordinary, 
perhaps even professional skills, as well as a carefully selected space and timing. 
Slightly caricatured, grief talk is seen as something that requires a solemn atmosphere 
with candle lights and Kleenex on the table, in order to create space for the difficult 
emotions of grief. Certainly, grief does involve difficult emotions, and there are 
indeed a range of situations in which bereaved individuals might feel it inappropriate 
or uncomfortable to be exposed to their loss. However, in spite of the emotional 
distress, and in spite of not wanting to talk about the loss with anyone anywhere, many 
bereaved individuals bemoan the cultural seclusion of grief talk from the everyday 
flow of conversation. In my own study, this was evident in the parents’ stories of other 
people’s silence when the talk fell on their dead children – or the living children of 
other people, for that matter. Several of the parents tell stories of how they have caused 
a halt in the flow of conversation by mentioning their dead children. All of a sudden, 
they report, the atmosphere changes, people become grave, silent, and uneasy. Some 
people might hesitantly ask how they are doing, after which someone usually will try 
to change the subject of the conversation. As the Danish journalist and bereaved 
father, Esben Kjær (2016) writes in his autobiographical book of living with the loss 
of his son: “It is as if he dies twice – first in reality, and then he is silenced to death” 
(p. 109, my translation). My point here is not to examine how or why this 
unwillingness to talk about loss and grief has developed in our culture. Instead, I want 
to highlight what bereaved people so desperately seem to miss in these situations, 
namely an opportunity to include their lost loved ones in their social reality––not only 
as a painful and unspeakable grief, but as a continuing, precious, and important part 
of their lives. For example, Linda mentions how she wishes to be able to say “I bet 
Lucas would have gotten red hair”, without other people responding awkwardly. I 
believe what is at stake here can best be analyzed as a case of othering (Sharp, 2011), 
through which the bereaved parents’ experiences and identities are treated as 
essentially different from parents of living children, evoking responses ranging from 
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pity, estrangement and unease to praise for being “strong”. In effect, the bereaved 
parents’ experiences of pregnancy, child birth, and parental identity are excluded from 
the conversation. As I have described in my second article, “Becoming a bereaved 
parent”, my own background as a bereavement counselor and a bereaved parent might 
have sensitized me to listen to and encourage conversations that include and normalize 
such experiences. In any case, by listening to the parents’ stories, it is obvious that 
their grief also includes love, pride, and affection for their children. When this was 
highlighted and expressed, their children’s existence was felt as an immediate 
presence during our conversations, poignantly illustrating the inseparable connections 
between grief and love. 
5.3. ANALYZING AND WRITING  
The process of analyzing and writing up my findings has been a continuous, inductive 
and explorative activity throughout the entire research period. From the very 
beginning, writing has been an integral part of the analytical process, insofar as 
writing not only (re)presents preexisting thoughts, but mediates and gives shape to 
thoughts and ideas. I have collected notes on the literature I have read, reflections I 
have had prior to and after interviews, as well as on everyday encounters with matters 
of relevance to my project (e.g., stories of bereavement, grief, mental health, suffering 
and illness represented in the mass media, social media, books, magazines, films, etc.). 
Moreover, this has been a socially mediated activity, insofar as I have discussed my 
thoughts and writings with others who have been willing to listen; with my supervisor, 
my research group, participants on Ph.D. courses and conferences, and my informants. 
Often, tentative analyses have been tested and challenged in these conversations. 
Moreover, two of the articles included in the thesis (article 1 and 4) emerged from 
papers presented at a conference and a Ph.D. course. Although they have been revised 
and elaborated on as I have progressed through the study, at some point, the reality of 
research life has forced me to let go and move on to new themes to explore and write 
about. This means that my project has not been a neatly progressing process moving 
from data collection to analyses. Instead, reading, interviewing, writing, and analyzing 
have mutually informed each other in a hermeneutical, and, admittedly, messy 
process. Encouraged and prompted by pending Ph.D. courses, conferences, or merely 
the opportunity to present emerging ideas for my research group or for DIDA (who, 
naturally, have been eager to hear about my findings), I have been forced to engage 
with my material, and to generate ideas and arguments that would not have emerged 
without the effort of writing. In spite of the messiness of this approach, I believe that 
a more linear approach would have made it difficult to me to develop self-reflective 
and sensitizing accounts of my findings. For example, although I am not proud of my 
hesitant and inept process of including my personal experiences of loss in the context 
of research, the cultural significance of this process would not have been tangible 
without continually reflecting on and analyzing my material and my engagement with 
the field.  
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The downside of this messy, ongoing analytical approach is arguably a lack of 
overview over my data. If I had followed a more linear approach from data collection 
to analysis and writing, I might have structured my articles differently. Most 
noticeably, I might have analyzed more systematically how the participants relate to 
grief over time. As I have presented my data in the articles now, I have not been 
explicit about when they were collected, i.e., which round of interviews and how long 
after the loss the selected data are drawn from. For example, in article 4, “Grief as a 
border diagnosis”, I discuss Mia’s statements about not letting grief change her, or 
only for the better (as a contrast to pathological grief, which she asserts “makes you a 
lesser person”). Although Mia to some extent maintains this position across the 
interviews, her own experiences makes her reconsider some of her previous 
perspectives. In the second and third interview, she describes how she has given up 
on her initial attempts to not let their loss change her, and not missing out of anything 
because of their loss (e.g., being close to her sister in her pregnancy, enjoying other 
people’s living babies, etc.). In spite of her attempts to avoid it, grief has changed her, 
her relationships, and her priorities. Instead of trying to please other people’s 
expectations of not “cultivating grief”, she insists on her right to continue a 
relationship with their dead daughter, allowing herself to be “more egoistic” (e.g., by 
declining invitations, allowing herself not to listen to her sister’s complaints about 
pregnancy, etc.). Such observations of how grief experiences, interpretations, and acts 
change over time could have made an important contribution to the thesis. 
My analytical approach has primarily been informed by inductive and data-driven 
strategies (Charmaz, 2006; Gibbs, 2007), in which themes are allowed to emerge from 
the data, rather than attempting to force the data into preconceived categories. I have 
read and re-read my interview transcripts several times, familiarized myself with the 
data, written comments in the margins, sorted into tentative, emerging themes, etc. 
(see example from transcript with comments in table 3, p. 76). 
Again, this process can best be described as a hermeneutic process, in which I have 
moved back and forth between the whole and the parts of the interview material, from 
reading within interviews to reading across, and from single statements and passages 
to emerging themes. In this process, my reading of the material has also been informed 
by my theoretical and practical knowledge of the field, as I have recognized themes 
that have either confirmed, challenged, nuanced, or expanded my previous 
understandings. For example, while familiarizing myself within the literature on 
parental bereavement, I have recognized themes emerging in my own data, such as 
disenfranchisement or ambiguity. These themes were also familiar to me from my 
background as a bereavement counselor. However, through careful readings and re-
readings of my own data, new understandings of how disenfranchisement and 
ambiguity processes are experienced have emerged, e.g. how parents not only 
passively find themselves victims of such processes, but also actively participate in 
the negotiation of their social realities. In a broader sense, the latter observation is also 
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informed by the dialectical perspective on the relations between individual 
experiences and cultural practices provided by the analytical outlook of the thesis.  
Instead of coding my data in a stringent way, I have used my comments as a means of 
condensing and interpreting the data (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Informed by my 
comments, I have clustered recurrent themes in my materials, such as “diffuse norms 
concerning infant loss – replaceable vs. irreplaceable”, “other people’s expectations 
of grief as ‘either-or’/’black-and-white’ vs. bereaved parents’ experiences of grief and 
joy as coexisting”, etc. Neither of these tentative codes are derived from preexisting 
theoretical concepts, although often, I have been able to find existing literature that 
sheds light on the themes developing in my material (see e.g. the reference to Tony 
Walter’s article in table 3). Although the coding has thus been primarily data driven, 
my interest in certain aspects of grief has arguably informed my interviewing as well 
as my reading of the material. For example, my interest in the situated, relational 
aspects of grief has shaped the questions I have asked, as well as the themes I have 
pursued and explored in the data. In order to explicate my active role in the interviews 
and analyzing process, I have developed reflexive codes (Gibbs, 2007) to address my 
own role in the process (e.g., codes that address normative assumptions implicated in 
my questions and remarks, interruptions, etc.). In acknowledgement of the situated, 
mediated, and processual character of meanings, my approach to the coding process 
has been as tentative heuristics, rather than as fixed and unambiguous meaning 
entities. Through the entire process, it has been a goal to develop sensitive accounts 
of bereaved parents’ experiences, interpretations, and ways of living with the loss of 
an infant.  
While striving for analytical insight, I have also attempted to broaden the scope of 
understanding by including evocative accounts of grief and loss, most notably in 
article 2, “Becoming a bereaved parent.” Beyond facilitating a more creative and 
inspiring writing process, evocative presentations also have the potential to give 
vicarious access to other people’s experiences in ways that a purely analytical account 
cannot provide. A purely analytical approach to an emotionally complex phenomenon 
such as grief is incapable of providing a comprehensive understanding of how grief is 
experienced and lived. On the other side, a purely evocative approach is equally 
incapable of grasping the complex social, cultural and material conditions that 
contribute to shape individual grief experiences. Hence, my ambition has been to 
balance between the analytical and the evocative, in order to create sensitizing and 
open-ended accounts of grief that promotes understanding, compassion, and empathy. 
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Interview excerpt: My comments: 
Chris: They don’t understand that you can... 
miss your dead child so much... [Ester: Mm.] 
…and at the same time, run around in an 
amusement park with Carl [Lucas’ younger 
brother] and be happy. [Ester: Mm.] You 
can’t do that! You can’t… [Linda: Mm, 
mm…] The world is simply too black and 
white [Ester: Mm.] in many people’s way 
to… that’s not possible. 
 
Other people’s expectations of grief as 
something that is incompatible with joy and 
happiness (“black and white”) vs. bereaved 
parents’ experiences of joy and grief as 
coexisting. 
Linda: And that’s why people, at least those 
I talk to and surround myself with in my 
family and such. If you talk about Lucas, it 
is with deep sorrow. [Ester: Yes.] It can’t 
just be in a… [Chris: Mmm.] joyful way… 
Like, “I imagine [indistinctly] Lucas would 
have been fiery red haired,” or whatever, 
right? [Ester: Yes.] Like that, just as a 
passing remark. Instead it’s like, 
”Arghrrghp!” [Ester: Ah...] So then it’s 
either, ”Oh, no, phew, now we’ll have to talk 
feelings, now we must be sad, now it is grief, 
etc.” [Chris makes affirmative sounds.] In 
the middle of a merry moment or something. 
A wish to include the dead child in 
conversations without drawing attention to 
the grief vs. other people’s expectations that 
anything concerning their dead child 
involves “deep sorrow”. 
Walter, 1996 (“Bereavement and 
Biography…”): Grief as construction of 
durable biography through talk with others 
who knew the deceased (more than 
emotional processing). 
Early infant loss: Diffuse loss – others did 
not know the child. Loss of past vs. loss of 
future. (Memories vs. dreams and 
expectations) 
Chris: But-  
Ester: Yes, yes. Like then it becomes kind of 
a state of emergency. 
(Interrupts.) 
Linda: Yes, exactly.  
Chris: Yes, but it’s probably also – try to 
think of how much we’ve worked to place 
Lucas on the right shelf. [Ester: Mmm.] All 
those around us need to place him on the 
right shelf too. And right now it’s just black 
and white. 
“Together they construct a story that places 
the dead within their lives” (Walter, 1996, p. 
1). Chris expresses hope that this is possible 
through continuing conversations… 
Table 3: Excerpt from interview transcript with comments. 
 
5.4. STORIES OF LOVE AND LOSS: BRIEF PRESENTATIONS OF 
THE PARTICIPATING PARENTS 
Before ending this chapter, I will briefly present fragments of the stories of the parents 
I have talked to during this project. It is important to emphasize that these are indeed 
only tiny glimpses into the realities of living with the loss of a child, primarily 
focusing on the immediate situation of going through the loss of a baby. Some of the 
following narratives are presented in modified versions in article 2, “Becoming a 
bereaved parent”. Here, I will let all of the parents and their children be presented by 
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a brief narrative, in order to provide some context and empathic resonance for the 
interview data presented in the articles.  
Emma & John 
Emma’s second pregnancy had been going so well––everything was perfect, and 
although she had been a bit worried about not gaining much weight, the midwives had 
reassured her that everything was just fine. Their entire family was anxious to have a 
new member; their little two-year old toddler was to be a big brother, and Emma’s 
sister was pregnant at the same time. As Emma puts it, “everything was just as it 
should be.” A few weeks before the expected birth, she gets a little worried. She has 
not felt the baby kicking for a while, and although a regular check at the midwife’s 
office a couple of days earlier showed no sign of warning, she ends up contacting the 
maternity ward “just to be reassured.” She is not. She remembers the words of the 
midwife who did the ultrasound: “The little heart has stopped beating.” At first, Emma 
recollects, she just wants it to be “overcome as quickly as possible.” John remembers 
that he “really just thought it was a pregnancy that had gone wrong; an abortion.” 
However, with the gentle guidance from the midwifes at the maternity ward, they get 
used to the idea of giving birth to their child, and they both remember the birth as a 
pleasant experience. Emma gives birth to a boy. Here, I call him Samuel. As his warm 
body lies quietly on her chest, he seems absolutely perfect. John recalls how the 
midwives congratulated them on their son. When I ask what this meant to him, he 
explains that it was “a part of the recognition that he was a real human being, and (…) 
he was our son”. At this point, Emma starts to cry. I look at her. “You’re tearful now”, 
I say. Emma sits quietly sobbing for a moment, before she speaks: “It’s just that… Of 
course, he was a real human being.” “Mmm…”, John says, and nods affirmatively. 
Thomas & Anna 
Thomas and Anna have been together for eight years when they decide to try to have 
a child. Anna gets pregnant “at first ovulation”, and as the morning sickness gradually 
fades, they are kind of laid back, not being too busy planning, although looking 
forward to what was going to happen. The birth is getting closer, and one day Anna 
notices that she has not felt the baby kicking as much as it used to. She has been told 
that it is quite normal in late pregnancy, so she does not become that worried, but calls 
the maternity ward just to be sure. They ask her to come by, and they “bring the camera 
with them – just in case.” Birth might be close now. First a midwifery student and 
then an experienced midwife tries to find the baby’s heart beat with the ultrasonic 
scanner, without success. Anna recollects that she was not panicking, as she still could 
not imagine anything being seriously wrong. Thomas, on the other hand, recalls that 
“it began to dawn” on him. They are prepared for birth, and Thomas remembers being 
“devastated, as far down as I have ever been.” Anna, however, was fully concentrated 
on giving birth, and recalls the birth as a “really good experience––I can really do 
this!” As their little son is born, Anna holds him by her chest, and feels like any other 
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proud new mother. She recalls the midwife saying she had rarely seen a stillborn baby 
this beautiful. In the evening after the birth, Thomas sits with his son. As he puts his 
finger into Oliver’s tiny palm and his little fingers don’t squeeze back, Thomas is hit 
by the irretrievable reality. Their son is dead. They both stress how the midwives 
gently “showed the way” (a phrase they both repeatedly use) to how they could be 
together with their dead son. As Anna states, “it was so natural to be together with 
him. If anyone had told me they’d been together with their dead child from Monday 
to Thursday, I would have thought it was macabre, but… (…) It has really helped the 
attachment…” Their son was named during birth, as Thomas gives the midwife 
permission to call him the name they had been thinking of during pregnancy. In this 
thesis, I call him Oliver. 
Linda & Chris 
Linda and Chris start by telling me that their son––I call him Lucas––was “made with 
fertility treatment.” After trying for two and a half years, pregnancy was going 
“fantastic.” Due to a medical condition, Linda was having extra weight scans, but their 
“little football player” was doing fine, and as birth was getting closer, they were 
“excited as a child before Christmas.” Lucas is born one week after the due date, and 
in spite of being a bit smaller than they expected, he is fine. After a few days in the 
hospital to get breastfeeding on track, they go home. Linda does not feel like sleeping. 
“I just lay there watching him. When I slept, you [Chris] held him. It felt safe. (…) 
Having my two boys in the living room. It was nice.” At a point, though, they cannot 
get Lucas to eat, and as they are a little worried about his weight, they decide to call 
the “nursing hotline” for advice. The person they talk to advises them to wait until 
morning, where they are scheduled for an appointment anyway. However, Lucas 
seems to be getting worse. He is not responding to touch, and his skin color is 
changing, so Chris insists that they come in with him immediately. When this is 
rejected, he hangs up and calls 911. The ambulance crew takes over, and in a state of 
shock, Linda and Chris cooperate on getting to the hospital with their son: Linda in 
the ambulance, and Chris following after in their own car. In the days that follows, 
Linda and Chris stand by the side of his incubator, encouraging him to fight for his 
life. “I kept telling him about all the wonderful things that should happen when we 
got back home with him”, Linda recalls, “how proud we were of him, how much we 
loved him, that he should fight, that we fought with him.” The doctors cannot say what 
is wrong with Lucas, and he is getting more and more sick. After repeatedly having 
turned it down, Linda and Chris get to the point where they accept the offer of an 
emergency baptism. Shortly after the ceremony, Lucas is released from all the tubes 
that have been attached to his little body. “He breathes out in our arms,” Linda says 
quietly. “It was how it was supposed to be, when it had to be like this. In that moment, 
our world fell apart.”  
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Rita 
Rita has been struggling with mental illness for many years when she meets her 
husband. She is in her late thirties when they meet, and they soon decide they want to 
have children together. Becoming pregnant turns out to be a struggle too. After two 
years of trying, including arduous periods of fertility treatment, Rita finally gets 
pregnant. During pregnancy, she attends a program for “vulnerable parents”, due to 
her pre-history with mental illness. The process is hard on her, as she experiences it 
as an unduly “digging” into her problematic past. She is stressed out by it, and finds 
herself in a dilemma between wanting to back out of it, and at the same time being 
afraid of “closing the door” to potentially needed help during the pregnancy and 
afterwards. With her doctor’s consent, she decides to quit the weekly appointments in 
the program, and “concentrate on being carefree pregnant,” enjoying all the 
expectations, and planning for this very planned baby to come. Halfway through 
pregnancy, Rita’s water suddenly cracks, and after two weeks in a hospital bed, 
fighting to delay a premature birth, Rita gives birth to a little girl. Here, I call her Lily. 
As they realize that the birth cannot be prevented, and that it is still too early to hope 
for Lily to survive, Rita focuses on giving her a gentle birth, and to experience as 
much as they can with her in the short time they might get with her. “In the middle of 
all the tragic and traumatic,” she recalls, “all of a sudden there was something life-
giving––after all––in all this darkness. So she was born, and… she was alive. And she 
was so beautiful and unharmed. Because I thought: The only thing I can do for her is 
to be good at giving birth to her, so she wouldn’t have to suffer too much.” Lily dies 
peacefully on Rita’s chest shortly after birth, with her father’s arms around her. “It 
was the right way to leave this world,” Rita says with a trembling voice. “It means a 
lot, because we got the opportunity to become parents, even though we knew she 
wouldn’t survive.” 
Paul & Sarah 
Although Paul and Sarah had been trying for some time to get pregnant, they did not 
worry too much about it. After a year and a half, including a “brief detour” to a 
gynecologist, Sarah became pregnant, and everything was going “nice and quietly.” 
Sarah had never regarded herself as especially fond of babies, and when she was 
younger, she was not sure she would want to have children of her own. As the baby 
started kicking, she was getting used to the thought of becoming a mother and to the 
fact that their world as they knew it was about to change for good. One day, about two 
months before the expected delivery, Sarah notices that her stomach feels a bit tense. 
As she is about to go to sleep, she cannot feel the baby kicking, and when she visits 
the toilet half an hour later, she faints onto the bathroom floor. Peter is away for a 
period because of his work, so she calls her parents-in-law, who live nearby. They 
take her to the hospital where a midwife tries in vain to find the baby’s heartbeat. 
Doctors show up to do an ultrasound. Even before their final confirmation, Sarah 
knows it is over, and is already pondering what is going to happen now. They 
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eventually succeed in getting in contact with Paul, who is rushed home by plane a few 
hours later, in due time to be there during the birth. Both their families are at the 
hospital when their little girl is born, and afterwards, they are happy that they all saw 
her: “[She] was an absolutely fine and healthy baby, just a bit small. Our families saw 
that. There was no doubt she was a child (…) Nobody has questioned our grief.” Their 
little girl got the name they both had been most keen on before the birth. Here, I call 
her Eva. 
Mia & Jacob 
Mia and Jacob have just met when they find out that Mia is pregnant. For a week or 
two, they are in doubt, lying awake at night: Are we going to have a baby? Shall it be 
us? An appointment with the doctor makes it “100% clear” that they did not want an 
abortion: “I don’t think it was a hard decision”, Jacob recalls. Time rushes away as 
they are planning for their new life together: moving together, meeting each other’s 
friends and families for the first time, and sharing the big news with them. Throughout 
the pregnancy, they exercise together, Mia with the doctor’s and midwife’s consent: 
“Pregnancy is not an illness.” However, by week 30, she has to take sick leave from 
work due to signs of threatening preterm labor. This passes, and a few days before the 
estimated date of delivery, they are invited to a family get-together a few hours away 
from home. Mia feels she is about to go into labor, but she is stoic, and does not say 
anything, although “the women who had given birth noticed.” It is Jacob’s mother 
who eventually suggests that they head homeward. In the car, Mia tells Jacob she has 
not felt the baby kicking for a while. They pull over, and Jacob puts his ear to her 
belly, as he has done so many times during the last months. This time, he cannot hear 
the little heart ticking. They call the hospital, and a midwife reassures them this is 
quite normal; “but if you’re really worried, you can come by.” Although Mia feels a 
bit stupid, Jacob insists they go by the maternity ward. Neither a stethoscope nor an 
ultrasound can find any heartbeat. Mia recalls: “I kept hoping. For me, it is not until 
the doctor scans me (…) and we can see that the little heart is all still, that I truly 
realize it. (…) Then everything stops. I go into shock. The contractions stop…” Jacob 
continues, “It’s the worst night of my life. It can’t be right. I still think that.” 
“Sometimes I think,” he says, turning to Mia, “have you been pregnant at all?”  
After a few hours back home, they return to the hospital. Mia goes into labor. “It was 
beautiful––nice and quiet,” Mia recalls. “When I was about to give up,” she says to 
Jacob, “you encouraged me. It was like when we’ve been training together.” They 
have not decided on what to do when their little girl is born, but when it happens, they 
have no doubt. “Of course we should hold her,” Mia says. “That’s what they had 
recommended, although it would be okay if we didn’t want to. (…) All of a sudden, 
each second was really precious.” The first time I speak to Mia and Jacob, their little 
girl is called by an affectionate nickname. Later on, they decide to give her a real 
name. Here, I call her Sophie. 
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Eric & Diana 
Two years before we meet, Eric and Diana become parents to their first child, William. 
Diana has dreamt of having a child for years, Eric tells me. The first night after birth, 
she can hardly sleep. She just lies there, looking at their little boy. She thinks his 
respiration is strange, but the hospital staff tells them not to worry: Newborn babies’ 
breathing tend to be a little irregular. In the evening the day after he is born, William 
falls asleep during breastfeeding, and Diana lets him sleep. All of a sudden, she is 
worried: “Is he breathing?” she asks Eric, and as she hands him over to her husband, 
William’s little body is motionless and limp. Eric runs out to call for help, and after 
some chaotic minutes, the doctors hurry to resuscitate William. He is brought back to 
life, but with severe brain damage. He is kept alive for five days before he dies, six 
days old. Eric recalls how often Diana has talked about the first 24 hours with William 
as the best time of her life. For months, William’s death is unexplained, and when 
seeing parents walking their babies in their strollers, Diana wonders how they dare to. 
“We thought babies just stopped breathing”, she recalls, “without any warning.” 
However, after waiting for months, the final autopsy report lets them know that 
William was born with a rare disease that caused him to stop breathing. Getting an 
answer is a relief, especially because they are told that it is not a hereditary disease. 
At the same time, the extreme rarity of William’s condition adds to the feeling of an 
incomprehensibly bad fortune. Eric recalls, “For so many years you wanted to have 
children. And then it happens, and he is fine and healthy, and then he just dies––all of 
a sudden. It is so incredibly unfortunate. I remember I thought so for a very long time 
afterwards, and I still think so. It’s incomprehensible that it could happen. Still. 
Absolutely incomprehensible.” 
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CHAPTER 6. “HERE EVERYBODY 
KNEW I WAS A PARENT”: GRIEF IN 
THE DANISH INFANT DEATH 
ASSOCIATION 
“As I entered [DIDA’s annual meeting], it was like everyone could see – 
I brought William with me. I mean, here everybody knew I was a mother. 
That I had a son. Because when you come there, you’ve lost someone, and 
everybody just knew. Of course, they didn’t know I had a son, but… That 
meant a lot to me. It was as if it was the first time I brought William with 
me out to show him to the world”  
(Diana, two years after the loss of her firstborn son). 
Like many other bereaved parents, perhaps especially parents who have lost a child in 
the very beginning of life, Diana’s story testifies to the complexity of bereaved 
parental identity. In the months after their son’s death, she struggled with realizing 
that he had been there; that it had all happened; that it had not merely been a dream. 
She was a mother––or was she? Eric tells that she repeatedly asked herself (and him) 
this question. Consequently, their first visit to a DIDA gathering with other bereaved 
parents became crucial to her parental identity. Diana’s story of doubting and 
searching for confirmation of her parental identity is far from unique among the 
parents I have interviewed. As Dennis Klass (1988) notes, bereaved parents are faced 
with reestablishing themselves in a changed world (p. 99). This reestablishment 
involves their own identity as bereaved parents, their ways of interpreting and dealing 
with their loss, how to find a place for the loss and for their dead child, and how to 
see themselves in a future that is changed by the loss. For some parents, participating 
in DIDA’s services for bereaved parents becomes a part of the process of learning 
how to live with the loss. (For the sake of clarity, an overview of DIDA’s history, 
organizational structure, and services is presented in table 1 next page.) 
In the next, I examine how DIDA’s services have been involved in these processes 
for the parents participating in my study. First, I examine how parental identity is 
mediated by the involvement in DIDA’s services. Second, I examine how the services 
may provide experiential repertoires for how to deal with and interpret the loss, and 
how the parents reflexively use these repertoires in their everyday lives. Third, I 
discuss how the parents relate to the authority of personal experience as a contrast to 
or supplement to professional expertise concerning grief and loss. Forth, I examine 
how the parents position themselves and navigate between the repertoires provided 
by the bereavement community and the “outside world” of their personal networks  
PARENTAL GRIEF AFTER INFANT LOSS 
 
 
84 
 
DIDA’s history and organization:  
DIDA emerged in 1983 as a subgroup within the association “Parents and Birth” [“Forældre 
og Fødsel”], initiated by a bereaved mother in order to improve support for bereaved parents 
after infant loss. In 1992, it was established as an independent, private, nationwide 
association under its current name. DIDA is a humanitarian membership-based organization 
with approx. 1000 members (bereaved parents and families), 70 volunteering members 
(bereaved parents who volunteer in peer-to-peer support services), and five employees at the 
secretariat (including the secretariat leader, three bereavement counselors, and one 
administrative employee). The board of the association, elected among the members at the 
annual general assembly, is responsible for making major decisions concerning the 
organization. Since 2004, Her Excellency Countess Alexandra Christina of Fredensborg has 
served as protector of the association. 
DIDA’s services used by the participating parents in this study: 
1. Counseling conversations with DIDA’s professional bereavement counselors 
(primarily telephonic, but also occasional face-to-face meetings). The counseling can 
consist of single or multiple conversations, depending on the bereaved parents’ 
situations and needs. According to DIDA’s web page, “the counseling can be used to 
talk about the loss […], gain insight in one’s own and other people’s reactions, get 
information about grief and grief reactions, […] rules and rights, hear about other 
people’s experiences from a similar situation, and get information about the 
association’s services.”21 
2. Monthly meetings led by volunteers who have lost a child, all of which receive training 
and supervision from DIDA’s counselors. The meetings are open for parents and their 
grown-up friends and relatives. When I conducted the interviews, these meetings 
usually included a presentation round, where the parents were invited to tell their story, 
a presentation by a professional or a lay-person on a predefined topic, e.g. “celebrating 
Christmas without one’s child,” “communicating about grief,” etc., and a more open 
conversation based on presented topic or whatever the participants preferred to discuss. 
3. Parental groups, i.e., smaller, closed groups of 3-4 couples or single parents who are 
matched by DIDA’s counselors and who meet in each other’s homes. At the first four 
meetings, a volunteer from DIDA facilitates the conversation, after which the parents 
can choose to continue meeting each other on their own. 
4. Annual meetings where the members of the organization (regular members, volunteers, 
and board members) meet to socialize, listen to presentations, etc. The annual meetings 
also include the general assembly of the organization, where the members elect the 
board and make decisions for the organization’s future. 
5. Hospital based bereavement support group, led by health care professionals who were 
initially trained and supervised by DIDA’s counselors (only one of the couples, Paul 
and Sarah, participated in this service.) 
 
Other activities and services include weekend gatherings for bereaved parents, telephonic 
conversations with a volunteering contact person with the aim of providing identification 
and support, All Saints masses in churches all over the country where families can come and 
memorialize their dead children, public events such as a photo exhibition of bereaved 
parents’ tattoos, the opportunity to enroll in a team for DIDA in a public running event, etc. 
Table 1: DIDA’s history, organizational structure, services and activities (at the time of the 
interviews). 
                                                            
21 DIDA’s web page: http://spaedbarnsdoed.dk/tilbud/radgivning/ (Accessed February 24th, 
2017.) 
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and the wider culture. Fifth, I examine how DIDA’s services provide resources for 
seeing oneself in the future, and how the parents’ positions and roles within the 
services may change over time. Finally, I will briefly discuss some of the normative 
dilemmas involved in decisions about DIDA’s practices, and how these decisions 
inevitably enable or restrict certain normative practices and interpretations related to 
infant loss, parental grief, and identity. 
6.1. PARENTAL IDENTITY IN A COMMUNITY OF BEREAVED 
PARENTS 
As I attempt to demonstrate in my second and third articles, bereaved parental identity 
in contemporary Western cultures is a continuous process mediated by diffuse and 
ambivalent, yet inescapably normative practices and understandings concerning 
infant loss and parental grief. Drawing on a Heideggerian existential-
phenomenological perspective, Thomas Attig (2004) describes grief as a process of 
“learning practical ways to live meaningfully again through reshaping our daily life, 
redirecting our life story, and reestablishing connections with larger wholes of which 
we are a part” (p. 350). For some of the bereaved parents in my study, this process is 
mediated by practices and interpretive repertoires provided by DIDA. For many of the 
parents, coming to see themselves as belonging to a community of bereaved parents 
was not a straight-forward and easy process. Echoing a much-used Danish proverb, 
several of the parents express an initial feeling of being struck by something one 
usually thinks “only happens to one’s neighbor,” implying that we usually do not 
imagine bad things happening to ourselves. The identity as a bereaved parent is new, 
unfamiliar, and unsolicited, and the thought of identifying with others in such a 
situation can be overwhelming. As Dennis Klass (1988) frames it, entering and 
identifying with a community of other bereaved parents are accompanied by concerns 
of whether the people there are “like I want to be” (p. 104). These concerns are also 
present among the parents in my study. For example, Linda recalls how she imagined 
the other participants prior to their first participation in a DIDA meeting as “drug 
addicts and young mothers,” i.e., someone radically different from herself.  Likewise, 
Jacob describes their reluctance before entering the first meeting like this, 
 “the first time we went there [to DIDA’s monthly meeting], it was like 
‘we’re not going there, are we? This only happens to somebody else!’ That 
was difficult to begin with.”  
Several of the parents express similarly reluctant and ambivalent feelings concerning 
seeing themselves as members of such a community. On the one side, there is a 
comfort involved in belonging to a community and knowing that you are not alone. 
On the other side, it is a community you definitely do not want to belong to. In our 
last interview, I ask Linda and Chris to describe what DIDA has meant to them in the 
time following the loss of their son. Linda replies, 
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”To belong somewhere. I don’t know if that’s good or bad. I can’t figure 
that out. Because it’s a group you don’t want to be a part of. But then again, 
you are. And there’s just this sense of community. I mean, regardless of 
how close or far away you are from it [DIDA]… Now of course we’re a 
bit farther away from it, but… You still have this sense of belonging. You 
have a place.” 
In spite of the initial reluctance, many of the parents emphasize that meeting others 
for the first time was a relieving experience. As Mia frames it, 
“You don’t feel alone, because all of a sudden you sit in a room with 
twenty other people who are all in the same boat.” 
In fact, merely knowing that there is a community of bereaved individuals, 
represented by an organization, can provide a sense of comfort and recognition, 
because it proves that you are “not all alone in the world”, as several of my informants 
express it. Engaging in such a community may provide a sense of shared identity 
based on the shared condition and experiences, regardless of other differences 
between the participants. Due to the culturally contested nature of early infant loss, 
the existence of such a community may serve as an important social recognition of 
one’s loss and identity as a bereaved parent. As Diana’s quote in the introduction to 
this chapter illustrates, the recognition of one’s parental identity and dead child is 
implicitly present in the very existence of such a community, prior to any verbal 
expression of recognition. Whether one talks or not, belonging to a community of 
others who has similar experiences can be significant (Walter, 1999, p. 43). Chris 
illustrates how the mutual recognition of sharing the same fate enables ways of being 
together and talking about the loss that are difficult to achieve with others, 
 “It’s like you don’t have to pre-explain a lot of things. Each time you meet 
new people who don’t know what this is, you feel you have to explain and 
elaborate on what kind of feelings… and that just makes it very, very… 
heavy. [Linda: Yes, and cold.] Yes, cold too, right? Then, when you enter 
the room for the first time at a meeting [in DIDA] and say ‘Okay, we’re 
here, let’s get started! We know what we’re up to’. That is relieving.” 
Rather than merely focusing on the emotional distress involved in grieving, the 
bereavement community provides social recognition of the parents’ identity as 
bereaved parents. Moreover, by talking together and sharing experiences of being 
parents of dead children, their dead children gain social existence (Klass, 2006, p. 
845). Several of the parents describe the comfort provided by other bereaved parents’ 
recognition of their dead children. While people outside the bereavement community 
often become silent when they talk about their children, the bereavement community 
represents a forum in which it is welcomed to talk and share stories of their children, 
remembering birthdays, etc. For example, several of the parents describe the special 
significance of other bereaved parents congratulating them on their children, instead 
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of merely condoling their loss. Referring to another bereaved couple in her personal 
network, Linda says, 
“They were the first to say congratulations––congratulations on your son. 
Because they knew what it was all about.” 
By congratulating, in spite of the loss, the bereaved parents express their 
acknowledgment of the child’s existence and the bereaved parents’ parenthood. 
Likewise, many of the parents explain how new pregnancies are referred to in the 
bereavement community as their dead children becoming big brothers or sisters. In 
addition to being an acknowledgment of the dead children’s continuous status as their 
parents’ children, this is also used by many of the parents as a way to introduce a new 
pregnancy to outsiders, hereby stressing that a new pregnancy does not imply that 
they forget their dead children. This leads me to another issue, namely how the parents 
reflexively use DIDA’s services and communities as experiential repertoires for 
dealing with and interpreting the loss in their everyday lives. 
6.2. SHARING IDEAS AND EXPERIENCES, DEFINING ONE’S 
OWN WAY 
“If I shall try to explain how we used DIDA… I think it can be explained 
by… it’s as if you walk in a dead alley. You don’t know where you are, 
you don’t know where you’re going. So it’s a kind of guidance, I think. 
What do other people do in this situation? Because the situation seems so 
hopeless. So it’s nice to listen to someone who has been in the same 
situation.”  
(Eric, two years after the loss of their firstborn son) 
In addition to providing interpretive repertoires for mediating one’s relationship to 
oneself as a bereaved parent to a dead child, DIDA’s activities also provide resources 
for dealing with all sorts of issues and dilemmas the parents are faced with in their 
everyday lives after the loss. As Eric’s quote indicates, learning to live with the loss 
of an infant is an unknown and difficult territory to navigate in. Unclear cultural 
norms, lack of public acknowledgment, and few common rituals add to the experience 
of not knowing how to live with such a loss (Rando, 1992; Malacrida, 1998; Walter, 
1999). In this situation, many bereaved parents search for guidance among others who 
are dealing with the same difficulties. Sometimes, merely being reassured that others 
have the same experiences is sufficient to provide comfort. Like Paul expresses it, 
“I can walk around with some frustrations and thoughts, and then there’s 
someone sitting there [in the bereavement support group] with exactly the 
same, and then you think, ‘okay, so it’s probably okay to feel like this.’ 
(…) Not because it’s a goal to be normal, but just so you don’t feel… all 
alone in the world.” 
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Other times, listening to the other parents give more concrete ideas to how one can 
face the challenges and dilemmas involved in living with the loss. For example, 
several of the parents explain how listening to the other parents they have met through 
DIDA has given them ideas to what they can do in their continuing lives as bereaved 
parents. This may for example involve “how to include the dead child in the family 
without cultivating it,” as Anna phrases it in our last conversation. Inspired by another 
mother participating in DIDA’s monthly meetings, she and Thomas had decided to 
buy a candle holder to memorize Oliver. Such decisions are often described by the 
parents as carefully thought through in order to find out “if it fits” with their own 
values and norms for how to deal with their loss. As Anna explains it, “We’ve been 
inspired and then we have talked about what would feel right for us.”  
In my time as a counselor in DIDA, the role of the volunteering parents who lead these 
activities (the monthly meetings and the parental groups) was often discussed. The 
fact that they are not professionals, although they have a huge responsibility for 
leading these activities in a skillful way, was a frequently occurring concern among 
the counselors who were responsible for training and supervising them. One major 
concern was whether the volunteers unintentionally may come to imply normative 
assumptions of how to deal with loss based on their own notions of what constitutes 
“good grieving.” In spite of a huge focus on this, the parents participating in my study 
do indeed testify to experiences of volunteers who express their own norms about 
grief. However, this does not seem to concern the parents. For example, Mia describes 
how the volunteers express their grief in different ways, someone by accepting the 
loss, others by expressing bitterness. When I ask how she experiences this, she states 
that it “provides a very realistic picture” of how grief can be. As she says, “You can 
certainly disagree with those who sit there [the volunteers], and make up your own 
mind.” 
Whether ideas and advice come from fellow participants or from the volunteers, the 
parents seem to reflectively use and negotiate them to fit with their own values and 
beliefs. In other words, rather than being passively shaped by normative standards 
imposed through DIDA, the parents mediate their own grief through the cultural 
repertoires provided through DIDA––as well as through the wider cultural practices 
the parents are situated in. 
6.2.1. ACCEPTING DIFFERENCES AND INDIVIDUALIZING NORMALITY 
Another subject that is often stressed by the parents is how participation in DIDA’s 
services has played a role for how they relate to differences within the couple in 
dealing with the loss. For example, Linda describes the importance of “learning to 
accept that we are different, and that we grieve differently.” This is so commonly 
described that I can probably find almost exactly the same quote in several of the 
interviews. Rather than explaining these differences in essentialist terms, most of the 
parents address this as a matter of different conditions for men and women. These 
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include different rights concerning parental leave after the loss of a child, different 
cultural expectations and social support to fathers and mothers following infant loss, 
gender socialization concerning how to deal with emotional distress, as well as the 
different physical relationship to the child during pregnancy (this is interestingly 
almost exclusively addressed by the fathers). Although these differences are easily 
explained by the parents, learning to accept them is another matter. For example, in 
my conversation with Diana and Eric, Diana repeatedly stresses the importance of 
getting advice and information about these issues. She says, 
“[The bereavement counselor] clearly stressed that it is different how you 
react in grief. And that it was okay to react in the way that you do. One 
should accept it, right? (…) I remember Eric sometimes asked “What’s the 
normal thing to do here?” And then she said “Oh, but that is so different. 
Somebody does this and this”, and then she came up with some examples. 
But it’s important that you do it your own way – that you accept your own 
way.” 
When I ask why this was important to her, Diana responds that she had felt “so 
enormously wrong.” She had been convinced that Eric’s way of dealing with the loss 
was “more right,” and that he was going through the loss more easily than her. 
However, the bereavement counselor reassured her that people grieve differently. 
Moreover, and perhaps at least as important, the counselor stressed that “just because 
you don’t cry, that doesn’t mean you’re not sad,” as Diana phrases it.  
In terms of differences, the fathers sometimes say they have missed the presence of 
more men participating in the activities. As Thomas states, “it would have been nice 
if more men joined––that would bring up some other subjects… instead of––I don’t 
know… women’s stuff. As time went by, I felt it became less relevant for me to be 
there [at the monthly meetings].” When I ask him what he thinks could have made it 
more relevant for him and others like him to participate, he says, “I have good 
experiences with walking, for example. Instead of just sitting across to each other and 
talk feelings. Do something, you know. I guess it’s got something to do with gender 
socializing…”  
John reflects on gender differences as well several times during our interviews. In our 
first conversation, he notes that he was intrigued by how one of DIDA’s counselors 
had been talking about gender at one of the monthly meetings. In contrast to his 
experiences and preconceptions, the counselor had stressed the individual character 
of grief and that there are no “male” or “female” ways of grieving. In our first 
conversation, John seems to doubt this interpretation. However, in our last 
conversation, he returns to this issue. He recalls that Emma had asked her 
psychologist, who had made it clear that there are indeed gender differences in grief. 
Nevertheless, John states, he appreciates that DIDA had stressed the individuality 
instead of the gender differences. When I ask him why he thinks so, he replies, “It 
would be terrible if someone sat there and were happy to be there and be normal… 
PARENTAL GRIEF AFTER INFANT LOSS 
 
 
90 
 
Then it would be upsetting to be told that you’re a minority by responding like you 
do.” In other words, by stressing the individuality of grief, he asserts, the counselors 
in DIDA represent an including conception of normality, hereby allowing individual 
variation that cut across gender stereotypes. According to Tony Walter (1999), such 
rejection of popular cultural as well as clinical conceptions of grief is typical for what 
he terms mutual help groups in bereavement. On the one side, Walter asserts, such 
groups “typically reject popular culture with its notions of getting over grief in a 
matter of weeks, but on the other hand they typically also reject clinical lore with its 
notions of resolution, stages and normality” (p. 155). While “clinical lore” has 
arguably changed since Walter wrote this in 1999, conceptions of normality still 
mediate bereavement experiences. In DIDA’s individually oriented normality 
conception (as it has been portrayed by the informants in my study), the organization 
seems to represent what Walter terms “a fourth kind of knowledge about bereavement, 
sometimes conflicting with both clinical lore and research findings, and almost always 
conflicting with popular culture” (Ibid.). In the following, I examine how this “fourth 
kind of knowledge”, i.e., the personal experiences of bereaved parents, is used as a 
contrast to or supplement to professional expertise concerning grief and loss. 
6.3. THE AUTHORITY OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 
In line with Walter’s (Ibid.) observations of the skepticism towards many of the 
popular and clinical conceptions of grief, most of the parents in my study emphasize 
the significance of experiential knowledge as a source for understanding and relating 
to grief. While sometimes relating to the experiential knowledge as supplementing 
professional knowledge, at other times they express more outright skepticism towards 
knowledge that is not rooted in personal experiences. For example, in our second 
conversation, Chris reflects on their expectations before attending their first monthly 
meeting in DIDA, 
“Before we drove out to the first parents evening [the monthly meeting], I 
remember we talked a lot about: “Have they tried this themselves? [Or] 
are they just – “just” – some experts sitting there, who have read some 
books about this? Or do they actually know what they’re talking about?” 
It was very important – for me, at least – that they could tell their own 
story. And say “I know…” They know what it’s all about. Then it becomes 
legitimate for them to talk about it. Because without doubt, for you [talking 
to Linda] – correct me if I’m wrong – but there’s definitely a wall that 
comes down when someone hasn’t tried it.” 
When I ask Chris and Linda whether they think there is a difference between what 
someone who has tried something similar is “allowed” to say, compared to someone 
who has not, Chris exclaims emphatically and with what I hear as a self-ironical 
twinkle, 
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“Yes, definitely! Because we feel so special. We feel that this grief, you 
only know what you talk about if you’ve tried it yourself.” 
Linda elaborates, 
“It’s like you belong to a group. Like if you have a disease, then you belong 
to this group. It’s a bit like putting it in a box, but you feel a bit like you 
belong to this group now, and that it is only those in this group that are 
allowed to talk about it or comment on how you feel, or…” 
Chris: “At least at that point. I think it’s easier now. Now I can talk to 
others as well.” 
Linda: “But still, nobody shall come and tell me how it really is…” 
 
While others are less dismissive of the usefulness of professional support and 
knowledge, all of those who have participated in services that involves meeting other 
bereaved parents emphasize the importance of experiential knowledge. In our first 
conversation, Mia states, 
“I’ve been to a psychologist before, but in this process, I feel like I can talk 
with everybody about it. I don’t miss anyone to listen or who gives tools 
for coping, I miss someone who can say “I know how you feel”. I miss 
other mothers who says “Yes, my body does such and such. I also listen 
for my [dead] child”.  
The parents alternately move between portraying the bereavement community as a 
supplement and as an alternative to “outsider’s” knowledge and support. Chris 
mentions how this to him has been a process developing from being dismissive of 
outsider’s attempts to understand their loss towards a more appreciative attitude. 
Likewise, several of the informants stress that while the bereavement support network 
has been crucial for learning how to live with the loss, this does not eliminate the 
importance of other people’s acknowledgment and support. In the following, I will 
address how the parents in this study navigate between the interpretive repertoires 
provided from “inside” and “outside” the bereavement community in their mediation 
of grief. 
6.4. DIDA AS ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETIVE SOURCES TO 
POPULAR CULTURE’S GRIEF UNDERSTANDINGS 
In their study of bereaved parents’ experiences of participating in bereavement 
communities, Gordon Riches and Pam Dawson (1996) emphasize how they 
repeatedly have been “struck (…) by the strength of the boundary between those who 
have been through the experience of child bereavement and those who have not, and 
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by the strong identification by parents of a community of ‘insiders’” (p. 145). In 
similar veins, Paul C. Rosenblatt (2000) talks of a “chasm” between bereaved parents 
and other people (p. 93), and Dennis Klass (1988) notes that “[sometimes] there seems 
to be a rather strange feeling of estrangement from the natural support system that 
moves people to find a place where they will fit in” (p. 102). According to the 
American sociologist David Karp (1996), a commonly described function of 
“subcultures among disvalued groups is to provide support for alternative, non-
stigmatizing, definitions of their common circumstance” (p. 47).  
To a certain extent, my interviews with the parents participating in this study echoes 
such findings. However, rather than describing their relationship to the bereavement 
community and to the ‘outside world’ as fixed and unambiguous, the parents seem to 
navigate and draw upon interpretive resources available to them in multiple and highly 
individual ways. For example, in my first interview with Mia and Jacob, they both 
express how it is important to them “not to get too far away from the normal,” and to 
avoid “cultivating” and being stuck in their grief. To this endeavor, they actively draw 
upon cultural conceptions of normality and pathology that are available through 
communication with their family, health care professionals, etc. They also draw upon 
what they see as negative examples of coping which they have encountered during 
their participation in DIDA’s services, as well as in a bereaved friend whose grief they 
repeatedly refer to as “their worst horror scenario.”  However, they also describe 
examples of how their attempts to mediate their grief through these conceptions of 
normality have failed, and how participation in DIDA’s services has served as 
alternative sources to mediate these experiences. Mia explains, 
“We chose to pull the plug and celebrate New Year’s Eve alone, just Jacob 
and me. Our parents said they understood, but I could sense that they were 
a bit worried. And then, in the group [DIDA], of course nobody had 
celebrated New Year’s Eve. We had at least dressed up. (…) The others 
had really pulled the plug. We have tried to seem as strong as possible. 
Not that there hasn’t been room for a little tear, but we’ve been so busy 
becoming as normal as possible again… To avoid this label of being those 
who have lost.” 
Although Mia and Jacob at times distance themselves from how the other participants 
relate to their loss, the bereavement community nevertheless serves as an 
interpretational repertoire for understanding and relating to their own experiences and 
societal expectations. At other times, the parents portray their participation in DIDA’s 
services as a “safe base” that prepare them to engage with the outside world, without 
necessarily feeling estranged from this outside world. For example, in our second 
conversation, Chris states, 
“Those around us, they don’t really get it… But now I can meet the world. 
Perhaps because I have a safe base in DIDA. So, when the world gets too 
stupid and moves on too fast, then once a month I am allowed to stop and 
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say, ‘phew! I’m still here.’ I think that’s what I use it for. I can feel now, 
at work, that things are moving fast now. In the first two or three weeks, I 
had colleagues who were immensely good at covering me. Now, the train 
is moving.” 
While DIDA’s services might serve as alternatives to cultural norms that the parents 
find difficult or undesirable to strive for, the implicit norms of the bereavement 
community might also at times be experienced as problematic for the parents. For 
example, Thomas and Anna repeatedly mention how the atmosphere at the monthly 
meetings has involved a sense of normative pressure towards expressing their grief in 
a certain way. In our second conversation, Anna explains it like this, 
Anna: “[With some of] the other participants, you can barely hear what 
they say, because they cry so much. Then it’s difficult when it’s my turn.” 
Me: “You feel there’s a normative pressure?” 
Anna: “Exactly. Should I sort out the positive things, and talk more about 
the difficult, dark things?” 
They both stress the volunteers’ role in creating this atmosphere. As Thomas describes 
it, “I get so tired of that overly pedagogical voice going ‘Now I will tell you… two 
years ago, I lost…’” Anna laughs and finishes his sentence, “veeery slow… now it’s 
really dark and sad!” When I ask them what they feel this invites to, Anna states that 
she feels an expectation of “having some feelings you don’t have, like they want you 
to say something specific.” At the same time, they acknowledge, the volunteers’ task 
is a difficult one, insofar as they cannot be too upbeat either. In any case, Thomas’ 
and Anna’s example illustrates how grieving is a socially situated, normative practice 
that involves active “emotion work” and negotiations of situated “feeling rules” 
(Hochschild, 1979; see also chapter 1, “Defining the subject matter” (pp. 10-11)). 
Although reflected upon and contested in our conversation, it is likely that the 
experience of the feeling rules of the situation is rather tacit and unreflected. The rules 
and normative demands of the situation are sensed as an affective atmosphere (Slaby, 
2016) that enables and inhibits, encourages and discourages specific enactments of 
grief (cf. chapter 2, “Grief as emotional practices” (pp. 18-21)). 
6.5. SEEING ONESELF IN THE FUTURE 
“As a matter of fact, what took up most energy in the time after Michael 
died was perhaps: ‘Can you really have a normal life?’ (…) You kind of 
grope in the dark, thinking ‘Now everything just falls apart.’ Perhaps you 
looked for some inspiration… Perhaps we searched for an image of how 
the future could look like… In reality, right?” 
(Eric, 2 years after the loss of their firstborn son). 
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As I illustrate in my second article, “Becoming a bereaved parent,” parental identity 
after infant loss is an ongoing, culturally mediated process. Relearning the world 
(Attig, 2004) and developing “a durable biography that enables the living to integrate 
the memory of the dead into their ongoing lives” (Walter, 1996, p. 7) take time and 
effort. In the following, I examine how DIDA’s services provide resources for seeing 
oneself in the future, and how the parents’ positions and roles within the services may 
change over time. In his ethnographic work on bereaved parents in a bereavement 
network, Dennis Klass (1988) stresses that developing an identity as a bereaved parent 
and imagining the future after the loss of a child is a painful and frightening process. 
For some parents, he notes, “the discovery that the new self can be socially validated 
within a group of others who share the same condition provides a beginning place to 
rebuild” (Ibid., p. 105). Eric’s quote above echoes this observation, and illustrates how 
other bereaved parents may serve as examples of how one might live with the loss and 
enact a parental identity over time. 
Throughout the interviews, the fear of forgetting the loss, the grief, and the dead child 
is a frequently occurring theme. Several of the parents mention how this fear has been 
alleviated by meeting parents who have been living with the loss for a longer time. 
For example, in our first conversation, John says, 
“What I feared the most after the first days, when you didn’t cry all the 
time, that was that I would forget it really fast. Because then I feel I would 
have lost everything. So the fact that there are someone sitting there [at 
DIDA’s monthly meetings] who has lost… I think it was nine years ago, 
and who also had reacted like this––returned to work fast and such. But 
that they still haven’t lost everything––they still have the memories and 
such… That makes me feel more safe about it.” 
Likewise, his wife Emma explains how she felt “almost high” after their first meeting 
in DIDA, because listening to the other parents had given her hope that they might 
indeed learn to live with their loss without forgetting. There are different ways in 
which these other parents may serve as resources for seeing oneself in the future. First, 
the circumstances of their lives, e.g., whether they seem able to live what Eric terms 
“normal lives,” parent living children, etc., may give hope that this is possible to 
achieve. At the same time, the fact that these parents still are engaged in DIDA 
illustrates that the loss is not left behind. In this way, these parents provide images of 
how bereaved parental identity may be enacted, and how their dead children may 
become a continuing presence in their ongoing lives. For example, in our first 
conversation, Thomas says he thinks it is nice to hear someone (at DIDA’s monthly 
meetings) saying that they still feel sad about their loss five years after it happened. 
When I ask why he thinks this is nice, he responds, “Because then you obviously don’t 
forget.” 
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At other times, those who have lived with their loss for a longer time may provide 
hope that the pain of grief will be less intense and give space for more positive 
emotions over time. As Mia states in our first conversation, 
“It’s nice to see how they [the volunteers at DIDA’s monthly meetings] 
deal with their grief today. Because, for us, when we visit the cemetery, 
it’s still really tough. When they go to the cemetery, it’s a joyful and 
pleasant thing. I look forward to that. I don’t doubt that we’ll get there, it 
will just take some years. It’s nice to hear that they’ve all gotten there. In 
that sense, they are a sort of role models.” 
Over time, the parents’ own role in the bereavement communities may change as well, 
as they gradually become more experienced and newcomers enter into the group (this 
is relevant for DIDA’s monthly meetings and the hospital based support group). The 
open structure of these groups enables “new” and “older” members of the group to 
share experiences, the older being able to identify their own progression since their 
loss, and the newer members to imagine their own future through identifying with the 
older members of the group. For example, in our second conversation, Sarah and Paul 
describe how their role in the hospital based grief group changed over time, 
Sarah: “You kind of become the experienced one who are able to say: ‘Oh 
yes, we recognize that”, and “We felt like that too”. You become kind 
of…” 
Paul: “Yes, when we were there for the first time, we thought ‘We’ll never 
get through this’, right? And then there’s someone there who has been 
there for two months or something like that, right. And then you can say 
“Well, they seem quite normal, so I suppose we’ll make it too, after all.”  
Sarah: “Yes. So you kind of become the supportive one, instead of gaining 
so much from it yourself… after some time, right?” 
The hospital group differs from DIDA’s community based activities insofar as they 
are led by health care professionals, and that participation in the group is typically 
limited to a few months, after which the parents gradually are prepared to “stand on 
their own feet,” as Sarah describes it. This means that the parents typically won’t meet 
other parents who have lost several years ago, like they might often do in DIDA’s 
volunteer-led activities.  Some of the parents who have participated in these services 
express thoughts of “giving something back” by volunteering in the organization at a 
later point. Like Linda says in our second conversation (she also repeats this point in 
our third conversation a year later), 
“We’ve talked about involving as volunteers at some point in the future. 
Because we’ve benefited so much from it. So we’d like to share our… 
what we have learned, and what we can contribute with to people who lose 
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[a child], right? Because it has meant so much to us. I could certainly see 
myself, at some point when I am ready to... deal with other people’s grief.” 
Linda’s last sentence points to a central conflict in relation to participating in 
community based grief support services. Although meeting others in a similar 
situation can often be experienced as comforting, and as a source of social validation 
of one’s loss and parental identity, being confronted with other people’s loss and grief 
can also be emotionally overwhelming. This is an inherent conflict involved in putting 
people together based on shared, traumatic circumstances. For several of the parents 
I have talked to, the need to protect themselves from being exposed to “new losses” 
before they feel ready for it has been one of the main reasons for not continuing going 
to monthly meetings, attending weekend seminars, etc. Instead, some of them have 
continued to meet in private with parents they have met through DIDA’s activities, 
sometimes by developing new friendships based on a very special kind of mutual 
understanding. For example, Diana describes their relationship to a couple they met 
at DIDA’s weekend seminar, a little less than two years before our conversation, 
“It’s strange how fast you can become this close to each other. Because it 
feels like we’ve been friends for years. Which we haven’t, really.” 
For other parents, DIDA becomes what Benedict Anderson (1993) has termed an 
“imagined community.” Although they might not interact much with the organization 
in their daily lives, the organization may maintain a special significance for their 
identity as bereaved parents, as a place where they “belong,” as Linda and Chris 
repeatedly express it.  
Some of the parents stress the importance of DIDA as a site for raising public 
awareness about infant loss and parental grief. More than merely providing immediate 
support to bereaved parents after infant loss, they emphasize that the organization 
ought to represent bereaved parents’ interest in the society. For example, Linda and 
Chris talk about the importance of creating societal awareness and recognition of 
infant loss and parental grief, and how DIDA might work to promote this through, 
e.g., cooperating with television companies about producing documentary programs 
about infant loss, by arranging public memorial ceremonies etc. Chris states, 
“It’s about emphasizing… to say: ‘We are here too. Recognize us!’ Why 
shall it be so much of Robinson and Paradise Hotel? I mean: Recognize 
us, too!” 
This is indeed also one of the organization’s declared goals, expressed for example in 
awareness campaigns, events, and in their contributions to media coverage on infant 
loss and parental grief. In addition to the immediate support represented through 
counseling and network services, the organization represents a shared platform for 
creating public awareness and recognition of infant loss and parental grief. As such, 
parental engagement in DIDA may range from using the organization’s services as 
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mediators in one’s own grief, sharing and “giving back” personal experiences, and 
fighting for public awareness and recognition. In his autoethnographic essay about the 
loss of his stillborn daughter, Marcus Weaver-Hightower (2012) describes how one 
of his “reactions to grief––which, along with philanthropy, seems quite common 
among the bereaved [Cook, 1988, 299]—included becoming politically active on still-
birth issues, involving actions like writing legislators, calling businesses about their 
problematic practices, contributing financially to political action, and speaking 
publicly as a father as often as I could” (p. 479). Although Weaver-Hightower slightly 
self-ironically refers to these initiatives as “grief reactions,” it is obvious that such 
actions are normative practices that certainly does not merely “happen” to you as a 
cause of loss. For most bereaved parents, pursuing such motivations may be too 
demanding to do alone. Hence, involving in or supporting the work of a bereavement 
organization can be a way to fight for public recognition of infant loss and parental 
grief––simultaneously helping others in a similar situation and honoring one’s own 
child’s existence.  
6.6. THE NORMATIVITY OF BEREAVEMENT SUPPORT 
PRACTICES 
From my experiences as a counselor in DIDA as well as through my continuous 
encounters with the organization during my Ph.D. project, I have been involved in 
many conversations and reflections about the normativity inherent in the 
organization’s practices. Just like the parents struggle with finding good ways to deal 
with their loss and their changed identities over time, so does the bereavement 
organization face normative dilemmas in their practices. Working with bereavement 
is inescapably normative, and regardless of which decisions that are made, these 
decisions will inevitably enable and restrict certain practices, ways of interpreting, 
and ways of feeling about loss for the parents who are engaged in the practices.  
Surprisingly often, some of the most pressing normative dilemmas seem to be related 
to very mundane and material conditions, such as whether or not to put a candle light 
in the grief support kit handed out at the hospitals to newly bereaved parents. While 
this might seem like an insignificant detail, these kinds of decisions are loaded with 
ethical dilemmas: Is giving a candle a way to signal recognition of the parents’ loss 
and grief? Or does it impose a normative pressure on the parents to engage in certain 
interpretations and practices related to their loss? Will the box set without the candle 
seem sterile and distanced, compared to a box set including a candle? There are no 
easy solutions to such dilemmas. 
Similar dilemmas unfold in a range of daily decisions within the organization. Each 
year, DIDA arranges All Saints masses (memorial services) in remembrance of 
deceased children in churches all over the country. In some of the local churches, the 
volunteers and/or the priest have suggested to set up a memorial wall by the entrance 
where those attending the ceremony can choose to hang a picture, a poem or another 
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token to commemorate their dead children. However, this practice has given rise to 
careful considerations within the organization about its implicit normativity. For many 
parents, the opportunity to publicly share pictures and memories of their children is 
experienced as a much-welcomed acknowledgment of their loss. On the other side, 
inviting to such a practice may also represent a normative expectation to enact one’s 
grief and loss in accordance with a norm of continuing bonds, and indirectly 
questioning the grief of those who live with their loss in other ways. Moreover, the 
practice may also reinforce unofficial grief hierarchies between the parents, insofar as 
they inevitably are invited to compare their own loss with the loss of the other parents. 
While the official dogma in DIDA is that “you cannot compare grief,” i.e., parental 
grief cannot be measured or quantified by the circumstances of the loss, the parents 
who use DIDA’s services inevitably do compare with each other. Hence, whether or 
not DIDA choose to set up a memorial wall, the parents are invited into inherently 
normative practices of enacting and interpreting their loss and parental identities.  
Another illustration of the normative nature of DIDA’s services and activities is a 
photo exhibition DIDA arranged in 2015 with pictures of bereaved parents’ tattoos 
created in memory of their dead children.22 Through this photo exhibition, DIDA’s 
ambition was to “create visibility about losing a child and abolish taboos about grief 
in general and infant death in particular” (DIDA’s newsletter, June 2015). Regardless 
of the good intentions, such an exhibition inevitably involves normative dilemmas 
similar to those I illustrated above. While the tattoo campaign is a very efficient way 
to communicate the significance of early infant loss, it’s identification of parental love 
with physical imprints on the body can be experienced as a strong normative 
expectation for bereaved parents. Although I was not aware of the campaign when I 
conducted my interviews, Anna refers to it in our last conversation. Her thoughts 
about such memorial tattoos clearly illustrate the normative implications of such 
initiatives: 
“I read an article [in DIDA’s newsletter] of people getting tattoos with 
something about their children. I could relate to getting a tattoo of a hand 
print or whatever. But I couldn’t understand why they would want to place 
it where it is visible [to others]. And then I thought: ‘Why are you so 
opposed to that, Anna? Why won’t you attribute that significance to 
Oliver?’” 
Anna’s reflections illustrate that such a campaign––or any other initiative aimed at 
helping bereaved parents––is involved in normative interpretations and practices in 
multiple and highly individual ways. Rather than striving to eliminate the normative 
                                                            
22 See media coverage in Kristeligt Dagblad, August 25th, 2015: ”Tattoos help parents in their 
grief over their dead children” [“Tatoveringer hjælper forældre i sorgen over deres døde børn”]. 
https://www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/kirke-tro/tatoveringer-hjaelper-foraeldre-i-sorgen-over-
deres-doede-barn (Retrieved February 20th, 2017.) 
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dilemmas involved in such practices, I believe it is essential for organizations such as 
DIDA to constantly engage in self-reflective awareness of the normative implications 
of their practices. 
6.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
For some bereaved parents, DIDA’s activities become a part of their process of living 
with the loss, developing identities as bereaved parents, and gaining social validation 
of their dead children’s existence and significance. Throughout this process, the 
parents are informed by––but also reflectively draw upon, negotiate, and contest––the 
normative interpretations and practices that are available in DIDA as well as in the 
“outside” world to create their “own way” of living with the loss. The community of 
bereaved parents provides resources for mediating their way of living with the loss 
here and now, as well as towards the future. The parents’ involvement in DIDA 
includes mediating their own loss and grief, receiving and providing support, and 
fighting for public awareness and recognition. The practices provided by an 
organization such as DIDA are inherently normative, and, accordingly, those 
responsible for developing and maintaining these practices need to pay attention to 
the normative implications and dilemmas involved in this endeavor. 
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Abstract 
In this paper I present three ideal typical grief articulations drawn from three historical 
periods: 1) Grief as a moral practice in Ancient Greek virtue ethics, 2) Grief as an 
expression of an inner, authentic morality in the Romantic era, and, 3) Grief as a 
psychologized and increasingly pathologized phenomenon in modern psychology up 
to the present attempts to include separate diagnoses for pathological grief in the 
diagnostic manuals for mental disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; 
World Health Organization, 2016). The purpose of this presentation is to shed light 
on current taken for granted notions of grief, and, by providing some historical 
background, challenge prevailing understandings that depict grief as an ahistorical, 
universal, intra-psychological and (potentially) medical condition that is analytically 
separate from historical, social, cultural and religious practices. Informed by a cultural 
psychological outlook (Brinkmann, 2016; Valsiner, 2014), I argue that the 
relationship between grieving individuals and their cultures is dialectical, mutually 
constituting and inherently normative, and hence, that the diagnostic approach to grief 
as an individual, causal reaction to loss is flawed. On this background, I argue that an 
acknowledgement of the inherent normativity of grief (as presented by the historical 
accounts) can potentially inform and enrich contemporary understandings and 
practices related to bereavement, ultimately to the benefit of people who suffer from 
grief. 
Keywords: grief, loss, mental illness, diagnostic cultures, historical transformations, 
pathologization 
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Introduction 
Historically, grief in most societies has been articulated and interpreted within a 
metaphysical framework of religion, providing rituals for experiencing and acting in 
relation to loss. By contrast, grief in the late modern era is increasingly becoming a 
subject of psychiatry and psychology – a matter of individuals’ mental and physical 
health and risk of pathology (Stroebe, Schut, & Stroebe, 2007; Stroebe & Stroebe, 
1987). During the last decades, several leading research groups within the field of 
bereavement have advocated for the introduction of separate diagnostic categories for 
pathological grief reactions (Horowitz, Bonnanno & Holen, 1993; Prigerson et al., 
2009; Shear et al., 2011). The understanding of grief as a potentially pathological 
phenomenon can be seen as an example of how bio-medical, psychiatric, and 
diagnostic understandings are becoming increasingly central for how we deal with 
suffering and deviance in contemporary Western “diagnostic cultures” (Brinkmann, 
2016). My aim in this article is to use historical examples of how death, dying and 
bereavement have been accounted for in different historical eras in order to shed light 
on the implicit assumptions underlying our contemporary understandings of grief. In 
the words of Michel Foucault: “We have to know the historical conditions which 
motivate our conceptualization. We need a historical awareness of our present 
circumstance” (Foucault, 1982, p. 209).  
The historical examples are selected with the purpose of challenging current taken for 
granted notions of grief, rather than providing a thorough analysis of the examples 
and the complex historical conditions they are embedded in. By focusing mainly on 
philosophical and literary sources, I do not claim to say anything about the actual 
distribution or meanings of grief practices in the periods referred to. Instead, the 
presented perspectives should be read as ideal types (Weber, 1904/1949), i.e., sketchy 
analytical constructs intended to illuminate certain characteristic phenomena of each 
presented period. More specifically, I will limit myself to delve into three selected 
sources drawn from pre-modern philosophy, Romanticism and modern psychological 
and psychiatric bereavement research, in order to present different historical 
conceptions of grief, demonstrate the historical embeddedness of our contemporary 
understandings and practices, and discuss potential benefits and problems of the 
different accounts presented throughout the article.  
Initially, I address grief as a moral practice in pre-modern times, with examples drawn 
from Ancient Greek virtue ethics. Subsequently, after a brief review of the historical 
transformations of the death practices throughout the Middle Ages, I explore how 
Romanticism might be seen as a transitional phase between a pre-modern and an 
emerging modern worldview. During this period, the morality of grief was relocated 
from external to internal sources – a transition that heralded the depiction of grief as 
a natural and psychological process in modern psychology. Following this historical 
trajectory, I analyze how grief is transformed into a pathologized phenomenon in 
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contemporary late modernity, where it has become a full-fledged subject of 
psychiatric research and diagnostics.  
In an attempt to limit a potentially very broad scope of analysis, non-Western 
traditions concerning death and mourning are omitted from the present analysis, 
although such an inclusion would indisputably enrich our understandings of 
contemporary Western grief practices. (For such analyses, see e.g. Scheper-Hughes, 
1993; Rosenblatt, 2001). By focusing on how contemporary practices and 
understanding have a cultural history, I will try to avoid the interpretive fallacy of 
analyzing historical practices through “the view from the present” (Hockey, 1996). In 
other words, my aim is to develop a historical awareness of contemporary practices, 
as well as an awareness of how our contemporary understandings affect how we read 
and interpret the practices of other places and times. Indeed, as I will try to elaborate 
later, our contemporary inclination to see grief as the main concern of death has a 
history too, as do our preoccupation with, for example, the health outcomes of 
different grief practices. Several researchers within the field of bereavement and death 
studies have warned against interpreting the accounts of earlier practices through the 
lenses of contemporary psychologized understandings (Hockey, 1996; Rosenblatt, 
2001). Hence, my aim with the present historical account is not to argue that former 
practices were better at promoting health and well-being, but rather to provide some 
historical background for understanding how the very question of health has become 
a main focus of contemporary understandings of grief. 
A cultural psychological outlook 
The theoretical outlook for this analysis is informed by cultural psychology 
(Brinkmann, 2016; Valsiner, 2014). Cultural psychology addresses the relationship 
between persons and cultures as a dialectical rather than a dualistic one, and 
emphasizes the historicity and processual character of mental and cultural 
phenomena. From a cultural psychological perspective, neither cultures nor minds 
should be understood as variables with causal powers. Only persons – not cultures, 
brains or minds – are capable of thinking, feeling and acting. Instead of conceiving 
cultures as independent variables that affect human behavior, cultures are conceived 
as mediators: Tools (e.g., language, material artifacts, practices) that mediate persons’ 
capacity for thinking, feeling and acting. Mediators are not entirely the same as means, 
insofar as means indicate a realization of a priori intentions, “whereas mediators at 
once constitute and transform the intentions that they carry” (Brinkmann, 2016, p. 16). 
For example, I can only strive for “mindfulness” in my daily life insofar as I have 
access to a certain language, certain practices (e.g., meditation, specific “mindfulness 
exercises”) and technologies (e.g., a yoga mat, mindfulness books and courses, means 
of creating a quiet space, etc.).  
Furthermore, cultural psychology conceives of the mind as normative: Psychological 
phenomena like thinking, feeling and acting differ from physiological phenomena 
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insofar as only the former are (and can be) subject to normative appraisal. For 
example, although both fear and stomach ache have physiological expressions and 
experiential qualities, only the former can be subject to praise and blame. (E.g., while 
it makes sense to say that fear is legitimate or illegitimate, depending on the situation, 
it is meaningless to attribute such normative judgments to stomach aches.) In sum, the 
cultural psychological outlook that informs the following analysis stresses the 
interrelated and normative nature of psychological and cultural processes, and insists 
that neither can be understood as independent variables with causal agency. 
Ancient Greek philosophy: Grief as a moral practice 
In pre-modern times, death and loss – like all other aspects of human existence – were 
interpreted within a cosmological framework that provided guidelines for people’s 
actions and interpretations. A central subject of ancient Greek moral philosophy was 
the idea of virtues as moral guidelines for human action (e.g., the cardinal virtues: 
wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance). In relation to death and loss, Plato’s 
writings on the death of Socrates might serve as an illustration of how Plato conceived 
emotionality as something that needed to be regulated and subjected to reason: 
Up to that time we had been able to restrain our tears fairly well, but when 
we watched him drinking and saw that he had drunk the poison, we could 
do so no longer, but in spite of myself my tears ran down in floods, so that 
I wrapped myself in my cloak and wept for my self; for it was not for him 
that I wept, but for my own misfortune in being deprived of such a friend. 
Crito had got up and gone away even before I did, because he could not 
restrain his tears. But Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time 
before, then wailed aloud in his grief and made us all break down, except 
Socrates himself. But he said, “What conduct is this, you strange men! I 
sent the women away chiefly for this very reason, that they might not 
behave in this absurd way; for I have heard that it is best to die in silence. 
Keep quiet and be brave.” Then we were ashamed and controlled our tears 
(Plato, Phaedo 117 c-e, trans. 1914). 
The passage reflects Plato’s concern with the “blindness” and involuntary aspects of 
emotions, and the primacy of reason over passion in his moral philosophy. Although 
the Aristotelian virtue ethics also gives primacy to reason over passion, the 
Aristotelian conception of the relationship between reason and passion is somewhat 
more complex. The guiding question in the Aristotelian virtue ethics is ‘What 
constitutes the good life of man?’. In accordance with the teleological approach of 
Aristotelian philosophy, the answer to this question should be found by clarifying the 
proper function (telos; purpose) of man – what it means for human beings to work at 
their best as human beings. Aristotle gives a universal answer: The proper function of 
man is “activity of soul in accordance with virtue” (Nicomachean Ethics, book 1, 7). 
In other words, living a good life was not a matter of seeking subjective pleasure or 
finding one’s own unique purpose in life, but of realizing one’s potentials as a human 
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being, by cultivating virtues that were commonly acknowledged as good and 
praiseworthy. To develop virtue was an act of developing good judgment in particular 
situations, of finding the right balance (the golden mean) between too much and too 
little of the trait that is called for in the particular situation: To act courageously would 
mean to balance between acting cowardly and foolhardily, practicing temperance to 
find the proper balance between asceticism and overindulgence, etc. (Johansen & 
Vetlesen, 1996).  
In order to elaborate on the implications of this for the topic of grieving, it is necessary 
to consider Aristotle’s view on emotions in relation to virtue. In contrast to the 
Platonic view of emotions, Aristotle emphasized the intentional aspects of emotions. 
According to Aristotle, emotions are not mere passive reactions towards what happens 
in our lives. Rather, emotion, perception and intellectual understanding should interact 
and guide each other, and must be cultivated properly in order to develop virtue. 
Hence, to extrapolate to the topic of grief, the emotional pain involved in grieving 
should not merely be understood as an involuntary and adverse reaction to the loss. 
On the contrary, a person who realizes intellectually that a beloved person is dead, but 
who does not respond with grief, lacks something significant of what Aristotle calls 
moral virtue. Without an emotional responsiveness, our understanding of situations 
and phenomena in the world is substantially deficient (Vetlesen & Nortvedt, 1997). 
Emotional reactions to loss should indeed be subject to voluntary regulation and 
cultivation. Rather than conceiving grief as a matter of authentic expression of 
emotional reactions, grieving must be seen as a moral practice involving a reflective 
mediation of emotional responses in accordance with moral values. Hence, the 
feelings accompanying loss are necessary, but not sufficient, to guide the bereaved 
individual, and (contrary to what seems to be widely held conceptions of grief in 
contemporary Western societies) the emotional aspects of grieving are not merely 
something that involuntarily strikes people as a causal reaction to loss. Rather, the 
emotional, perceptual and intellectual aspects of loss should mutually guide each other 
in order to grieve properly.  
Our death, my death, thy death: The changing conceptions of death and dying in 
Medieval Europe  
The French historian of mentalities, Philippe Ariès, has conducted some of the most 
thorough and prominent analyses of the historical transformations of the conceptions 
and practices related to death and dying in the Western world. According to Ariès, the 
practices and conceptions of death, dying, and mourning have gone through a series 
of subtle, yet significant changes throughout the history of the Western cultures 
(1974). In contemporary Western cultures, we are inclined to think about time as a 
linear movement from the past, through the present, towards the future. In contrast to 
this, the Medieval man did not differentiate strongly between the past, present and 
future: The past was, like the present, merely a time “in between” (i.e., medieval) the 
Creation on the one side, and the resurrection of Christ and the final judgement on the 
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other. Hence, the living and the dead existed in a shared time, awaiting the resurrection 
and judgement day, and the people of the Middle Ages were connected to the dead 
through prayers and requiem masses (Mai, 2010). In the first phase of the Middle 
Ages, death was omnipresent and expected, and hence, according to Ariès, the rituals 
associated with dying were simple and non-dramatic. Ariès called this period the 
tamed death (1974, p. 14). During this period, people’s relationship with death was 
characterized by a straight-forward and non-dramatic acceptance of death as a 
common destiny. From approximately the 12th century, death increasingly became a 
question of the individual person’s salvation or perdition. Ariès referred to this as 
one’s own death (p. 52). During this period, we see the emerging contours of the 
modern individual, with its emphasis on the individuals’ responsibility for his or her 
personal destiny. During both of these two periods, however, death was primarily 
conceived of as something that concerned the destiny of the dead or dying person, 
rather than the destiny of the survivors. From the beginning of the 18th Century, this 
began to change, according to Ariès. With the emergence of the Romantic Era, the 
focus was turned toward the survivors and their grief over the loss of their beloved – 
thy death, as Ariès termed this period (p. 68). In other words, with the Romantics, 
grief came to the front as the most salient concern in Western man’s relation to death 
and dying. 
Romanticism: Grief as an expression of an inner morality 
The Greek Antiquity and the Medieval period both represent historical periods in 
which human practices concerning death, suffering, and distress took place within a 
shared cosmological framework. With the secularization processes that took place in 
Western Europe from the Renaissance and onwards, and the proliferation of the 
rationalist ideas of the Enlightenment, the inevitability of these cosmological 
frameworks were gradually challenged and questioned. The emergence of the 
Romantic Era in Western Europe from the latter half of the 18th Century can be seen 
as a culmination of these processes. In a disenchanted world (Weber, 1946), the 
Romantics turned their focus inward––to the individual soul’s capacity to experience 
the sublime through its own imagination. Spiritual matters, beauty and divine 
presence were transformed and reduced to “projections of the soul”, a phrase 
borrowed from the German poet Hölderlin (Izenberg, 1992, p. 6). The Romantics’ 
celebration of the unique individual’s active imagination and emotional expressionism 
can be seen as heralding the 20th century’s prevailing ideals of authenticity and 
expressive individualism (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler & Tipton, 1985; Warner, 
2010).  
 
Furthermore, the Romantic preoccupation with subjective spontaneity, creativity and 
imagination was also associated with a pursuing of emotional intensity, as strong 
feelings of pain, terror and awe were seen as sources of accessing the sublime. As a 
consequence, grieving was regarded by the Romantics as an opportunity to express 
the significance of one’s relationship to the deceased, and, not least, to express the 
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depth of one’s own spirit. Neglecting the grief would be seen not only as neglecting 
the importance of one’s relationship with the deceased, but also as neglecting one’s 
own sense of self-worth and spirituality. Accordingly, from the perspective of the 
contemporary Western “happiness culture” (Stearns, 2012), the picture that emerges 
of the ideal Romantic griever is a rather tragic figure: One who deliberately holds on 
to grief, and lives heroically with a broken heart. A few lines from Jane Austen’s 
Sense and sensibility (2004, first published in 1811) might give a hint of this 
endorsement of a “broken heart’s ethics” (Stroebe, Gergen, Gergen & Stroebe, 1992): 
The agony of grief which, overpowered them at first, was voluntarily 
renewed, was sought for, was created again and again. They gave 
themselves up wholly to their sorrow, seeking increase of wretchedness in 
every reflection that could afford it, and resolved against ever admitting 
consolation in future (Austen, 2004, ch. 1). 
Austen’s characters express the Romantic preoccupation with emotional pain, not as 
a condition to be overcome, but rather as an “instructor of the wise”, as Lord Byron’s 
poetic figure Manfred states in the famous poem of the same name (Byron, Manfred, 
1, i, 7-11.). In Byron’s poem, “sorrow is knowledge”, and “they who know the most 
[m]ust mourn the deepest o’er the fatal truth” (Manfred, 1, i, 7-11.). The Romantic 
ethos depicts sorrow and grief not as meaningless, adverse states to be overcome, but 
as sources of knowledge and wisdom – or rather, as Byron’s poem spells it out: sorrow 
is wisdom. As we shall see, with the rise of modern, scientific psychology, this 
acknowledgement of grief’s moral and epistemic value is undermined and replaced 
by a focus on “resolving” grief, detaching the energy from the lost relationship and 
“reinvesting” it in the future. 
Early modernity: Grief as a universal and natural process 
The Romantics altered our conception of death and dying by relocating the attention 
from a focus on the destiny of the dead towards a preoccupation with the destiny of 
the bereaved survivors. (From one’s own death to thy death, to use Ariès’s 
terminology.) The British sociologist Tony Walter has argued that the very notion of 
grief being the main object of concern after death, is in itself a fundamentally secular 
idea: 
The idea that the real problem after death is the grief of the survivors rather 
than the journey of the soul is a secular idea. Religious beliefs are judged 
according to whether they assist grieving rather than assisting the souls of 
the dead. Hence, the very concept of bereavement is a secular one (Walter, 
1997, p. 187). 
The Romantic preoccupation with grief – and the related internalization of morality 
to the inner realm of the individual person’s soul – heralded the pervasive 
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subjectivization and psychologization of values that imbues mainstream modern 
psychology (Brinkmann, 2011). Regarding grief, Sigmund Freud’s works represent a 
pioneer contribution to grief becoming understood and practiced as a psychological 
phenomenon: That is, as a phenomenon concerning an inner realm of mental 
dynamics, representations, emotions and dispositions of the individual. While the art 
and poetry of the Romantic era idealized and celebrated the inconsolable broken heart 
as a mark of honor, Freud wrote his groundbreaking work On mourning and 
Melancholia (1917/1957) in a time marked by the unfathomable sufferings and losses 
caused by the 1st World War. Under these conditions, grief, death and loss were 
increasingly secluded from the public sphere, and confined to the private, emotional 
life of the individual. The bereaved individual was encouraged to put the loss behind 
and look to the future, and Freud’s works provided a framework for accomplishing 
this. The Freudian “grief work hypothesis”, i.e., “[the] view that it is essential to 
undertake grief work in order to adjust without lasting mental and/or physical health 
detriments to the loss of a loved one” (Stroebe, 1993, p. 20), has had a significant 
influence on professional and popular accounts of grief in the 20th Century (Wortman 
& Silver, 2001; author citation, 2015).  
 
In a famous essay from 1937, the Austrian-American psychoanalyst Helene Deutsch 
argued that “the death of a beloved person must produce reactive expression in the 
normal course of events; (…) omission of such reactive responses is to be considered 
just as much a variation from the normal as excess in time or intensity; and (…) 
unmanifested grief will be found expressed to the full in some way or other” (p. 224). 
Hereby, she introduced the idea that not only overt grief, but also seemingly absent 
grief, is pathological. 
 
A few years later, grief was systematized by the German-American psychiatrist Erich 
Lindemann (1963) as a “definite syndrome with psychological and somatic 
symptomatology” (p. 8). Like Freud, Lindemann asserted that “[the] duration of a 
grief reaction seems to depend upon the success with which a person does the grief 
work, namely, emancipation from the bondage to the deceased, readjustment to the 
environment in which the deceased is missing, and the formation of new 
relationships” (p. 11). According to Lindemann, a failure to accomplish this grief 
work was associated with a range of symptoms for pathological grief, including 
somatic distress, preoccupation with the image of the deceased, guilt, hostility, and a 
“lack of capacity to initiate and maintain organized patterns of activity” (p. 10). 
Lindemann’s work represented a pioneer contribution to an increasingly empirical and 
quantitative approach within bereavement research. In the following decades, 
academic bereavement research has been characterized by different attempts to 
identify universal patterns in individual bereavement reactions, and to differentiate 
between normal and pathological grief reactions (Valentine, 2006; Kofod, 2015). 
“Morbid”, “pathological”, “unresolved”, “absent”, “delayed”, “abnormal”, 
“complicated”, “traumatic”, “chronic” and “prolonged” grief are only some of the 
terms that have been suggested in order to designate grief reactions that fail to meet 
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the expectations of normality. The wide variety of labels reflects the comprehensive 
and vigorous attempts within contemporary bereavement research to establish grief as 
a legitimate target of psychiatric research and intervention. 
 
Contemporary late modernity: Grief as a pathologized phenomenon 
The impact of these conceptualizations of grief can be traced up to recent attempts to 
define diagnostic criteria for pathological grief. With the recent release of the DSM-5 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), bereaved individuals who experience even 
mild and transient depressive reaction might qualify for a depressive disorder as soon 
as 14 days after the death of a loved one (p. 161). Furthermore, “Persistent Complex 
Bereavement Disorder” has been included in section III of the DSM-5 for further 
research and potential implementation in future revisions, and prolonged grief 
disorder is suggested as a separate diagnostic category in the forthcoming revision of 
the World Health Organization’s diagnostic manual ICD-11 (World Health 
Organization, 2016). 
 
The different proposals for a grief diagnosis suggest slightly different diagnostic 
criteria, each focusing on the duration and intensity of the grief response, and to which 
extent the response exceeds expected social, cultural or religious norms of the 
individual’s background. For example, the proposed criteria for prolonged grief 
disorder in the forthcoming revision of the ICD system involve “longing for the 
deceased or persistent preoccupation with the deceased accompanied by intense 
emotional pain (e.g. sadness, guilt, anger, denial, blame, difficulty accepting the death, 
feeling one has lost a part of one’s self, an inability to experience positive mood, 
emotional numbness, difficulty in engaging in social or other activities)” that persists 
for “an atypically long period of time following the loss” (>6 months), “clearly 
exceeds expected social, cultural or religious norms for the individual’s culture and 
context” and “causes significant impairment in personal, family, social, educational, 
occupational or other important areas of functioning” (World Health Organization, 
2016).  
 
The diagnostic proposals are remarkable for several reasons: First of all, grief 
represents a form of suffering that all human beings are likely to experience, insofar 
as we are mortal, vulnerable and mutually dependent on each other in order to live 
meaningful lives. Even within the DSM, grief, defined as an “expectable or culturally 
approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one”, 
has so far been used as an example of non-disordered distress in DSM’s own definition 
of mental disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This means that grief 
responses that are “expectable and culturally approved” per definition represent non-
disordered, and hence non-treatable, normal distress. However, whether or not we 
evaluate a certain grief response as “expectable and culturally approved” depends on 
the particular circumstances of the loss, e.g., the relationship between the bereaved 
and the lost loved one, and therefore there cannot be a general cultural standard for 
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how long or how intense grief should be. For example, what we would consider to be 
expectable for a bereaved parent of a dead child is not the same as for the child’s 
neighbor (although we might think that both are entitled to grieve, in most situations 
we would probably find it disrespectful and inappropriate if the neighbor claimed to 
grieve as deeply as the parents of the child). This leads us to another noteworthy 
feature of the diagnosis, namely its ambivalent and somehow paradoxical position on 
the diagnosed subject’s moral accountability. On the one side, the evaluation of 
whether or not a specific response is appropriate involves a moral evaluation of the 
response (e.g., we might evaluate the neighbor’s grief as exaggerated, while the 
parents’ similar response is regarded as expectable and appropriate). On the other side, 
the diagnosis implies a dysfunction in individual functioning that partially exempts 
the individual from moral responsibility. Yet again, by assessing the grief response as 
inappropriate, we are inclined to meet the grieving individual with moral demands of 
managing his or her grief in a way that complies with the cultural expectations, e.g. 
by seeking treatment.  
 
Furthermore, given the complex context-sensitive nature of our evaluations of the 
appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of any given grief response, the medical 
assessment of whether or not an individual’s grief response is normal or disordered 
will demand knowledge of his or her personal, social, cultural and religious 
background that goes far beyond what is provided in the current diagnostic guidelines, 
and arguably also beyond what is reasonable to expect in a typical diagnostic 
assessment interview. Hence, whether this complexity of personal, social, cultural and 
religious norms can be adequately accounted for in real-life medical practice is 
arguably questionable.  
 
Finally, the diagnostic category itself is likely to interact dynamically with our 
interpretations and actions in relation to loss, in the sense that the category 
simultaneously shapes and is shaped by prevailing ideas of what grief is and ought to 
be. Ian Hacking refers to this dynamic process as “the looping effects of human 
kinds”:  
To create new ways of classifying people is also to change how we can 
think of ourselves, to change our sense of self-worth, even how we 
remember our own past. This in turn generates a looping effect, because 
people of a kind behave differently and so are different. That is to say the 
kind changes, and so there is new causal knowledge to be gained and, 
perhaps, old causal knowledge to be jettisoned (Hacking, 1995, p. 369). 
In other words, it is likely that the grief diagnosis will simultaneously reflect and 
influence the ways we will interpret, experience and act in relation to loss in the future, 
and even the ways we will relate to and understand past losses and griefs. 
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Discussion 
In the following, I will try to outline some of the potential consequences of applying 
the different perspectives of grief put forth in this article. Which actions, feelings and 
interpretations of grief are made available – and which are restricted or sanctioned – 
when grief is approached through the presented (ideal-typical) images of Ancient 
Greek virtue ethics, Romanticism, early modern psychology, and contemporary 
diagnostic accounts?  
 
Plato’s perspective on emotions implies an emphasis on the necessity to restrain and 
control them. Hence, emotional expressions of grief become a dubious and potentially 
immoral phenomenon, something that threatens to undermine our capacity to act with 
reason and virtue. In contrast, Aristotle’s virtue ethics offers a perspective of the 
motivational and, hence, moral aspects of emotions. He appreciates emotions as 
necessary, but not sufficient, resources for moral action and reasoning. Seeing grief 
through Aristotelian glasses gives a perspective on the intentional and relational 
aspects of grieving. Grief has a motivational and emotional directedness towards what 
is considered morally valuable: The emotional pain involved in grieving is not merely 
to be understood as an involuntary reaction to the loss. Rather, the feelings of grief 
are connected to the moral value of affectionate relationships – feelings that are 
fundamentally human, and ought to be cultivated virtuously.  
 
As we have seen, the very idea that grief is the main concern following death is 
arguably not a universal and ahistorical phenomenon (Walter, 1997). Although death 
and loss are human universals, and although people of all times and cultures are likely 
to grieve over their dead, the experiences, practices and interpretations related to death 
and loss are embedded in profoundly different historical, social, cultural and material 
conditions. According to Walter and Ariès, the cultural preoccupation with grief, 
rather than with the destiny of the dead, is a phenomenon that emerged with the 
individualization and secularization processes of early modernity.  
 
Following this analysis, the Romantic Era can be seen as representing a shift from the 
former focus on “my death” (i.e., the destiny of the dead and dying) toward the destiny 
of the survivors who had to live on without their deceased loved ones. In a 
disenchanted world no longer experienced as imbued with moral order and meaning 
in itself, the locus of morality was turned inward, to the individual’s active 
imagination and ability to project meaning and significance to the world. Under these 
conditions, suffering from a broken heart became a mark of honor: A way to express 
one’s moral depth and sensibility, and a source of wisdom.  
 
Although the Freudian and later modern psychological understandings of grief as a 
universal, time-limited, intra-psychological process of emotional separation and 
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reinvestment of energy are increasingly challenged and rejected within contemporary 
bereavement research (see e.g. Klass et al., 1996; Valentine, 2006; Wortman & Silver, 
2001), they continue to live within popular culture. At a glance, these ideas might 
seem very different from the Romantic ideal of broken hearts. However, they share a 
common notion of grief as an intra-psychological process analytically separate from 
external cultural bonds. The idea that grief evolves from within the individual and 
needs to be expressed authentically is frequently expressed in popular culture, self-
help literature and autobiographical accounts of bereavement (see e.g. Leick, 
Davidsen & Nielsen, 1991; Westberg, 2010).  
 
The recent developments within the diagnostic systems can be seen as a part of an 
increasing tendency in contemporary late modern society to articulate and understand 
painful and difficult life experiences within a medical, psychiatric discourse (Conrad, 
2007; Brinkmann, 2016). Firstly, while balancing between excess and deficit – 
between “too much” and “too little” – was regarded as a matter of moral importance 
in the Greek virtue ethics, the contemporary diagnostic approach to grief emphasizes 
the health consequences of grieving “too little” or – most notably – “too much”. 
Secondly, grief is conceived within the diagnostic account as a natural process; a 
causal reaction to loss, rather than as a normatively shaped response to bereavement. 
As within the Romantic and early modern psychological accounts of grief, grief is 
conceptualized as a process that occurs spontaneously from inside the individual, and 
as analytically separate from cultural practices of mourning. Thirdly, the diagnostic 
approach to grief largely depicts grief as a time-limited process, with an aim of full 
recovery of the individual’s “normal functioning”. While the Romantics regarded 
long-lasting grief and broken hearts as potential signs of spirituality, contemporary 
discourse considers “broken hearts” as an undesirable pathological reaction that needs 
to be treated. The idea of grief as a time-limited process is connected to the Freudian 
ideal of recovery, detachment and autonomy as the goal of the grieving process. 
Although there is a growing interest in the importance of “continuing bonds” in 
contemporary bereavement research (see e.g. Klass et al., 1996), while the 
continuation of bonds in the Romantic ethos was a moral goal valued independently 
of health outcome, contemporary bereavement research addresses it as a question of 
whether it promotes or prevents healthy grieving. 
 
As we have seen, since the Romantic era, emotional reactions to loss have been 
analytically separated from cultural practices of mourning. Within early modern 
psychology, the idea that grief and mourning were analytically separate was further 
developed, and within contemporary bereavement research, complicated grief 
reactions are seen as intra-psychological dysfunctions that are equally separable from 
cultural norms of grieving. However, from the perspective of cultural psychology, 
neither psychological nor cultural phenomena represent separate variables that affect 
people’s behaviors and reactions. Rather, cultures provide tools that are used by 
people to mediate their thoughts, emotions, and actions. In other words, our mental 
life is intrinsically relational, situational, and social, and cannot be reduced to either 
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individual (e.g. psychological or physiological dysfunctions) or cultural variables 
(e.g., social norms of illness and health). 
 
If we approach cultures (and brains and bodies) as complex and heterogeneous 
mediators that simultaneously inform and are transformed through persons’ active 
engagements in the world, the symptoms expressed and experienced by an individual 
cannot be isolated from the web of meanings, socio-material practices and 
technologies that make these symptoms possible to express, interpret, evaluate and 
act upon. From this perspective, a phenomenon such as complicated or prolonged 
grief cannot be reduced to an essence within the suffering individual (e.g., a 
neurological or psychological dysfunction, personality traits or the like). On the other 
side, neither can the suffering people experience be reduced to (a failure to comply 
with) socio-cultural norms and contingent social constructions. Instead, we need to 
acknowledge that problems of living, for example people’s experiences and 
enactments of grief, are radically situated (Brinkmann, 2016): “[Illness] and disorder 
are always found in a relation between a person (or organism) and life situations 
(constituted by socio-material practices)” (p. 120). Grieving, like all psychological 
phenomena, are intrinsically related to material, social, cultural, and normative 
conditions, and from this perspective, it is not possible to reduce grief to either 
individual, biological or socio-cultural factors. Accordingly, the symptoms enlisted in 
the diagnostic criteria for complicated or prolonged grief cannot conceivably be 
evaluated as appropriate or inappropriate without taking into account the situational 
context in which these symptoms are expressed, the socio-material technologies and 
normative practices that render these symptoms problematic or even tangible, and 
ultimately, the meanings people attribute to the symptoms they experience. For 
example, an individual’s experiences of “longing for the deceased” as something that 
persists for “an atypically long period”, “exceeds expected social, cultural or religious 
norms for the individual’s culture and context”, and “causes significant impairment in 
(…) important areas of functioning” involve not only individual emotional and bodily 
experiences, but also normative expectations concerning individual performance, 
functionality, and health, as well as socio-material practices concerning work-life, 
well-fare services, diagnostics and interventions, etc. 
 
Hence, the evaluations and interpretations of these kinds of symptoms can neither be 
isolated to individual experiences nor to socio-cultural conditions, but must involve a 
focus on the relations between all of these factors (Brinkmann, 2016, p. 121). From a 
phenomenological perspective, this means that the experience of grief is informed and 
shaped by biological, personal, bodily, material, and socio-cultural conditions, and 
ultimately, that all of these factors are involved in people’s experiences, 
interpretations and enactments of grief. Simply put, although longing for the deceased 
is arguably a painful experience for us living in contemporary diagnostic culture as 
well as for the imagined Romantic griever, whether the longing is conceived of as an 
expression of a moral bond or as a symptom of mental illness shapes our experiences 
and ways of dealing with this kind of suffering in profoundly different ways. 
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However, neither of these interpretations determine the experiences of grief 
independently of the socio-material realities they take place within. 
 
Conclusions 
The basic argument developed throughout this paper is that grief is always already 
embedded in socio-cultural and material practices, without which individual 
experiences and interpretations of loss would be inconceivable. Different perspectives 
promote different moral values, hereby enabling and restricting different actions and 
understandings. Throughout this article, I have attempted to demonstrate that the 
contemporary inclination to separate individual experiences of grief from cultural 
norms of mourning is problematic for several reasons: From a cultural psychological 
perspective, grief experiences are radically situated and relational. Our experiences of 
grief are inseparably linked to the socio-cultural and material repertoires available for 
mediating and interpreting these experiences. Furthermore, grief cannot adequately 
be depicted as a causal reaction, because psychological phenomena are normative, 
i.e., unlike for example bodily functions, grief is subjected to moral evaluation. 
Although bereaved individuals sometimes experience grief as something that simply 
“strikes” them (e.g., when one is overwhelmed by strong emotions), these experiences 
are constantly shaped, mediated and interpreted in light of cultural norms. Rather than 
being a causal effect of loss (e.g., like a fracture is caused by a trauma), grief is a 
response that is imbued with meaning and normativity. By translating painful life 
experiences of death and loss into a medical and diagnostic language, we risk to 
impoverish the interpretative repertoire people use to go about these life conditions, 
and ultimately to impair people’s abilities to endure, cope with and provide support 
for each other when life hurts. On this background, I believe that the Aristotelian and 
the Romantic appreciation of grief and broken hearts as more than just adverse and 
meaningless reactions to loss (i.e., their acknowledgment of the normativity of 
emotional responses) can inform contemporary understandings of grief. By being 
aware of the normative implications of our own understandings and practices, I 
believe that researchers and practitioners within the field of bereavement will be more 
capable of understanding grief as a phenomenon, and providing support for people 
who suffer from grief. 
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Abstract 
In this essay, I explore the significance of involving personal experiences with loss in 
my research on parental bereavement. By intersecting autoethnography and findings 
from a qualitative interview study with bereaved parents after infant loss, I argue that 
while popular accounts depict normal grief as a transitory state, parental accounts 
present grief as a continuing and open-ended relationship with the dead child. In 
appreciation of this, this essay presents fragmentary, non-reifying narratives of the 
continuing realities of becoming a bereaved parent. 
Keywords: Parental grief; infant loss; autoethnography 
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My story 
There are multiple entrances to the story of how grief became a focal point of my 
work as a psychologist. One begins with my name: I was named after my brother, 
Espen, who died in a car accident fourteen months before I was born. He was a seven-
year-old boy, blond-haired, and toothlessly smiling in the school portrait taken shortly 
before the accident. It was December 1st, and my family was on their way to visit 
relatives for a birthday party. The roads were slippery due to the newly fallen snow. 
A truck driver in the opposite lane lost control of his vehicle, and within seconds, the 
future of my family was irreversibly altered. Espen died at the hospital a couple of 
days later. My maternal grandfather was the only one from our family who saw him 
after the accident, and the sight of his tiny, wrecked body haunted him for the rest of 
his life. Eager to protect his daughter from the gruesome realities, he ensured that my 
mother was held back from attending the funeral. As a result, she was kept in hospital 
until the following day.  
As a child, I did not comprehend the loss my family lived with. To 
me, Espen was a series of enjoyable stories, an idealized image of a big brother, the 
boy with the smiling face on the pictures in our home, the one from which I inherited 
toys and clothes, the one we visited in the cemetery. After I grew up, my father has 
spoken to me about the silence at the dinner table following Espen’s death. My mother 
has talked about the unfathomable pain and emptiness of coming home to his untidy 
room, left in the midst of play. My sister, who was ten years old when the accident 
occurred, has described how her childhood ended abruptly with Espen’s death. 
Witnessing our parents’ abysmal grief, she silently thought it would have been better 
if she had been the one who died instead of him. I still doubt whether I will ever be 
able to grasp the magnitude of my family’s loss. However, the images of my mother’s 
absence from the funeral, the silent dinner table, the untidied room, and the little girl 
who thought about death, give me a wordless and fleeting comprehension of what 
grief can be like.  
Thirty years after Espen’s death, my husband and I were expecting 
our first child. We were on our honeymoon, a few days after our wedding, when I 
slowly realized I was in labor. Once we got to the hospital, it was too late to stop the 
birth, and our daughter was born—three months early and too early to survive. My 
only image of her is an elusive remembrance of her seemingly thoughtful expression, 
delicate skin, and gentle, muscular body. She did not get a name; she was “our little 
girl.” That is what we had inscribed on her tombstone: Our little girl. Our subsequent 
children sometimes refer to her as their big sister. Unlike my parents, we don’t have 
a great deal of stories to tell—but every now and then, they want us to tell how small 
she was, how old she would have been now, and how happy we became when they 
were born afterwards. Our little girl did not get the opportunity to experience the world 
outside my womb. We never got to look into her eyes. (Were they blue, by the way—
like our other daughter’s and youngest son’s? Or brown like our middle son’s?) We 
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will never get to see her growing up and becoming a person of her own. We will never 
attend any school meetings, arrange play dates, comfort her when she would have 
been distressed, and laugh with her when she would have been amused. Nevertheless, 
our little girl is written into our life story and into our hearts. Present by her absence, 
she opened the door to motherhood for me. 
My study  
Three years after our daughter’s death, I started as a counselor in The Danish Infant 
Death Association (DIDA), a private, nationwide association for bereaved parents 
following infant loss. Throughout the following years, I have talked with hundreds of 
parents who have been trying to find out how to live their lives after the loss of a child 
or—for some—children. Listening to the many different stories of these parents has 
influenced me far beyond my role as a professional. It has affected how I relate to the 
fundamental vulnerability of existence, and has been a constant reminder of not taking 
life for granted. It has made me humble toward the different ways people deal with 
painful life experiences. Moreover, it has made me critical towards the current trend 
in contemporary bereavement research and practice of judging people’s grief by 
general standards of appropriateness, functionality, or health. This skepticism was a 
point of departure when I began my Ph.D. project on parental grief following infant 
loss, from which this essay has developed. My main research23 interest has evolved 
around the interactions between individual grief experiences and cultural norms and 
expectations concerning grief. Thirteen parents who were recruited through DIDA 
(six heterosexual couples and one woman participating without her husband) have 
generously given their time to share their stories, thoughts and reflections about their 
painful experiences of losing an infant. Over a period of two years, starting shortly (1-
2 months) after the loss of their children, each of the parents has participated in three 
semi-structured interviews about their loss (with one exception; a couple that was 
interviewed once, approximately two years after their loss). Except for the woman 
participating alone, all of the parents have been interviewed together with their partner 
(dyadic interviews), allowing conversations and mutual reflections to unfold during 
the interviews.  
In previous articles, I have written about how the parents relate to the 
current tendency within Western culture to pathologize grief, and have argued that 
grief needs to be understood as normative responses to loss, rather than as causally 
inflicted reactions (Kofod, 2015, 2017; Kofod & Brinkmann, 2017). In this essay, I 
will explore how parental loss responses may unfold, how the parents’ accounts of 
their loss and grief are related to my engagement in the interview situation, and how 
they are related in a broader sense to cultural norms and expectations concerning grief.  
                                                            
23 In Danish: Landsforeningen Spædbarnsdød. 
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Autoethnography and grief 
For a long time, I was reluctant to write about my own experiences with loss in the 
context of my research. I was concerned about how these personal experiences of loss 
might influence how my intentions for working professionally and writing about grief 
would be interpreted. Would my working with, and writing about, bereaved parents 
be regarded as an effect of unresolved grief, possibly casting doubt on my 
professionalism and my ability to decenter my own loss? Or would my, sometimes 
distanced, manner of relating to my own loss be regarded as a sign of a shallow nature? 
Would describing my own way of living with loss be seen as implicitly held normative 
standards for “good coping”? These questions lurked at the back of my mind, evoking 
a strange sense of unease that prevented me from explicitly addressing them. As a 
consequence, I downplayed my own personal relationship with grief on many 
occasions—most notably in the context of my research. However, this state of silence 
grew in me like a cancerous tumor, a malady in the heart of my research, one that 
prevented me from integrating my personal and professional experiences.  
The critical moment of “coming out of the closet” was not planned 
for or thought through in advance. I had just presented a paper at a conference when 
a distant research colleague praised my presentation for being “refreshingly free from 
personal experiences,” in contrast to the many autoethnographic accounts presented 
throughout the conference. Feeling the shame of my silence, I burst out, telling him I 
had indeed lost a child, but “that was not the topic of my research.” As my colleague 
continued to praise me for “keeping the private private,” the awkwardness of the 
situation persuaded me that the perceived “privacy” of my loss was indeed a relevant 
topic to explore. My urge to remain silent about my loss in the context of working 
with bereavement reflects a prevailing cultural split between the private, emotional 
and subjective vis-à-vis the public, rational, and objective. This split is also 
represented in the 20th century’s grand narratives of grief as a private, emotional 
process with a goal of resolution and normalization (i.e., returning to public life) that 
continue to shape present understandings and practices of grief in Western societies 
(Walter, 1999). Hence, when private experiences are so deeply related to professional 
identity, as in my case, the latter becomes susceptible to suspicion. This is perhaps 
especially pronounced when the private involves experiences of grief, loss, death, and 
sadness—and when the professional identity at stake is that of an academic (Granek, 
2009).  
Moreover, it is relevant to explore the significance of my own loss 
for my relationship with the bereaved parents participating in my study. As a trained 
psychologist, I have learned to decenter my own experiences. Paradoxically, however, 
my experiences as a practitioner have taught me that moments of transforming trust 
can emerge when I share personal experiences and vulnerabilities with my clients. 
This is also the case in relation to the parents participating in this study. Being a 
bereaved parent myself enables a dual relationship with my informants––as a 
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researcher, but also as a member of an invisible community of bereaved parents, 
implying an assumption of mutual understanding and shared worldview (Jenks, 2005). 
Revealing that I am not only professionally engaged with the topic of bereavement–– 
but also a bereaved parent myself––arguably affects the stories I am told. As the 
British sociologist and feminist writer, Ann Oakley, has argued, “Personal 
involvement is more than dangerous bias––it is the condition under which people 
come to know each other and to admit others into their lives” (Oakley, 1981, p. 58).  
Most, if not all, of the parents I have talked to about grief, tell stories 
of the differences between talking to someone who has experienced loss or other 
major life crises and someone without such experiences. While those “outside” often 
either avoid the topic altogether, or seem eager to mitigate the pain of loss, the 
“insiders” are much more straightforward and less reluctant to talk about the loss, the 
grief, and the dead child. Moreover, those with personal experiences of loss and crises 
are less likely to expect grief to disappear, and less likely to interpret signs of joy and 
laughter as expressions of resolved grief. This lessens the risk of disclosure, and gives 
the parents an opportunity to talk about the painful experiences of loss, as well as the 
precious experiences of love and affection for their dead children, or even humorous 
experiences. For example, one of the parents I interviewed has laughingly told me 
how she threw out an ugly candleholder given as a gift to memorize her dead child. 
These kinds of stories are more likely to be told when the narrator trusts the audience 
to acknowledge the coexistence of joyous and painful experiences.  
An autoethnographic inquiry of the relations between my personal 
experiences, my engagement with my topic and with my informants enables me to 
connect “the personal to the cultural” (Bochner & Ellis, 2016, p. 65), and to challenge 
the cultural dichotomies between the private and the public, the emotional and the 
analytical, the personal and the professional. Although my need for privacy 
continuously makes autoethnographic writing a vulnerable struggle, the potential to 
explore the cultural and epistemic significance of the relations between my private 
experiences and my research hopefully makes the effort worthwhile. 
Parental narratives of infant loss 
While every death of a child involves the loss of a future, this is almost all there is 
when a child dies in the very beginning of life. It is the story of what should have 
been, not of what has been. As such, the loss of a small child is the loss of hopes and 
dreams—the loss of an anticipated future. When a person dies later in life—also in 
childhood—there is a history to share among the bereaved. The stories express the 
deceased person’s significance for the bereaved, for their network, and sometimes 
even for future generations (Kempson, Conley & Murdoch, 2008). When a child dies 
early in life, the stories of the child are typically more fleeting. For the parents, this 
might have several meanings. For some, narrating the child’s life story becomes even 
more crucial, as part of a struggle for recognition of the child’s continuing significance 
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in their lives (Kofod & Brinkmann, 2017). Kenneth J. Doka (1989) has introduced the 
concept of disenfranchised grief to designate “grief that persons experience when they 
incur a loss that is not or cannot be openly acknowledged, publicly mourned, or 
socially supported” (p. 4). It has been suggested that grief following perinatal loss 
(i.e., during pregnancy or in the first week of life) is particularly vulnerable to 
disenfranchisement, hence adding an extra burden to the bereaved parents (Lang et 
al., 2011). However, as Patricia Robson and Tony Walter (2013) have highlighted, 
social recognition is not an either-or matter, but rather a question of more or less. By 
narrating their children’s stories, bereaved parents actively position themselves as 
parents and their children as “real” children—children they continue to love. Hence, 
grief is not conceived of as a terminable process, but instead as a lifelong relationship 
with their dead children. Consequently, the stories to be told are also continuous and 
open-ended, and any attempt to do justice to this in the context of a brief research 
essay is evidently doomed to fail.  
Each of the stories I have heard are heartbreaking, illuminating and 
unfinished. Writing them down inevitably involves an act of selection that could be 
performed in innumerable other ways. Should I tell the stories of the events and 
conditions preceding the death of their children? Or the stories of how the parents 
came to realize that their child was dying or dead? Or of the precious time spent with 
their child? The stories of pride, love and affection? Of emptiness and 
meaninglessness? Of listening for the dead child to cry and knowing that it will never 
happen? Of looking for similarities between the dead child and her siblings? Of 
deciding how to spend Christmas without the dead child? The stories to tell are 
virtually infinite, and trying to fit them into an overly linear narrative scheme will 
only produce a false sense of closure that cannot do justice to the open-ended, 
continuing stories of living with the loss of a dead child. In appreciation of this, I will 
limit myself to present fragments of the parental stories I have heard. These fragments 
present tiny glimpses into the complex and continuing realities of becoming a 
bereaved parent. In the following, I focus on the stories of having and losing a child. 
Subsequently, after exploring the ethical and epistemic significance of recognition 
and difference for my relationship with the participants in my study, I compare the 
parental narratives of living with loss with popular accounts of grief presented in 
academic and popular bereavement literature. 
Stories of having and losing 
Each story of losing a child has a prehistory that begins long before the child is born. 
For some of the parents I have talked to, these stories involve years of arduous struggle 
to become pregnant. For others, having children was less planned for, but never a 
random choice. Like most parents in our part of the world, all of the parents I have 
talked to describe the pregnancy as a reflective choice and a process of preparing, 
emotionally as well as practically, for their child to come. Parenthood and emotional 
bonds develop through everyday activities such as considering a name for the unborn 
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child, seeing ultrasound images, feeling the baby’s movements in the belly, decorating 
the nursery, reflecting on one’s coming identity as a parent, etc. Although fear of 
losing is a well-known experience among expectant parents, the death of a child is 
not, and cannot, be prepared for before it is an inevitable 
 reality. Hence, each of the stories the parents have told me involve a before and an 
after the moments of unbearable realization. For some, these moments occur during 
pregnancy; for others, after the child is born. However, love and attachment does not 
begin or end with these moments of realization. 
For those who haven’t experienced the loss of a child, going through 
childbirth knowing that one’s child is dead or will die might sound ferociously cruel. 
However, most of the parents I have talked to describe the birth of their child as a 
beautiful and precious experience (Kofod & Brinkmann, 2017). For example, Rita, 
who lost her long-expected firstborn daughter after a preterm labor, explains it like 
this: “In the midst of all the tragic and traumatic, there was suddenly something life-
giving––after all–– in all of this dark and gloomy.” When knowing that death was 
inevitable, Rita focused on giving her child a gentle birth and ensuring her daughter 
would not suffer too much. “I was happy she was alive, and that we got these few 
minutes with her”, Rita says.  
 Although parents may be together during their child’s birth, their 
experiences of labor can be profoundly different. While Anna went through their 
stillborn son Oliver’s birth in an almost elevated state of focused attention, her 
husband Thomas was as far down as he had ever been. As Anna held Oliver in her 
arms, she was overwhelmed with pride and affection. The midwives told them they 
had rarely seen a stillborn baby this beautiful. In the evening after the birth, Thomas 
sat with his son. As he put his finger into Oliver’s tiny palm and his little fingers didn’t 
squeeze back, Thomas was hit by the irretrievable reality. Their son was dead.  
The midwives gently introduced them to some of the many decisions 
they were faced with along the way: Had they thought of a name? Would they like to 
see a priest? Did they want the priest to bless Oliver? Would they like the staff to 
arrange a meeting with an undertaker, or would they rather find one themselves? 
Would they accept the offer of a post-mortem examination? Moreover, through their 
way of being around and taking care of Oliver, the midwives showed Thomas and 
Anna how they could be together their son in a way that felt natural to them. “We 
were together with Oliver,” Anna recalls. “We kind of played being this little family.”  
Thomas stresses the importance of having received visits from their 
family while they were at the hospital with Oliver: “They [members of their family] 
are so incredibly glad they got the opportunity to come and see him. Because then 
they have an image of who it is––and who we miss, right?… So it means really, really 
much, actually––that they were a part of it. … They’re the only ones who’ve seen 
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him––alive, at least…” “’Alive’?” Anna interrupts, before he realizes his slip of 
tongue. We all know what he means. The days together with Oliver were the only 
ones they would ever spend with him, and although he was not alive, he was––and 
continues to be––present in his parents love and grief. 
Unlike Rita, Thomas and Anna, Linda and Chris happily returned 
home from the maternity ward with their firstborn son, Lucas. They had fought so 
long to have him, and the first few days went by in a state of sleepless appreciation of 
their little wonder. However, they had difficulties with getting Lucas to eat, and as 
they called the “nursing hotline” for advice, they seemed to be losing contact with 
Lucas. When the midwife from the nursing hotline refused to take him in before their 
scheduled appointment the next morning, Chris hung up and called 911. From that 
moment on, everything that happened seemed like watching a bad movie. The doctors 
fought for Lucas’ life. Linda and Chris stood by the side of his incubator. “I kept 
telling him about all the wonderful things that should happen when we got back home 
with him”, Linda recalls, “how proud we were of him, how much we loved him, that 
he should fight, that we fought with him…” The doctors could not say what was wrong 
with Lucas, and he was getting increasingly ill. After repeatedly having turned it 
down, Linda and Chris got to the point where they accepted the offer of an emergency 
baptism. Shortly after the ceremony, Lucas was released from all the tubes that had 
been attached to his little body. “He breathes out in our arms”, Linda says quietly. “It 
was how it was supposed to be, when it had to be like this. In that moment, our world 
fell apart.”  
Each of the stories I have been told of losing a child involves worlds 
falling apart. However, they are also––and perhaps most of all––stories of love. 
Regardless of the unbearable loss, the parents are grateful of having had the 
opportunity to experience their children. As Eric expresses it, two years after the loss 
of his firstborn son due to a congenital disease:  
I would gladly have taken one more day, and one more day, and one more 
day. All the experiences I should have had with him. Then some people 
think, that would make me know him better as a person, and then the loss 
would probably be greater. But I don’t mind that. I mean, I would accept 
that the loss was greater. I just want an extra day, and an extra day, and an 
extra day. I want to know how he would have become. So every extra 
minute would have been good. So in that context, it’s actually irrelevant 
whether the loss would have been greater. I just wish I could have had one 
more minute. 
In spite of the pain of loss, and in spite of his expectation that this 
pain might have been even more profound if his son had lived longer, Eric would have 
been willing to “pay the price” to gain more time with his son. In other words, while 
acknowledging the widespread cultural assumption that the loss is somehow relative 
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to how long one has known the child, Eric highlights the loss of future that is so 
profound when a child dies early in life. The grief is not only related to the loss of 
what has been, but also—and perhaps most of all—the loss of what should have been. 
In the following, I explore the significance of comparing the magnitude of loss with 
reference to the child’s age and uniqueness, and how my doubts concerning my own 
loss reflect cultural ambivalences regarding infant loss and parental grief.  
Ethics of recognition and difference 
When talking about other people’s losses, I talk about grief. However, I am reluctant 
to use the term for my own loss. When talking to other bereaved parents, my loss gives 
me credibility as someone who “knows what it is all about.” Nonetheless, I tend to 
become hesitant when they ask me how I relate to my loss, grief, and dead child today. 
This is only partly due to my intention to decenter my own loss. In addition to this 
concern, my reluctance is also related to my reservations against positioning myself 
(and being positioned) as someone who shares their fate. Sometimes I doubt that the 
circumstances of my own loss qualify me as a legitimate participant in the community 
of bereaved parents: Is my loss “big enough” to be considered a “real loss” by those 
who have experienced “greater losses”? Several of the informants reflect on the issue 
of whether or not the magnitude of their loss is in any way related to the age of their 
children. Although the standard practices of care for bereaved parents after infant and 
perinatal loss in our culture involve acknowledging these losses as “real losses of real 
children”, there is also a common cultural assumption that the loss of a younger, less 
mature infant is somehow less severe than the loss of a relatively older child whom 
one has “gotten to know” (Kofod & Brinkmann, 2017). Furthermore, my hesitation is 
probably also related to the fact that my own loss is not something I “deal with” in a 
very explicit way anymore. I do not talk much about it, I do not pay regular visits to 
the cemetery, and when asked how many children I have, I seldom mention my dead 
child.  
So when the parents ask me how I relate to her today, I am in conflict 
between being honest on the one side, and keeping a decentered focus on what they 
are (often)—implicitly or explicitly—asking for: positive images of how their grief 
might become an integrated and natural part of their continuing life. However, 
confronted with people who grieve, I feel like humbling myself by claiming to share 
their fate. In some ways, the fact that I did not get to know my daughter has indeed 
made the loss more bearable to me. And yet, this is also what makes the loss so 
absolute. I lost everything of what should have been her. I loved her, yet she never 
knew. Not only she, but also us—our relationship as mother and child—was almost 
mere potential, yet to become reality. In many ways, she was a “loss of possibility, of 
parenthood, of potential relationship rather than existing relationship” (Grout & 
Romanoff, 2000, p. 104). However, in my eagerness to acknowledge the parents’ 
experiences of having lost “real children,” I am reluctant to talk about these 
experiences. By admitting that my loss sometimes feels more like a loss of an 
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imagined possibility than of a real child, I fear that I implicitly fail to acknowledge 
not only my own loss, but also the losses of the parents who share their stories with 
me.  
 In spite of my reluctance to use the term grief for my own loss, I seem 
to assume that my informants are comfortable with addressing their loss experiences 
as grief, and that they feel equally comfortable with the notion of grief as a life 
condition. By attempting to acknowledge the significance of their loss by addressing 
their condition as grief, am I implicitly reifying a normative assumption that the 
intensity and duration of the parents’ grief expressions reflect the intensity and 
duration of their love for their dead children? After losing my daughter, a friendly 
colleague whom I hardly knew called me to show her sympathy and share her own 
story of losing a child with me. In spite of her good intentions, I remember a feeling 
of awkwardness due to her repeated questions of our daughter’s name. It was as if the 
fact that we had not given her a real name indicated a failure to acknowledge her real 
existence and significance.  
In contemporary Western cultures, characterized by low infant 
mortality rates, advanced birth control technologies and a high degree of 
individualism, the process of attributing human and individual status to the infant is 
likely to be faster and more pronounced than in societies with higher infant mortality 
rates and lower levels of individualism (Scheper-Hughes, 1993). Naming practices 
are a part of this cultural pattern. As the American anthropologist, Nancy Scheper-
Hughes, has argued: “Our firm belief that every child has a constitutional right, as it 
were, to his or her individual name reflects our markedly individualistic way of 
thinking.” (Ibid., pp. 414-15). In this light, then, not giving our child a name indicates 
a failure to grant her individuality. To me, however, calling her “our little girl” stresses 
our relationship with her, while acknowledging that we did not get to know her as a 
unique person. Although she was indeed our little girl, we would never have the 
chance to call her by a name, and she would never be able to respond to one. In any 
case, I believe that my urge to justify our choice of not giving her a proper name (even 
in the context of this essay) expresses the blurred and ambivalent cultural norms 
concerning infant loss and parental grief, as well as the intrinsically normative 
relations between love and the expression of grief (Kofod & Brinkmann, 2017). This 
relationship between love and grief is also often implicitly or explicitly addressed by 
the parents in my study, for example by Anna, who repeatedly expresses her concerns 
about whether she “grieves enough” for her dead son: 
I would have thought that I wouldn’t be able to hold myself together… If 
I had that feeling before, that if you lose someone, then you can’t possibly 
hold yourself together. And now, when it’s actually me who has lost 
someone, I’ve been distressed about the fact that I do hang together. Why 
haven’t I been out so deep that I can’t float?  
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Anna is not alone in addressing these issues. Several of the parents, 
most notably the mothers, share similar concerns about whether their ability to feel 
joy—or conversely—their inability to feel grief all the time, reflect their failure as 
loving parents of their dead children. Like myself, all of the parents I have interviewed 
have lost very young children, with whom none of us have had the opportunity to 
spend much time. In some ways, this adds to the complexity of the loss experience. 
As Thomas expresses it in our last conversation, a little less than two years after his 
son’s death, “I have to make my daily life work again without my child, but then 
again, I’ve never had a daily life with him. I had dreams and expectations – things that 
should have been, but they haven’t been. It’s hard to tell exactly what you miss. … 
It’s so intangible…” Equally, also in our last conversation (approx. two years after the 
loss of their son), Chris and Linda discuss the difficult acknowledgement of not only 
missing their dead son, but also “a child”: 
Chris: We miss Lucas. Of course we do. But… we also missed… a child. 
Me: A living child. 
Chris and Linda: Yes. 
Linda: Yes. And sometimes I think that’s kind of ugly… 
Me: Yes? How so? 
Linda: Yes, actually… I kind of… not that he, at all, but… but I think, 
when you say it out loud, then it just sounds like… Then he’s just 
forgotten. And then he means nothing. Or so it may sound for the outside 
world… 
Apparently, some of the parents seem to share my fear of being seen 
as someone who does not grieve, and hence, does not love their children enough. 
Nevertheless, in spite of my responsiveness towards the parents’ struggles to come to 
terms with their roles as parents of their dead children, I wonder if sharing more of 
my own experiences with these issues could have opened up further explorations of 
the complex, normative nature of grieving the loss of a child whom one has not gotten 
to know.  
The interplay between parental and popular narratives of grief 
Through the analytical process of preparing and writing this essay, one aspect of the 
relationship between the cultural narratives of grief, as presented by the parental 
versus the popular and professional accounts of bereavement, has become 
increasingly obvious to me. There seems to be a discrepancy between the stories told 
by bereaved parents themselves and the narratives of grief with which they are 
confronted in their everyday lives. Bluntly put, the parents talk about grief as a 
continuous affectionate relationship with their dead children. In contrast, the 
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narratives they encounter in their everyday lives seem to depict grief as a painful 
process that they need to “go through” in order to return to a “normal” or perhaps a 
“new normal” level of functioning (Freud, 1957; Worden, 1982). Although most of 
the parents in this study do indeed “return” to what might be called some kind of 
normalcy, insofar as they gradually find themselves able to return to work and social 
life, most of them stress the importance of “finding a place” in this new life for their 
dead children. The notions of “going through” and “getting over” grief are repeatedly 
referred to as hurtful, insulting and fundamentally mistaken.  
Along with the cultural narratives of “going through” and resolving 
grief, grief is also often depicted as a developmental process, as a healing pain, 
through which the bereaved individual potentially grows and develops as a human 
being (Leick, Davidsen-Nielsen & Stoner, 1991, p. 7). A narrative of personal growth 
through crisis is reflected in numerous professional and popular accounts of 
bereavement, for example in the growing interest for so-called “post-traumatic 
growth” (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2001). In essence, these narratives reproduce the well-
known aphorism, “What doesn’t kill you makes you stronger,” i.e., like a Phoenix out 
of ashes, burned individuals rise and fly—wiser, stronger and better than before. As 
Granger E. Westberg (2010) states in the preface of his bestselling book Good Grief, 
first published in 1962: “We come out of it stronger, for we have had to learn how to 
use our spiritual muscles to climb the rugged mountain trails” (Ibid., preface). 
Throughout the interviews, I have talked with the parents about these different 
narratives of grief as a process of growth, development and change. Although some 
of them do indeed occasionally talk about grief as a transformational process, at other 
times they stress the experience of stagnation, or lack of new insights as an equally 
significant experience in grief. At times, our conversation unfolds like “discourses 
crossing swords” (Tanggaard, 2007), i.e., differing assumptions brought forth by me 
and by the interview participants “cross each other and become the context of a 
productive negotiation of meaning” (Ibid., p. 160). For example, in our second 
conversation, approx. 8 months after the loss of their daughter, I ask Paul and Sarah 
whether there is anything that has become “more important” for them after her death, 
after which the following conversation unfolds: 
Paul: Hmm… I don’t know, really... 
Sarah: I don’t know if there’s anything that has become more important… 
I mean, everything is a little uncertain, you might say. Afterwards, right? 
And… Of course you learn to… appreciate… each other. I think. I mean, 
I’ve really feared that anything should happen to Paul. It was like all balls 
were kind of thrown up in the air, and everything could… Everything 
could happen. So… losing more was not… unlikely, if you know what I 
mean? All the little things were certainly unimportant. But I don’t know if 
there was anything in particular that got extra important. 
In spite of their hesitant response, I pursue the topic: 
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Me: But some kind of change of perspective related to… 
Sarah: Yeah, definitely.  
Me: … what’s important, and what’s less important? 
Sarah: Yes, I think so. (…) Umm, I don’t know if there was anything that 
became especially important. 
Me: No, it isn’t because you necessarily find… a new meaning with life. 
Sarah: No, that hasn’t come yet. Almost the opposite, right? We’re not 
there yet at all yet, or I’m not, at least. There are really many things that 
don’t give any meaning. (…) [It] becomes kind of… it doesn’t matter, 
right? I mean, if the flowers stand straight in the flowerbed. Yeah, 
whatever!  
When re-reading this, it strikes me how my seemingly innocent 
question of whether “anything has become more important” implicitly reflects and 
reproduces the popular narrative of grief as a (positive) transformation process. 
However, instead of silently accepting this implicit assumption, Sarah and Paul 
actively reject it. Despite Sarah’s reluctant statement about “learning to appreciate 
each other,” they both stress that they do not feel that anything has become more 
important—almost the opposite, Sarah maintains. The sense of meaninglessness that 
pervades her experience of losing their daughter is replicated in her experience of 
everyday situations, where things she used to find meaningful appear bereft of 
meaning and value after the loss. However, although such a sense of meaninglessness 
seems to be a very common experience among bereaved parents, contemporary 
bereavement research addresses this as a pathological reaction to loss (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013; World Health Association, 2016). Thereby, the cultural 
ideal of the rising Phoenix is implicitly reflected in professional accounts of 
bereavement, by defining failure to regain meaning after a loss as a pathological 
condition that requires treatment.  
 When people from English-speaking countries—and several other 
Western countries—talk about grief, implicit assumptions of transience and exception 
seem to be some of the crucial features of what is conceived of as grief: “To be grief-
stricken”, “in grief”, “going through grief”, etc., are all ways of saying that grief is 
something people should ultimately “get over”. In contrast, in many personal accounts 
of bereavement, the sorrow that follows a loss is not necessarily regarded as something 
that should pass. This rejection of grief as a transitory state is also increasingly being 
expressed and acknowledged within contemporary bereavement research, for example 
in the concept of “continuing bonds” presented by Dennis Klass, Phyllis A. Silverman 
and Steven L. Nickman (1996) and within narrative psychology (see e.g., White, 
1988). However, this acknowledgement of grief as a continuing relationship with the 
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deceased loved one seems to be delimited to those who are able to do so in ways that 
are considered as “healthy” and “functional”, i.e., without interfering with the 
bereaved individual’s daily functioning, identity, and well-being. For example, in the 
recent suggestions to introduce a separate, diagnostic category for complicated or 
prolonged grief, pathological grief is associated with “confusion about one’s role in 
life”, “difficulty accepting the loss”, “bitterness or anger”, “difficulty in moving on 
with life”, or “feeling that life is unfulfilling, empty, or meaningless since the loss” 
(Prigerson et al., 2009, p. 9). In other words, normal grief is implicitly depicted as a 
rather non-dramatic phenomenon with little impact on the bereaved individual’s sense 
of identity and meaning. Furthermore, this delineation between normal and 
pathological grief implicitly depicts the grieving individual as a unified subject with 
a once and for all clarified and unambiguous relationship with the lost loved one. 
However, the parents participating in this study often describe their relationship to 
their loss, not as a matter of “either-or”, but rather in terms of “both-and”: feeling sad 
and proud at the same time; feeling sad and sometimes actually appreciating the 
sadness as a way to sense their child’s continuing presence in their lives; accepting 
the loss in some ways and not in others; longing for their child, while at the same time 
being able to go on with their lives; avoiding certain social situations and finding 
comfort in others, etc. Seen through a list of diagnostic criteria, these experiences 
might easily resemble a psychiatric disorder. However, although the love implicit in 
the yearning and sadness remains invisible, without it, there is no grief.  
Epilogue: A place for the dead 
If she had lived, my daughter would have turned eleven this summer. As we went 
through the cemetery on our way to soccer training last week, my seven-year-old son 
wanted to go visit her grave. His request came as a surprise to me because he seldom 
talks about her. I can only recall a few times before when he has asked to go see her 
grave. However, I remember how we imagined this when we chose this particular 
gravesite: The beautiful liveliness of this cemetery, its function as a local park where 
people come by to sit in the sun, or just walk through on the way to soccer training on 
a Monday afternoon after school. I imagined going there with our future kids, just like 
this, without any special occasion, just as a regular thing to do, a bit of everyday life.  
“Afterwards”, I responded, “or we’ll be too late for your training.”  
“I wish she was here”, he said, “Why couldn’t she live?” 
I answered, as I have done before, that she was born too early, her lungs were not 
ready to breathe on their own yet.  
“But why was she born so early, if she wasn’t ready?” he continued.  
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“It just happened”, I answered––once again falling short of giving a meaningful 
answer to her meaningless death.  
 However, although her death was meaningless, her existence was not. 
Although I cannot know how my life would have been without having and losing her, 
I know that I am a different person and a different parent than I would have been 
without her. As for the interviewed parents’ questions concerning her place in my life, 
she does indeed hold a place, although it is a quiet and private one. My children talk 
about her every now and then, and although I am reluctant to call it grief, they do seem 
to miss the idea of a protective and loving big sister. More than grief, her death has 
given them an awareness of the fragility of life which I sometimes wish I could have 
protected them from a bit longer.  
 Walking through the cemetery with my son’s hand in mine, looking 
at the birds, the trees and the people walking by, I imagine her being a part of 
everything, a tiny piece of the big puzzle of life. We did not walk by after training. It 
was late, we were hungry, and school work was waiting. Maybe next time. 
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Abstract 
Grief is often conceived in causal or reactive terms, as something that simply strikes 
people after a loss. But, on closer scrutiny, there are good reasons to think of grief as 
a normative phenomenon, which is done or enacted by people, relative to cultural 
norms. To substantiate the claim that grief should be thought of as normative, we draw 
upon empirical examples from a qualitative interview study with bereaved parents 
after infant loss, and analyze how grieving the loss of a small child in our culture is 
experienced, interpreted, and enacted within a diffuse and ambivalent, yet 
inescapable, moral framework. Further, we discuss some of the possible consequences 
for bereaved individuals when navigating the normative landscape of grieving in 
contemporary Western cultures: A landscape in which suffering is increasingly dealt 
with in psychiatric and medical terms and understood as an adverse and unnecessary 
condition to be overcome in order to maximize personal health, happiness and well-
being.  
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Introduction 
Grief is often conceived in causal or reactive terms, as something that simply strikes 
people after a loss, in contrast to mourning, which is typically described as “the social 
expressions or acts expressive of grief, which are shaped by the practices of a given 
society or cultural group” (Stroebe & Schut, 1998, p. 7). A standard definition, such 
as that provided by Gross in his textbook on grief, states for example that grief is ”a 
universal reaction to bereavement, involving both psychological and bodily 
experiences.” (Gross, 2016, p. 5). Grief is thus depicted in rather passive terms, as a 
response or reaction. Of course, there is also a more active notion of “grief work”, 
which is “the process by which the bereaved individual comes to terms with his/her 
bereavement” (p. 5), but this is typically seen as analytically separate from the grief 
reaction itself. For example, Thomas Attig (2004) distinguishes between grief as the 
“reactive agony (…) that happens to us after bereavement happens to us” and “our 
active response to loss” (p. 343). However, as we attempt to demonstrate in this article, 
the reactive responses and the active shaping of emotions and acts are deeply 
entangled and situated within cultural, normative practices. Hence, there are good 
reasons to think of grief as a normative phenomenon that not simply happens as a 
causally inflicted event, but which is done by people, relative to cultural norms. Grief, 
like mental phenomena in general, we will argue, are performed or enacted rather than 
passively undergone. This means that grief can be done in more or less adequate ways 
within local moral worlds and hence is normative (Harré, 1983). 
In this article, we outline what we mean more specifically when we claim that grief 
should be understood in normative terms. To substantiate this claim, in the latter half 
of the paper we draw upon empirical examples from a qualitative interview study 
conducted in Denmark with bereaved parents after infant loss, and analyze how 
grieving the loss of an infant in contemporary Danish culture is experienced, 
interpreted, and enacted within a diffuse and pluralistic, yet inescapable, moral 
framework. Finally, we highlight and discuss some of the possible consequences for 
bereaved individuals when navigating the normative landscape of grieving in 
contemporary Western cultures.  
The normativity of grief as a mental phenomenon 
In their ambitious attempt to build a normative psychology (i.e., a psychological 
science that acknowledges the basic normativity of psychological phenomena), Harré 
and Moghaddam (2012) cite Kalat’s introductory psychology textbook to illustrate 
how the normative approach differs fundamentally from the standard causal one. 
Kalat (2005) states that psychologists qua scientists should “act on the basis of 
determinism, the assumption that everything that happens has a cause, or a 
determinant, in the observable world” (p. 5). This, Kalat argues on the same page, is 
a key point of the scientific approach as such that consists of seeking the “immediate 
causes” of an event instead of its “final causes” (e.g. the purpose of an action). This 
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means that the phenomena studied by psychologists – how humans think, feel, and act 
– should in principle be treated like all other observable events in the world (such as 
planets orbiting the stars or glaciers melting to form rivers). Although other textbooks 
use slightly different phrases, it is probably a fair verdict to conclude that something 
like this represents the standard approach to scientific practice in psychology (leaving 
aside such perspectives as phenomenology, discursive psychology, and cultural 
psychology). 
According to Harré and Moghaddam (2012), many things are misguided about this 
standard causal approach. For one, they note that it (ironically) seriously 
misrepresents the natural sciences that it otherwise seeks to emulate. The natural 
sciences do not in general operate with simple Humean positivist causality (A is the 
cause of B if and only if there is a constant conjunction – to quote David Hume – 
between A-type events and B-type events), but employs models that are much more 
sophisticated, and which notably include references to the mechanisms or dynamic 
systems that mediate relationships between A- and B-type events. But even worse, the 
standard approach leaves out acting persons entirely, since these cannot be conceived 
in causal terms. If persons’ acts simply happened to them causally, they could not be 
held accountable for their doings, and, in a sense, there would not be any acts, but 
only behaviors or events. And if persons’ emotions simply happened mechanically in 
a given situation, no one could ever legitimately be blamed for exaggerated aggression 
or praised for suppressing an impulse to express anger.  
Throughout his career as a scientific psychologist, Harré has sought to demonstrate 
that we can only conceivably imagine and understand psychological phenomena in 
the first place, because we have access to a realm of normativity. The reason why 
dread and anger are psychological phenomena (i.e., emotions), but not indigestion or 
exhaustion – although all have behavioral manifestations as well as fairly distinctive 
experiential qualities – is that only dread and anger fall, for us, within a moral order 
(Harré, 1983; see also Brinkmann, 2011). Harré says ”for us”, since he believes that 
classifications of what does or does not belong in the normative moral order are at 
least partly culturally relative, which means that what counts as a psychological 
phenomenon likewise becomes partly culturally relative. 
In one way, the normative approach to psychology is “old news” in Western thought 
and was thoroughly examined and articulated by Aristotle. In the Ethics, Aristotle was 
concerned with the human being as an intentional creature whose operations demands 
teleological explanation. He was concerned with the human being as a minded 
creature who lives in a normative space and is responsive to reasons for acting and 
feeling, and mental life thus cannot be grasped in a causal framework. Like Harré and 
Moghaddam (2012), Aristotle saw the need for a “hybrid psychology” that can 
integrate knowledge of the working mechanisms of the organism and its brain with 
knowledge of the person as an active, intentional being. For example, when he 
discussed motivation, he did not think that it could be fully understood by the natural 
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scientist (the phusikos). We also need the work of the “dialectician” in order to grasp 
it (Robinson, 1989). For the latter “would define e.g. anger as the appetite for returning 
pain for pain, or something like that, while the former would define it as a boiling of 
the blood.” (Aristotle quoted from Robinson, 1989, p. 81). The dialecticians – the 
cultural psychologists of the day, we might say, place anger in a normative space of 
reasons, and know that there is such a thing as justified anger in the face of 
outrageousness. What makes “boiling of the blood” (or some modern 
neurophysiological equivalent) anger has not just to do with its natural scientific 
properties, but is precisely that it is situated in a context where it makes sense to 
question, justify, and state the normative reason for “boiling of the blood”. Anger is 
thus a psychological phenomenon in so far as it is done, performed, or enacted. In 
other words, in so far as it is a moral phenomenon, subject to praise and blame. If it 
were entirely outside the realm of normativity, we should confine it instead to the 
science of physiology. 
Similarly, to turn to the subject matter of the following analysis, grief is also on this 
account done or performed by skilled human actors, who can only grieve properly if 
they know their local moral order, i.e. know how, and how much, grief is called for in 
the social practices of their culture. This is not to say that grief is an action that can 
simply be stopped (like playing football with friends, which stops whenever the 
players become bored with the game or are leaving because of other appointments). 
But it is to say that grief should not be thought of as a purely mechanical reaction that 
is causally inflicted, but rather represents a normative response to a loss. The loss is 
not simply a cause that triggers an emotion, but is an event that provides a reason for 
feeling and expressing grief in a certain way. This also explains why grief (like other 
emotions) may be evaluated morally: The person who does not grieve sufficiently is 
easily seen as shallow or aloof (whether justified or not), whereas the person who is 
experiencing extreme grief (in a situation that does not call for deep mourning) can be 
accused of “overdoing it”. As we shall see below with reference to a study of parents’ 
grief after the loss of an infant, people in such a tragic situation do not only struggle 
with the loss as such, but also with navigating the rather unclear normativity in this 
tragic situation: On the one hand, there is a cultural discourse claiming that the worst 
thing a human being can experience is the loss of a child, but, on the other, there is 
also a discourse implying (to put it bluntly) that the loss is supposed to be less intense 
when the child is relatively young at the time of its death, compared to older children 
that the parents “have gotten to know” (there is also a cultural discourse, which 
implies that the loss of very old persons should call for less intense forms of grief). 
How – and how much – should one grieve then? This is not an easy question, 
especially not in a Western culture with relatively diffuse norms about grief and few 
common rituals. In order to understand how these conditions shape parental grief after 
infant loss, we will now outline some of the cultural-historical changes in the 
normative understandings and practices specifically related to infant death and 
parental grief. 
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Historical changes in the perception of infant death and parental grief 
In most Western countries prior to the late 1970s, the standard care for bereaved 
parents after stillbirths and perinatal losses (i.e., when an infant dies in the latter half 
of the pregnancy or in the first week of life) was to encourage the parents to put the 
loss behind them and look to the future. The dead babies were typically hid away and 
disposed of by the hospital staff, bereaved mothers were placed next to mothers of 
healthy new-born babies in the hospital ward, and any mentioning of the dead child 
was discouraged (Hughes & Riches, 2003; Lasker & Toedter, 1994). These practices 
were based on the assumption that confrontation with the loss and contact with the 
dead child would be harmful for the parents, reflecting the focus on ‘letting go’ in the 
dominating grief models of the time (Davies, 2004). 
However, inspired by the counter-cultural movement of the 1960s, grass-root 
associations questioning the dominating practices of care arose across several Western 
countries during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Bereaved parents, primarily mothers, 
protested against what they experienced as mechanical and emotionally oppressing 
practices (Hughes & Riches, 2003). These protests formed the background for the 
radical changes in the psychosocial management of stillbirth and perinatal 
bereavement that have occurred throughout the last decades in most Western 
countries. These movements have fought for public recognition and awareness of 
pregnancy and infant loss, and challenged the earlier practices of care. The change of 
perspective was also reflected in the publication of academic literature on parental 
bereavement, addressing the need for acknowledgement of the severity of the parents’ 
loss, and claiming that lack of contact with the dead child was associated with 
inhibited mourning (see e.g. Lewis, 1979). 
Today the model of care for bereaved parents after infant loss involves encouraging 
the parents to have contact with the dead child in order to create attachment and 
facilitate the grieving process (Davies, 2004). These new practices are associated with 
changes in the view on grief and bereavement, from the former focus on letting go 
towards understandings of grief stressing the importance of continuing bonds with the 
deceased (Klass, Silvermann & Nickman, 1996).  
However, in spite of these changes, cultural practices and expectations surrounding 
infant loss still reflect tensions and ambiguities concerning the normative practices 
and interpretations of the loss itself as well as the grief associated with losing small 
children (Cacciatore, Defrain & Jones, 2008; Lang et al., 2011). 
The British sociologist Tony Walter argues that contemporary Western grief culture 
is characterized by “an interplay between public provision and private experience” 
(Walter 1999, p. 187). On the one hand, we see a rise in the public expression of 
private grief experiences (e.g. via autobiographical accounts, internet blogs etc.), and 
these individual experiences have become increasingly authoritative in the 
CHAPTER 9. GRIEF AS A NORMATIVE PHENOMENON:  THE DIFFUSE AND AMBIVALENT NORMATIVITY OF INFANT 
LOSS AND PARENTAL GRIEVING IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN CULTURE 
 
 145 
professional understanding of bereavement. Simultaneously, the professional 
vocabulary of grief developed within the disciplines of medicine and psychology 
provides an interpretive framework for individuals’ grief experiences. According to 
Walter, the notion of the “grief process” has replaced social mourning as the main 
regulatory framework for grief in contemporary Western societies. Walter argues: 
“Insofar as the self is free to define its own grief, so that there is a diversity of voices 
undermining any notion of a single, universal grief process, we may refer to 
postmodern grief. Insofar as professional expertise dominates, we may refer to late 
modern grief” (p. 187). In this article, we will describe the outlines of the normative 
landscape of parental grief as it is experienced by a group of bereaved Danish parents 
after infant loss, and also explore some of the consequences for these parents of 
grieving within the cultural framework of contemporary Danish society.  
An empirical study of today’s grief experiences and practices 
Methodological approach 
The data are drawn from 20 in-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted 
by the first author over a period of 2 years (from December 2012 to October 2014) 
with 13 bereaved parents following infant loss. The participants – six heterosexual 
couples and one woman participating without her partner – were all recruited through 
a nationwide, private Danish organization that offers counselling and network support 
to bereaved parents after infant loss. With one exception (a couple participating in one 
interview approximately 2 years after the loss of their child), all participants were 
interviewed three times; shortly after the loss (<2 months), 7-8 months later, and 
finally approximately 2 years after the loss. With the exception of the woman 
participating alone, all participants were interviewed together with their partner, and 
all interviews were carried out in the participants’ homes. 
The sample of participants was selected in order to reflect the variation in terms of 
geographical location, circumstances of loss, family situation and social background 
of the parents who ordinarily make use of the services provided by the bereavement 
organization. The participants had lost children who died shortly before or after (< 1 
week) birth, all born in the 2nd or 3rd trimester of pregnancy. One of the couples had 
lost their second child, whereas the other participants had all lost their first-born child. 
The participants’ age ranged from 26 to 42 years, with a mean age of 33,3 for the 
female participants and 31,7 for the male participants. The interview guide was 
developed as a semi-structured guide in order to cover the research questions for the 
overall project, which were formulated as follows:  
• How do parents experience the loss of a child, and how are these 
experiences related to the practices and interpretative repertoires of 
grief that are available in our culture? 
• How do the current psychological, health oriented and increasingly 
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diagnostic understandings of grief inform individual grief experiences 
and practices? 
• How do the parents engage in and draw upon the production and 
negotiation of meaning, identity practices and narratives about loss that 
are created within the grief support practices provided by the 
bereavement organization? 
 
All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. During the process of 
interview transcription and analysis, significant statements were selected and 
developed into tentative codes and subsequently categorized into themes developing 
in the data (cf. Charmaz, 2006). For the purpose of this article, we have read through 
the transcripts to find interview passages that directly or indirectly address the 
normativity of grief, i.e., statements in which the participants reflect upon their own 
and other people’s evaluations of their loss, grief reactions, and responses. During the 
analytical process, the emergent findings were shared within our research group as 
well as with other scholars within the fields of psychology, sociology and 
anthropology, who continuously have challenged and discussed our interpretations.  
Findings: Diffuse status of the loss, diffuse normative framework for grieving 
Numerous studies and clinical practice support the popular assumption that parents 
(most notably mothers) are the "chief mourners" when a child dies, and the loss of a 
child is generally perceived as one of the most severe types of bereavement (Robson 
& Walter, 2013; Sanders, 1980). Historical and anthropological studies indicate that 
this may be particularly pronounced in modern societies with low child mortality, 
compared to societies with high child mortality that have formed and still form the 
conditions for many people around the globe (Lofland, 1985; Scheper-Hughes, 1993). 
However, in contemporary Western societies with low child mortality, the loss of a 
small child in pregnancy or within the first weeks of life is nonetheless associated with 
diffuse and conflicting understandings of the magnitude and character of the loss 
(Cacciatore, Defrain & Jones, 2008; Lang et al., 2011). As we have seen, earlier 
practices of care as well as public discourse have tended to view these losses as less 
severe than the loss of an older child whom one have "gotten to know". In contrast, 
today the prevailing practices of care for these bereaved parents explicitly 
acknowledge the dead child’s status as a ‘real child’, and encourage the parents to 
make bonds and create memories in order to help the grieving process (Callister, 
2006). These two views represent contrasting, yet coexisting views of the loss these 
parents experience. Bluntly put, the former represents the loss as a more or less 
replaceable loss of a ‘foetus’, ‘stillborn’, ‘miscarriage’ or ‘unknown child’, while the 
latter promote an image of the child as unique and irreplaceable. As we shall see, these 
opposing views are reflected in several ways in the participating parents’ accounts.  
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The blurred status of the child in early infant loss 
Even though most of the participating parents in this study express that they have been 
met with support and sympathy for their loss, most of them also refer to situations in 
which their loss have been met with comments which they have experienced as 
diminishing, inappropriate or offensive, such as “It was good it happened now instead 
of later”, “It is good you didn’t get to know him/her first” etc., implying that the loss 
of a smaller child is somehow replaceable and hence less severe than if the child had 
been older. For example, Linda24, whose firstborn child died four days after he was 
born due to an unrecognized congenital disease, recalls from their son’s funeral:  
Then one of Chris’ [her husband’s] parents’ friends came over, exclaiming 
‘You’ll just have to get back in the saddle!’ My son lies in the coffin, and 
we’re on our way to bury him! 
Likewise, Paul, who lost his firstborn child in a stillbirth, recalls:  
We’ve gotten some weird comments from people, like ‘You’re young, you 
can have another one.’ I understand what’s meant, but it’s not like a pair 
of trousers. The woman who said so has three children of her own. If she 
lost one of them, that [having two other children] would not make her grief 
less. 
However, even though most of the participants explicitly reject the notion that their 
grief is relative to the age of their child, at other times they seem to accept that there 
is indeed a difference. For example Mia, who also lost her firstborn child in a stillbirth, 
puts it this way: 
Mia: I feared to be put in a [grief support] group with someone who had 
lost a two-year-old child. Grief cannot be compared, but that must be so 
awful. I’d feel that our loss is nothing compared to that…  
In spite of stating that grief "cannot be compared" – an expression that is often used 
throughout the different interviews – Mia does actually compare her loss with others 
and finds her own to be less significant than someone who has lost older children. In 
this sense, there seems to be an unofficial "grief hierarchy" that is both rejected ("grief 
cannot be compared") and accepted ("our loss is nothing compared to that"). This is 
an indication of what might be called normative ambivalence. 
                                                            
24 The names of the participating parents in this study are changed for reasons of confidentiality. 
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Sarah, who lost her daughter in a stillbirth, reflects on the issue of social recognition 
of the loss being dependent on other people's ability to relate to the child as a unique 
person; as someone one has "gotten to know": 
Sarah: I think it makes a difference for people that they didn’t get to know 
her. I think the understanding would have been greater if she had lived for 
some months. (…) [But] it’s not just an abortion. You don’t just move 
on… 
The subject of the dead child’s individual and human status can be a sensitive matter. 
When John and Emma, who lost their second child in a stillbirth, think back to the 
time after their son’s birth, John recalls how the midwives: 
…play a crucial part in making us conceive of him as our child. At first it 
was just a failed pregnancy – an abortion or something like that…  
His wife Emma interrupts him, stating:  
It’s you who think like that, I don’t.  
John: No, okay- (they both laugh a little) That’s okay. (…) But I think the 
way these midwives act… (…) After the birth, they say ‘Congratulations 
with your son’ and such. (…) To me that has made me think he’s our son, 
and it was a real child. (…) 
Emma bursts into tears, exclaiming: Of course he was a real human being! 
Although many parents––also in the present study––react with initial shock and 
disbelief when confronted with the message that they are to go through a natural 
labour, most of them look back on the delivery and the time spent with their dying or 
dead baby as a precious experience. (It is necessary to stress that this applies to parents 
who by the time of birth knew that their baby was dead or would die soon after birth, 
and that the circumstances for parents who lose their children due to unanticipated 
events and medical failures during the course of birth will often be different.). The 
parents’ trajectories from their initial response of shock and disbelief to their 
retrospective accounts of the birth as something "natural" and precious are mediated 
by the hospital staff's (most prominently the midwives’) guidance throughout the 
process. For example, Thomas and Anna describe how the midwives “showed the 
way” to how they could be together with their dead son after the birth. Anna states:  
[The midwife said] ‘You’ve had a son who is dead’. That hadn’t dawned 
on me at all. She shows the way: ’May I see Oliver?’ She unwraps him, 
and then she leaves again. Kind of shows the way––‘this is how you are 
parents to a dead child’. It made it so natural to be with him, really. If 
somebody had told me they’d been with their dead child from Thursday to 
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Monday, I would have found it macabre, but…It just made it such a natural 
thing. We are so happy and grateful they gave us the opportunity to give 
Oliver a lot of care and love – and to be attached to him. It has helped with 
the attachment. 
Anna’s reflections on how she believes she would have reacted before is an expression 
of the cultural expectation of stillbirths and infant death as something macabre. 
Several of the parents describe how they take these cultural expectations into account 
when considering how to share their experiences with others. The assumed limits of 
other people regarding how much they can tolerate hearing about the loss can pose a 
dilemma for the bereaved parents: While they may feel an urge to share their 
experiences of pride and affection for their dead children with others, they are 
concerned about whether other people might find this offensive, something that 
illustrates the normative ambivalence of grief in this context. Linda and Chris recall:  
Linda: I still find it hard to look at the pictures [of him], but when I meet 
people, I really feel a need to show them the pictures. I am just as proud 
of my son, even though he’s not here.  
Chris: That’s why it was so important to us that so many attended the 
funeral. It was important to tell that he was here. It was important that 
everybody got a picture of him on the funeral brochure. 
Linda: It’s the only picture of him with open eyes. We put it on the leaflet 
instead of on the coffin. That would be too explicit for people… 
Diffuse norms about how to grieve: Grieving too much or too little 
Associated with the diffuse and ambivalent understandings of the loss itself is a 
similar lack of clearly defined norms about how much or little grief that is called upon 
in the context of infant loss. The parents’ accounts contain multiple experiences with 
uncertainty and confusion concerning their own and other people’s expectations of 
what is understood as appropriate intensity, duration and expression of their grief. On 
the one side, there is a dominating discourse against ‘cultivating’ or ‘overdoing’ grief, 
which is often associated with pathological grief reactions. For example, the 
participants repeatedly distinguish between “feeling sad” and “processing” versus 
being “stuck in”, “cultivating” or letting grief “take over” in order to distinguish 
between appropriate and exaggerated grieving – illustrated below by Mia’s reflections 
on the grief of a friend, who has also lost an infant: 
Her grief reactions [excessive anger and bitterness] have been my worst 
horror scenario. In my eyes, she became ill from it. (…) It’s okay to feel 
sad, but the grief shouldn’t take over. (…) We should process it, not 
cultivate it.  
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On the other side, there is a challenging discourse against grieving ‘too little’, that 
might be interpreted either as an expression of poor psychological coping (e.g. as 
repression), or as a failure to acknowledge the dead child’s significance. For example, 
Anna reflects: 
Several times I’ve gotten a bad consciousness about being able to sit and 
laugh… (…) I’ve doubted whether it’s the right way to cope (…) Am I 
supposed to sit and stare and be sad and cry for twelve hours a day..? 
Likewise, Linda talks about her ambivalent feelings when people praise her for “being 
strong”: 
My first thought is: ‘Okay, do I not love my son enough?’ Then I push it 
aside. I know I love him. 
The normative balancing between grieving “too much” and “too little” is a recurring 
theme in the interviews, and even though the participants frequently talk about grief 
reactions as something that “strikes” them, this does not mean that they deny 
responsibility for how they deal with their grief. For example, when Mia reflects on 
her moral accountability regarding how she responds to her loss, she suggests that 
there are grief reactions (like outbursts of anger or crying, etc.) that she cannot fully 
control. However, how she responds to these reactions (e.g., by being aware of her 
limits regarding social engagements in the time following the loss, apologizing for 
unrighteous behaviours etc.) is indeed her moral responsibility as she sees it: 
Mia: To me there’s a difference between grief reactions and conscious 
choices. We must have our own person with us. That’s what I’ve feared 
the most. Not so much the grief reactions. All of a sudden, everybody has 
seen you cry. (…) But my focus has been on not changing our values or 
personality. (…) We fine-tune our personalities. It mustn’t make us lesser 
persons. 
In Mia’s account, health and morality seem to conflate, in the sense that how one 
relates to and mediates one’s grief reactions––and not so much the reactions per se––
is crucial for evaluating the healthiness as well as the morality of the grief: Her 
friend’s anger and bitterness are simultaneously evaluated as unhealthy and morally 
blameworthy grief responses, while healthy grieving is associated with personal 
development (“fine-tuning of their personalities”). 
Discussion 
In this article, we have argued first theoretically that grief cannot convincingly be 
accounted for in causal and reactive terms, but rather must be understood as a 
normative practice. Then, we gave empirical examples to explore how the status of 
the loss itself, as well as the cultural norms for grieving the loss of an infant, are both 
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associated with normative ambivalence. This ambivalence is reflected in parental grief 
experiences and practices in several ways: The evaluations of the parents’ grief 
responses (as well as their own evaluations and mediation of these responses) depend 
on the extent to which their loss is conceived as replaceable or irreplaceable, relative 
to or independent of how long the parents have known the child. 
Parenthood in the modern West is shaped by normative ideals of unconditional love 
and of cherishing the individual uniqueness of one’s child. Within this moral 
framework, each child is by definition irreplaceable and parental love and attachment 
should be independent of how long one has “known” the child. The American 
anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1993), who has lived for decades among 
people in the poor regions of North Eastern Brazil, has given persuasive accounts of 
how cultural, material and social conditions shape the process of parental attachment. 
In contemporary Western societies, a prevailing culture of individualism, combined 
with low child mortality rates, prenatal diagnostics, family planning patterns etc., has 
led to increasingly earlier and more pronounced “anthropomorphization” of infants 
and unborn fetuses (i.e., the attribution of developed human qualities and individual 
personhood). In contrast, Scheper-Hughes describes how the parents of the poor 
shantytowns in which she has conducted her field work, faced with the harsh realities 
of high infant mortality rates, are much more reluctant and slow in forming 
attachments and attributing human and individual qualities to their new-born babies. 
Under the conditions of devastating poverty and hopelessness, infant deaths are met 
with resigned acceptance, rather than grief, and parental attachment is only gradually 
developed as a child proves it is “strong enough” to live. Grief is thus shaped, not only 
by cultural ideals, but also in the most profound way by the material and social 
conditions under which human beings live their lives.  
In contrast to the parents in Scheper-Hughes’ study, the parents participating in the 
present study are shaped by a culture in which infant deaths are rare and unexpected 
and widely considered against "the natural order". However, the normative 
ambivalence reflected in the parental accounts concerning infant loss indicates that 
even in this culture, anthropomorphization is a gradual and negotiated process. In spite 
of a cultural encouragement of early parental attachment, the personhood, human 
status and irreplaceability of infants who die before, during or shortly after birth are 
still culturally contested. As an effect, parental grieving after infant loss requires a 
constant negotiation of the significance and legitimacy of the loss itself. Related to 
this, the parents’ grief responses are also shaped by normative ambivalence 
concerning what is conceived as appropriate grieving. The parents need to balance 
between grieving “too much” and “too little”, and both extremes can be interpreted as 
an expression of a disproportion between the loss itself and the grief response. 
Whether the balance tips in the direction of “too much” or “too little”, this can be 
interpreted as unhealthy, abnormal, or even explicitly immoral responses (e.g., when 
grieving “too little” is interpreted as a failure to appreciate the child’s significance). 
Healthy, normal and appropriate grieving is associated with cultural ideals of personal 
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growth and development through “processing” the grief (allowing feelings of sadness, 
as long as these feelings do not “take over”).  
Following Walter’s argument of the interplay between public provision and private 
experience, individual grief practices are shaped by professional accounts of healthy 
versus pathological grief, while at the same time, professional accounts are also 
shaped by the normative practices of everyday life. Although we have outlined the 
contours of an ambivalent normative landscape for grief in general and parental grief 
in particular, current developments within our culture indicate a movement towards 
more fixed norms for grieving, most notably with the recent suggestions to introduce 
a psychiatric diagnosis for complicated or prolonged grief (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013; World Health Organization, 2016). While such a diagnosis 
arguably will shape bereavement experiences and practices in the future, the diagnosis 
itself will also reflect the prevailing cultural understanding of suffering as an adverse 
and unnecessary condition to be overcome in order to pursuit personal health, 
happiness and well-being (Kofod, 2015). 
Conclusions 
With reference to examples from a study of parental grief experiences after infant loss, 
we have attempted to demonstrate that human emotions, including grief, should be 
understood as normative, insofar as they are necessarily directed towards “objects” in 
the world in more or less culturally appropriate ways. When grief experiences become 
diffuse and ambivalent, this is related to cultural uncertainty regarding the status of 
the lost object (e.g., the human status of infants who die before, during or shortly after 
birth), as well as to ambivalent norms regarding the appropriate intensity and 
expression of the emotion. Grieving the loss of an infant in our culture requires a 
constant balancing within this ambivalent normative landscape. We believe that 
researchers and practitioners within the area of bereavement and grief should pay 
more attention to the diffuse and ambivalent normativity of grief in order to 
understand the nature of this form of human suffering today.  
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Abstract 
Grief is sometimes poetically described as the price of love: An inescapable existential 
condition of human life. However, throughout the 20th Century grief has increasingly 
come to be understood as a pathological condition that requires psychological and/or 
medical intervention. With the release of DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association 
2013), grief came close to being included as a separate mental disorder. However, the 
diagnostic revisions concerning bereavement have been met with criticism of 
medicalizing grief, and of exceeding the territory of psychiatry beyond its legitimate 
borders. On this basis, I argue that grief is currently a border diagnosis, i.e., a 
condition, whose meanings are informed in heterogeneous ways by medical, 
psychiatric and psychological understandings, yet constantly challenged by 
alternative, non-medicalizing discourses. Drawing on empirical findings from an on-
going interview study with bereaved parents after infant loss, I analyze and discuss 
four different accounts concerning the question of diagnosing grief: (1) Diagnosis as 
a legitimating and normalizing practice, (2) diagnosis as a demarcation practice, (3) 
diagnosis as pathologization, and (4) diagnosis as a normative ideal. Through the 
examples, I attempt to demonstrate how bereaved individuals do not merely passively 
adopt, but reflectively use these kinds of understandings to deal with their grief. 
 
Keywords: grief, mental disorder, DSM-5, parental bereavement. 
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Introduction 
Historically, death, loss and grief have been experienced and practiced within an 
interpretive framework of religion and morality. However, in Western societies since 
the beginning of the 20th Century, the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry have 
played an increasingly central role in our understandings and practices related to loss. 
This is part of a general historical line of development, in which “in short, more and 
more people and problems were opened up to the diagnostic gaze and therapeutic 
interventions of psychiatry” (Rose 1986; in Rose 2006 p. 475). Bluntly put, the main 
problem of death in pre-modern societies concerned the destiny of the deceased 
person’s soul in the afterlife. In contrast, the main problem of death in modern secular 
societies is that of the health and wellbeing of the survivors. Walter (1996) argues that 
the very concept of bereavement is a secular notion, in the sense that it reflects a shift 
from religious to secular concerns: From questions of salvation and condemnation to 
questions of health and illness, normality and pathology, risks and prevention.  
This inclusion of bereavement under a “diagnostic gaze” has given rise to heated 
debates on the legitimate territory and limits of psychiatry. Most recently, this debate 
has been raised in relation with the release of the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). The two most contested revisions concerned the elimination of 
the bereavement exclusion criterion for major depressive disorders, and the inclusion 
of complicated or prolonged bereavement reactions (currently named persistent 
complex bereavement disorder) in section III of the manual as a condition for further 
studies (Ibid.; criticized e.g. in Frances 2013; Wakefield 2013). Without the 
bereavement exclusion, studies indicate that one-third to one-half of bereaved 
individuals will meet the diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder within the 
first month after the loss (Clayton & Darvish, 1979; Zisook & Shuchter, 1991; in 
Horwitz & Wakefield 2007, p. 31 ff). For bereaved parents, the prevalence rates are 
estimated to be even larger, more intense and longer lasting (ibid.). 
This is not the place to account for the various arguments that have been raised in 
relation to these revisions. Here I want to highlight just one main argument that has 
been brought forth in the criticism of diagnosing bereavement reactions: In short, the 
argument that it represents an illegitimate medicalization of normal and natural 
experiences of human suffering (see e.g., Frances 2013; Wakefield 2013). This is by 
no means a new critique of psychiatry. Indeed, Rose (2007) refers to medicalization 
as a “cliché of critical social analysis” (p. 700), and argues that medicalization alone 
“should not be the conclusion of an analysis” (p. 702). Why, he asks, “should it seem 
ethically or politically preferably to live one aspect or department of life under one 
description rather than another?” (p. 701). In other words, it is not sufficient to state 
that medicalization processes occur; we need to analyze how they occur, and with 
which individual and societal consequences. In this article, my aim is to contribute to 
this analysis by articulating four different positions taken up by bereaved individuals 
towards diagnosing grief: (1) Diagnosis as a legitimating practice, (2) diagnosis as a 
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demarcation practice (delineating pathology from normality), (3) diagnosis as 
(illegitimate) pathologization, and (4) diagnosis as a potential normative ideal. The 
examples are based on empirical findings from an on-going interview study with 
bereaved parents after infant loss.  
While the overall study aim of the research project is to explore the relations between 
individual grief experiences and cultural understandings of grief, this article more 
specifically explores how the participating parents reflect upon the specific topic of 
diagnosing grief as a mental disorder. Furthermore, I will address and discuss some 
of the normative expectations towards grieving that are reflected in the parental 
accounts on diagnosing grief. Finally, by focusing on how diagnostic understandings 
are actively used and interpreted by individuals in social practices, I hope to contribute 
to the understanding of the complex relations between contemporary discursive 
practices and individual experiences of suffering. 
Theoretical framework 
The following analysis draws upon a cultural psychological perspective. Cultural 
psychology is based on the premise that culture mediates and enables human 
intentionality and activity. Following a cultural psychological perspective, intentional 
agents reflectively and unreflectively use culturally available semiotic and material 
tools to interpret themselves and the world, and to mediate their actions and emotions 
(Valsiner, 2007). Another central point in cultural psychology is the emphasis on the 
potential for creative use of cultural artefacts, and the co-constituted nature of mind 
and society. 
Consistent with this approach, I examine the ways in which bereaved parents 
experience, interpret and act in relation to their loss, and how they draw upon 
culturally available interpretive repertoires related to grief in this process. 
Experiencing grief is a culturally mediated process, in which the individual draws 
upon past experiences, culturally available interpretive repertoires and norms 
concerning how and when to grieve, how to interpret one’s own and other’s loss 
responses etc. How do these processes occur? How do bereaved individuals use and 
negotiate––and how are their experiences of grief shaped by––the grief discourses and 
practices of contemporary Western cultures? These questions become increasingly 
urgent in the light of the prevailing medical and diagnostic approaches to grief, as it 
is in this context individuals experience, interpret, evaluate and “do” their grief. 
Methodological approach 
In this article, I analyze interview material from a series of in-depth semi-structured 
qualitative interviews with bereaved parents after infant loss in order to explore how 
these parents relate to the idea of diagnosing grief as a mental disorder.  
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The data are drawn from 20 interviews conducted over a period of 2 years (from 
December 2012 to October 2014) with 13 bereaved parents following infant loss. The 
participants––six heterosexual couples and one woman participating without her 
partner––were all recruited through a nationwide, private Danish organization that 
offers counselling and network support to bereaved parents after infant loss. With one 
exception (a couple participating in one interview approx. 2 years after the loss of 
their child), all participants were interviewed three times; shortly after the loss (<2 
months), 7-8 months later, and finally approx. 2 years after the loss. With exception 
of the woman participating alone, all participants were interviewed together with their 
partner. Furthermore, all of the interviews were carried out in the participants’ homes. 
The sample of participants was selected in order to reflect the variation in terms of 
geographical location, circumstances of loss, family situation and social background 
of the parents who ordinarily make use of the services provided by the bereavement 
organization. The participants had lost children who died shortly before, during or 
after (< 1 month) birth, all born in 2nd or 3rd trimester of pregnancy. One of the couples 
had lost their second child, whereas the other participants had all lost their first-born 
child. The participants’ age ranged from 26 to 42 years, with a mean age of 33,3 for 
the female participants and 31,7 for the male participants. The interview guide was 
developed as a semi-structured guide in order to cover the research questions for the 
overall project, which are formulated as follows:  
• How do parents experience the loss of a child, and how are these 
experiences related to the practices and interpretative repertoires of 
grief that are available in our culture? 
• How do the current psychological, health oriented and increasingly 
diagnostic understandings of grief inform individual grief experiences 
and practices? 
• How do the parents engage in and draw upon the production and 
negotiation of meaning, identity practices and narratives about loss that 
are created within the grief support practices provided by DIDA?25 
 
The diagnostic and medical understandings of grief represent one aspect of bereaved 
parents’ loss experiences that I was eager to explore. This was reflected in my 
interview guides’ questions concerning the parents’ grief experiences, including how 
they perceive cultural expectations about grieving, how they consider grief in relation 
to illness, what they think about the proposed diagnostic category for complicated 
grief etc. (E.g. questions such as “How do your current experiences with grief fit with 
your prior notions of grief?”, “How do they fit with the way you experience other 
people’s expectations?”, “Has this changed over time?”, “Do you think it makes sense 
to compare grief to an illness? Why/why not? In your opinion, what are the similarities 
and what are the differences?”, and “It has been proposed to introduce a psychiatric 
                                                            
25 This part of the research project will not be pursued in this article. 
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diagnosis for complicated or prolonged grief (followed by a brief introduction to the 
proposed criteria). What are your immediate thoughts about that?” etc.). 
 All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. In order to address the 
topic of this article, my approach has been to read across the transcripts to find 
interview passages where the participants talk––either spontaneously or as a response 
to my questions––about the topic of diagnosing grief, how they experience cultural 
expectations toward grieving, and how they regard differences and/or similarities 
between grief and mental disorder, most notably depression. During the process of 
interview transcription and analysis, significant statements were selected and 
developed into tentative codes and subsequently categorized into themes developing 
in the data, informed by the guidelines of the constructivist version of grounded theory 
as outlined by Kathy Charmaz (2006). During the analytical process, my emergent 
findings were shared with my research group and other scholars within the fields of 
psychology, sociology and anthropology, who continuously have challenged and 
discussed my interpretations.  
Limitations 
Some points need to be made about the methodological approach, and the limitations 
and scope of the current analysis. Firstly, it is necessary to clarify that the subject of 
diagnosing grief is only one area of interest I pursue, as a part of a broader interest in 
cultural practices and interpretive repertoires related to grieving.  
Secondly, as the current diagnosis is not yet introduced in Denmark, none of the 
participants in my study have been in a situation where their grief has been diagnosed 
as a grief disorder. However, several of the participants have been diagnosed with a 
depressive disorder following the loss. Some have met tentative suggestions from 
their doctors––or from their personal network––that they might be suffering from 
depression. In other words, even though a diagnosis for prolonged grief is yet to be 
introduced in Denmark, several of the informants report that their grief has been 
associated with a psychiatric condition (primarily clinical depression).  
Thirdly, I make no claims about the frequency or specific distribution of the presented 
accounts. Rather than reading the following accounts as stable positions held by 
different groups of individuals, I believe they should be approached as heuristic 
typologies that inform us about the different ways diagnoses may be accounted for by 
grieving individuals in contemporary Western cultures.  
Ethical considerations 
The project is carried out in accordance with The National Committee on Health 
Research Ethics in Denmark and has been notified to the Danish Data Protection 
Agency. Inviting bereaved parents to participate in a research project on parental grief 
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is associated with a number of ethical considerations due to their vulnerable position. 
My own background as a clinical psychologist with several years of experience from 
working with bereaved parents has developed my awareness for attending to the 
individually different circumstances and needs of bereaved parents. Although it is 
important to be aware of the potentially vulnerable state these parents may be in, it is 
equally important to avoid reproducing what many bereaved individuals experience 
as a fear of contact from their environment towards their loss. My personal experience 
from talking to bereaved parents mirrors what is frequently stressed by bereaved 
individuals: While most bereaved parents express a wish to talk about what has 
happened, they often experience that many people tend to avoid confronting the topic 
of death in general, and especially the death of a child (Dyregrov 2003; Lehman et al. 
1986, Rönnmark 1999). 
In a Norwegian study of bereaved parents’ experiences of participating in research 
projects, all participants (63) rated it as a positive experience, and none of the 
respondents expressed regrets of having participated (Dyregrov 2004). In this and 
similar studies (see e.g. Breeze et al. 2011), the possibility to help others in a similar 
situation is stressed as a central motive for participation. 
Grief and the psy disciplines 
Medicalization has had a profound influence on the interpretive frameworks that are 
available for people’s normative understandings and practices related to grief. More 
specifically, psychiatry and psychology (the psy disciplines; Rose 1998) have 
contributed to shape our notions of what it means to grieve “properly”, of the goals 
and pitfalls of grieving, and of which practices that are approved of and sanctioned 
(Walter, 2000). While medicalization refers to understanding certain aspects of human 
behavior, thoughts and emotions as medical phenomena suitable for medical 
intervention, I use the term psychologization to refer to how psychological knowledge 
have come to shape our notions of who we are, as a certain kind of beings with an 
inner realm of mental dynamics, representations, emotions and dispositions. As such, 
medicalization and psychologization of grief reflect broader historical processes of 
modernization, in which medicine and the psy disciplines increasingly have come to 
play “a constitutive part in ‘making up people’” (Rose 2007, p. 700).  
In this process, psychiatric diagnoses have become significant “boundary objects” in 
the contemporary West, i.e., pragmatic constructions that have “different meanings in 
different social worlds”, yet still remain “robust enough to maintain a common 
identity across sites” (Bowker & Star 2000, p. 297). Likewise, Pickersgill (2012) 
analyses the DSM as polyvalent text that works as a “connective tissue” for the 
different groups of actors that have a stake in psychiatry (Lakoff 2005; in Pickersgill 
2012, p. 331). In the diagnostic cultures of contemporary West, these multiple actors 
are not confined to different groups of professionals, but include laypersons, patient 
organizations, media etc. (Brinkmann et al. 2014). 
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The processes of medicalization and psychologization of grief are interrelated and not 
easy to disentangle, and I will treat them as two sides of the same general tendency 
towards understanding grief as a psychological process, and––increasingly––as a 
matter of individuals’ mental and physical health and risk of pathology. However, as 
indicated above, merely pointing out processes of medicalization and 
psychologization does not help us understand how, why or with what consequences 
these processes have occurred (Rose 2007, p. 701). For example, while the anti-
psychiatric movement from the 1960’s and onwards highlighted the stigmatizing 
consequences of psychiatry, psychiatric diagnoses today seem to have heterogeneous 
and complex functions ranging from social control to legitimating and explaining 
individual suffering: ”A diagnosis can vindicate and blame, can legitimise or 
stigmatise, can facilitate access to resources just as it can restrict opportunities. A 
diagnosis can be welcomed or eschewed” (Jutel & Nettleton 2011, p. 797). What, 
then, are the consequences of diagnosing grief, and with which arguments is a grief 
diagnosis welcomed or eschewed by bereaved individuals in our present cultural 
context? 
Grief as a border diagnosis  
Psychiatry and psychology do not represent single entities. Both have heterogeneous 
effects on how grief is experienced, interpreted and acted upon in contemporary 
Western cultures. However, I argue that it is possible to identify some common themes 
between the psy disciplines and the grief discourses they have contributed to shape: 
On the one side, grief is accounted for as a matter of authentic emotional disclosure, 
of affectionate bonds and broken hearts. On the other side, grief is described in terms 
of work, tasks, coping strategies, risk factors and health consequences. I argue that 
these different accounts reflect an implicit tension within contemporary discourse of 
grief as on the one side a “natural” and existentially significant process, and on the 
other side as a potential risk of adverse mental and physical health consequences.   
Grief entered the field of psychology with Sigmund Freud’s ground-breaking essay 
“On mourning and melancholia” (Freud 1957). Freud’s idea that a period of “grief 
work” is necessary for the individual to break the attachment to the deceased in order 
to regain autonomy has had a significant influence on grief counselling, literature, and 
general public understanding of grief throughout the 20th Century (Wortman & Silver 
2001). Although Freud recognized grief as a fundamentally natural process, that 
neither could nor should be treated medically, a significant consequence of his work 
has been the positioning of grief as an object for psychological and psychiatric 
research and intervention (Granek 2010).  
Throughout the 20th Century, bereavement research increasingly followed an 
empirical and quantitative approach. Studies based on predominantly white, middle-
class, widowed female populations aimed at presenting systematic descriptions of 
grief symptoms and reactions (e.g. Marris 1958; Hobson 1964; Parkes 1964; 1970). 
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A common feature across these different empirical studies was the privileging of 
emotional reactions at the expense of e.g. cultural and social aspects of grief 
(Valentine 2006). Another common feature was the assumption of universalism at the 
core of the theoretical claims built upon these empirical findings. Individual 
experiences were subjected to theoretical systematizing and generalizing, and 
translated into universal theories of phases, stages and tasks that bereaved individuals 
were expected to go through in their mourning (Ibid.). These theoretical 
conceptualizations of grief were linked to strategies of interventions and therapeutic 
practices aimed at managing and treating bereaved individuals. The aim of the 
treatment was typically structured around solving the identified tasks. Hence, what 
were initially put forth as mere descriptions of grief became prescriptive targets of a 
clearly delimited grief process. Another central contribution to the bereavement 
research in the 20th century is the development of standardized questionnaires aimed 
at systematic measurement of individual grief reactions. From the 1970s, a series of 
influential grief inventories were produced in order to diagnose, manage and treat 
grief, as well as establishing grief as a scientific construct within the field of 
psychology and psychiatry (Granek 2010). By the end of the 1980s, Stroebe, Stroebe 
& Hansson (1988) identified mental and physical health consequences along with 
pathological forms of grief as the two major themes of the bereavement research of 
the time.  
These briefly outlined historical developments form the basis of the last decades’ 
attempts to formulate a diagnosis for complicated or prolonged grief (Shear 2012; 
Prigerson et al. 2009). The proposed diagnostic criteria put forth in the different 
suggestions involve intensity and duration of reactions such as longing/yearning, 
diminished sense of self, difficulty accepting the loss, bitterness or anger related to 
the loss, feeling that life is unfulfilling, empty or meaningless since the loss, etc. 
(Ibid.). 
According to the DSM definition, a mental disorder is a syndrome that “reflects a 
dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying 
mental functioning” (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p. 20). However, 
according to the same definition, “(an) expectable or culturally approved response to 
a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder” 
(Ibid.). Similarly, academic texts on grief disorders typically opens with a statement 
of the natural and universal character of grief, before they move on to discuss how 
grief can develop into a mental disorder for some individuals (see e.g. Shear 2012; 
Prigerson et al. 2009). In other words, although grief is regarded as a potential risk of 
mental disorder––and even as a potential disorder in itself––the reluctance to 
pathologize “normal” grief is reflected even in the “diagnostic bible”, the DSM. On 
the one side, authentic expression of emotional pain is encouraged as a means to self-
fulfillment, personal growth and healing. Tellingly, the bestselling book on grief in 
Denmark throughout the last three decades bears the title “Healing pain” (The original 
Danish title translates as “The necessary pain”) (Leick, Davidsen-Nielsen, & Stoner, 
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1991). On the other side, prolonged and overly intense grief reactions are considered 
to be risk factors and symptoms of mental disorder, hereby representing an object for 
medical, psychiatric and psychological science.  
Parental accounts on diagnosing grief 
In my interviews with the parents participating in this study, grief is repeatedly 
referred to simply as love. However painful, grief is also in some way appreciated as 
recognition of their dead children’s continuing significance in their lives. When asked 
whether they would appreciate it if there were a “pill that could make the pain of grief 
go away”, all of them object. Nevertheless, although some of the parents are critical 
towards the idea of a grief diagnosis, several of them immediately support it. Their 
reasons for objecting to or supporting the notion of a grief diagnosis form the basis 
for the present analysis, and I will briefly describe four positions identified throughout 
the interviews.  
Diagnosis as a legitimating practice 
The first account, diagnosis as a legitimating practice, refers to a tendency among 
bereaved parents in my study to view a diagnosis as a form of legitimization of the 
suffering of grief; as a means of achieving rights and privileges, either emotionally 
(“to have the right to grieve”), materially (e.g. in form of access to sick leave, 
economic and therapeutic support etc.), or relationally (to have a legitimate way of 
communicating one’s suffering to others). When I ask what they think of the notion 
of a grief diagnosis, several of the participants state that they think it is nice to get the 
“system’s recognition” of the severity of their loss. As one of the male participants, 
John,26 argues: “Why should grief not be a diagnosis, if e.g. fear of flying is?” 
Likewise, one of the female participants, Diana, argues that a diagnosis would have 
made it easier to claim her rights in front of her employer, who had shown little 
support in the time following her child’s death.  
Similarly, some emphasize that a diagnosis would probably make it easier for their 
friends and relatives to understand and relate to their problems. E.g., Paul ponders,  
I think it would have made it easier for them [their relatives] to say ‘Okay, 
they’re depressive! Instead of ‘They’re just sad…’ That’s kind of… 
Others stress the possibility of using the diagnosis as a means to understand their own 
experiences, to explain it to others, and to use the language provided by the diagnostic 
descriptions as a communicative tool.  Furthermore, and quite interesting given the 
widely-held criticism of psychiatric diagnoses as stigmatizing, some of the 
                                                            
26 The names of the participating parents in this study are changed for reasons of 
confidentiality.  
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participants mention the potential normalizing consequences of a diagnosis. Thomas 
states, 
To get other people’s word for… Kind of: This happens to others too. It’s 
a normal reaction, and it’s a symptom of this. Okay! That’s nice. Because 
then you have something tangible to relate it to. 
In other words, rather than interpreting the diagnosis as a description of abnormal 
reactions, the very opposite might sometimes be the case: The diagnostic description 
might be interpreted as recognition of the normality of the reaction, i.e., as a 
description of common experiences one might have after a loss, rather than as a 
description of pathological or exceptional experiences.  
Diagnosis as a demarcation practice  
In the next perspective I will present, the idea of a grief diagnosis is recognized as a 
generally acceptable way to differentiate between healthy/normal/natural and 
unhealthy/pathological/dysfunctional grief reactions.  
This reflects the majority view of the proponents of a grief diagnosis, in which a 
diagnosis is viewed as a means to identify and diagnose those in need of preventive 
or therapeutic intervention. Demarcations between normal and pathological grief are 
made with reference to normative standards of intensity, duration and content of 
emotional expressions: Normal grieving allows for a certain degree and duration of 
emotional pain, while pathological grief is associated with prolonged, overly intense 
and negative emotional expressions like bitterness and anger. E.g., when I ask what 
they think of the idea of differentiating between normal and pathological grief, Mia 
and Jacob recall a woman they met in a grief support group they attended after the 
loss of their daughter: 
Mia: I felt like shaking her: ‘You need help!’ 
Jacob: The thoughts she had… so much bitterness and anger. It was one 
year ago [since she lost her child]. At that point, we should be able to talk 
about it… 
Mia: Without such anger… 
For Mia and Jacob, demarcation practice is stressed as a part of their self-regulation, 
as they actively monitor “warning signs” in each other. For example, they have been 
told that it’s okay to stay in bed for one day, but if it is for several days, this is a sign 
that something needs to be done. Furthermore, grief reactions are monitored according 
to normative standards of personal development. As Mia states: “It must not change 
us. Or it changes us––but it must be for the better”.  
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Similar to the use of demarcation practices as a means to steer away from pathological 
grieving, is the positive use of them as reassurance of normality. For example, Rita, 
who has a prehistory of mental illness, tells that she was worried that she was about 
to become ill again, but that her therapist had reassured her that her reactions where 
“normal”. Several, if not all, of the participants in this study, highlight the importance 
of reassurance of normality from professionals or from others with personal loss 
experiences. To know that their experiences of suffering, in spite of their often 
frightening intensity, are normal, makes it easier to accept them. Additionally, several 
of them stress that feeling confident about the normality of their reactions makes it 
easier to resist the normative pressure from friends and family to “resolve grief” and 
achieve “closure”. Several of the participants object to the idea that grief should be 
“resolved”, and prefer expressions such as “learning to live with it”, “carrying 
him/her/the grief in one’s heart” etc. 
Diagnosis as (illegitimate) pathologization  
The third account I want to highlight, diagnosis as illegitimate pathologization, 
mirrors the medicalization critique described briefly in the introduction to this article. 
This perspective maintains that even intense and long-lasting grief ought to be 
considered as a normal reaction to a profound loss. As Sarah states, 
I’m quite certain that, when a year has passed, I’ll still think about it, I 
most certainly will… (Cries). I don’t know. I think I would find it strange 
to get a diagnosis, because then it becomes something pathological, that 
must not be there… 
Interviewer: Do you think, if we imagine it as a psychiatric disorder, would 
they think ‘she can’t help it’, or would they think ‘she should pull herself 
together, she just sits there and wallows in this grief’? 
Sarah: Yeah, I think so – more the latter, that you wallow a little too much 
in it… 
While the first account stressed the diagnoses’ potential to raise public awareness and 
acknowledgement of the suffering people in grief experience, the latter focus on the 
opposite possibility, i.e. that a diagnostic approach to grief might reduce other 
people’s tolerance and put pressure on bereaved individuals to resolve their grief 
and/or seek treatment.  
Another objection against diagnosing grief is that a diagnosis does not allow for 
individual differences, which many of the informants stress as a crucial aspect of grief. 
For example, Emma exclaims, 
But is it at all possible to make such criteria? Because grief is so 
individual… Isn’t it? I mean, you cannot just lump people together… 
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However, even though this perspective is presented by several of the informants, this 
is not necessarily associated with a plain rejection of any medical intervention in the 
case of painful grief. For example, some of the participants argue that even though 
grief reactions might be perfectly normal and natural, they might be so distressing that 
some kind of intervention––be it medical, psychotherapeutic or something else––
might be required. As Rita argues, 
There are many people who have to fight alone with their grief; who don’t 
have a big man to cuddle them, right? And on such an occasion I’d say 
that such things as tranquillizers, perhaps sleeping medicine, might be 
something that is necessary to use. Because if you can’t sleep, your 
chances of getting along gets even worse. So, I think it’s highly individual, 
and I think that if a person asks for help in such a situation, it means that 
he or she really does need help, whether it be this one or another diagnosis. 
In this case, diagnoses are accounted for primarily as pragmatic tools for practitioners 
to help and intervene when people feel they can’t handle their problems alone. Given 
that medical intervention might actually help, it is suggested that it should be offered, 
regardless of whether the reactions are normal or symptoms of mental disorder. Linda 
too reflects on the pragmatic aspect of diagnosing (the relation between diagnosis and 
availability of treatment), and like many of the participants, she argues that she would 
‘rather have a grief diagnosis than a depression diagnosis’. Likewise, Mia and Jacob 
refer to a bereaved mother whom they met through a grief support group. The woman 
had been diagnosed with a depressive disorder. Mia recalls, 
I could hear she missed a grief diagnosis, actually. Because the doctor 
labelled her as depressive. She was frustrated about that. She didn’t feel 
she was depressed, but in grief. But she needed the diagnosis in order to 
get her sick leave.  
At other times, the participants were ambiguous towards the idea of a grief diagnosis. 
E.g., Thomas reflects, 
[Yesterday] we talked about this: Grief is so… individual. I think that’s at 
the core of this. I wouldn’t like being labelled with a grief diagnosis. 
Interviewer: Why, do you think? 
Thomas: Because then I think it’s pathologized. I don’t want to be 
pathologized because of this, because it’s a grief and it should be allowed 
to take space without me necessarily being ill. Because that’s how it is 
when you lose someone. You get sad. And you should be allowed to be 
so, without being ill. But on the other side, I can imagine that there might 
be someone who does become ill from it. I believe you might, if you 
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become depressed or really struck by it. I can really understand if someone 
does, so it’s both… 
Several of the informants pursue a view similar to Thomas’s: They express a 
reluctance towards considering grief as an illness, but on the other hand, they can 
imagine––and have perhaps met––someone who might be ill from grief. As 
complicated grief is not yet introduced as a diagnosis, it is plausible to argue that it is 
still more contested than widespread diagnoses such as depressive disorder, which is 
also reflected in the informants’ accounts. Several times the informants state that grief 
that ‘develops into a depression’ is another matter than grief in itself. 
Thomas’s fluctuating position illustrates one of the basic claims of this article: 
Psychiatric diagnoses increasingly function as semiotic mediators for individuals to 
understand and act upon their experiences of suffering and distress (Brinkmann 2014). 
However, as this analysis has attempted to show, this happens in multifaceted and at 
times contradictory ways. People use, negotiate and challenge the understandings 
provided by the psychiatric language, and combine them in ways that cannot be 
accounted for as either exclusively iatrogenic or therapeutic, repressive or 
emancipating. Rather, the relationship between psychiatric diagnoses and practices, 
socio-political realities and individual self-practices are complex and heterogeneous.  
Diagnosis as a normative ideal 
The fourth account is represented by only one of my informants, but is included 
because of the intriguing challenge it poses to the widely held notion of psychiatric 
diagnoses as stigmatizing: Linda interestingly states that given a grief diagnosis, she 
would feel an urge to “live up to” the criteria in order to prove to herself (and others) 
that she loved her dead child: “If I didn’t get the diagnosis… I would think ‘Do I not 
grieve enough for my child?’” 
Linda returns to this topic several times during our conversations, and elaborate on 
her own struggle to acknowledge that her ability to cope with the loss does not indicate 
that she does not love her son or that he has less significance than if she were more 
depressed or grief-struck: 
We’ve had to reassure each other that it’s okay to feel like we do… And 
that we may also laugh. We don’t need to sit and cry 24/7. That doesn’t 
mean we don’t miss our son and wish that he was here, and that we love 
him more than anything on earth.  
Although not directly associated with the topic of diagnosing grief, Anna reflects 
along similar lines on the normative implications of the suffering of grief: 
I would have thought that I wouldn’t be able to hold myself together. … 
If I had that feeling before, that if you lose someone, then you can’t 
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possibly hold yourself together. And now, when it’s actually me who has 
lost someone, I’ve been distressed about the fact that I do hang together. 
Why haven’t I been out so deep that I can’t float? 
In our last conversation, Anna returns to this topic. Turned towards her husband, 
Thomas, she states, 
We’ve just talked about it, where you said to me that you think you still 
can get struck by it [the grief] in another way than I can. I mean, it strikes 
you harder. Not that it has bigger or lesser significance, but that it can 
strike you harder than it strikes me. And then I can feel like I’m being 
thrown back to the start – that was how it was in the start. I didn’t feel I 
was struck by it. And why? And then again: Is that wrong? … Why doesn’t 
it hurt my heart the same way?  
While some of the participants describe a pressure towards resolving grief and 
regaining “normal functioning”, the normative ideal reflected here seems to be 
associated with another aspect of contemporary grief discourses, i.e., the one that 
speaks of grief as a morally significant expression of love. When this side of the 
normativity of grief is stressed, the grief diagnosis might be seen as a normative ideal 
worth striving for in order to express and prove one’s love and affection for the 
deceased. This is closely related to Romantic ideals of grieving described in Stroebe, 
Gergen, Gergen and Stroebe (1992), in which the sustaining of emotional bonds to the 
deceased loved one, “despite a broken heart” (p. 1208), was valued as morally superior 
to ideals of functionality and health.  
Discussion 
Which normative understandings are reflected when grief is perceived through the 
lenses of a diagnostic account? How does a “diagnostic gaze” inform and shape 
individuals’ experiences and interpretations of their suffering, and how might it affect 
cultural practices and expectations concerning grief? No straightforward answers 
emerge from the present analysis. However, it seems plausible to argue that the 
various accounts on diagnosing grief reflect a tension between seeing grief as a 
morally significant expression of love on the one side, and as a threat to the 
individual’s striving for health, autonomy, self-fulfillment and efficacy on the other.  
A grief diagnosis might legitimate the suffering caused by loss, enhance public 
recognition and awareness, and give access to professional and emotional support. A 
diagnosis might be a part of a normative self-regulatory practice, as e.g. when 
individuals and their networks use the diagnoses as tools to assess grief reactions as 
normal or deviant. The normative connection between grief and love might urge some 
bereaved individuals to strive for a diagnosis as a proof of their love to the deceased–
–or, conversely, to reject it as an illegitimate pathologization and devaluation of the 
grief’s moral and existential significance. However, the latter position is not 
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necessarily associated with a plain rejection of a medical account of grief. As argued 
by some of the informants in this study, a pragmatic use of diagnoses and medical 
intervention might be compatible with maintaining that grief reactions are “natural”, 
normal and not pathological. 
As the present analysis has attempted to demonstrate, medicalization processes are 
not adequately accounted for in terms of repressing power dynamics and stigmatizing 
practices.  Individuals in a diagnostic culture are not merely passively subjectified by 
repressing diagnostic labels. Rather, the powers of the psy disciplines work 
productively, by contributing to make us “the kinds of people we have become” (Rose 
2007, p. 702). The kinds that emerge from the present analysis are not “medical 
dopes”, whose interpretations, experiences and practices of grief have been absorbed 
entirely by a morally depleted medical language. Rather than replacing morality, 
medicalization processes are inextricably involved in the shaping of the ethical 
regimes and forms of life that characterize contemporary Western cultures. However, 
as I have tried to illustrate throughout this article, the moral ideals reflected in 
diagnostic and medical languages are not fixed; rather, they are polyvalent and 
malleable. This is perhaps particularly evident in the case of grief. Given the 
conflicting ideals of grief as a morally significant expression of love and 
connectedness vs. grief as a threat against individual health and well-being, a grief 
diagnosis might be embraced or rejected with arguments stressing either sides of this 
tension. 
One last point needs to be made. The broadened scope of psychiatry is often described 
as a “pathologization of normality” (see e.g. Frances 2013). However, as prevalence 
rates rise, and psychiatric diagnoses diffuse into everyday practices and conversations, 
a reverse process takes place simultaneously: A normalization of the pathological. In 
other words, when grief is pathologized, it does not necessarily mean that it is 
transformed from a shared human condition to a pathological exception, but rather, 
that pathological grief is turned into a potential risk for all grievers. The psychiatric 
and diagnostic language is no longer exclusively associated with pathology and 
deviance––and not even necessarily with something unambiguously negative (as the 
example with diagnoses as normative ideals illustrated.) The diagnostic and medical 
language is also used to legitimate and normalize individual experiences of suffering. 
Rose (2009) has argued that psychiatric disorders in our time is regarded 
“simultaneously [as] a condition to be treated and a mode of existence to be expected” 
(p. 79). Health and normality are no longer defined by the absence of illness, but rather 
as something to be “worked upon” through continuous health-promoting and self-
developing practices.  
“And so what?”, one might rhetorically ask. If more people are diagnosed with 
psychiatric disorders, and experience that this helps them to understand and cope with 
certain aspects of their lives, is that necessarily a problem? Several critics have 
addressed this question and offered different answers to it (see e.g. Francis 2013). 
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Here I only want to point to two potential risks associated with the diagnostic account 
of grief, and with the tendency to normalize pathology.  
The first issue concerns the localization of the diagnosis within the individual that is 
implied in a diagnostic understanding of human problems. Brinkmann (2014) argues 
that psychiatric diagnoses are commonly understood as “entities” within the 
individual, which are used as explanations of the problems individuals’ experience. 
Regardless of the circular character of these explanations (i.e., the diagnosis is based 
on the very same symptoms it is supposed to explain), one effect of this “entification” 
is that the individual’s external conditions are left out of the picture, or accounted for 
solely in terms of risk or preventive factors for individual illness. In the case of grief, 
this means that bereaved individuals’ possible experiences of e.g. lack of support 
(emotional, economic or other) are treated as risk factors of individual mental illness. 
However, this fails to account for how an individual might have very different 
experiences of e.g. support or lack of such from one context to another. For example, 
several of the participants in the present study describe different experiences of 
support across different social contexts, and hence different experiences of their grief 
across these situations. These complex relations between individuals and their 
external conditions seem poorly accounted for by a diagnostic approach to grief. 
Secondly, a diagnosis is not merely a description of suffering; it is also a target of 
intervention. As such, treatment is not merely an opportunity for the diagnosed 
individual. Rather, treatment easily amounts to a normative demand, as individuals 
are reinforced not to endure, but to act upon their suffering in order to transform it 
into personal growth and development. Hence, in spite of the potential benefits of the 
normalization of pathology regarding its de-stigmatizing and empowering effects, a 
diagnostic account might simultaneously reduce individual and cultural tolerance of 
suffering. In the case of grief, the pressure to seek treatment might marginalize 
individuals’ experiences of grief as a morally significant appreciation of love. Further, 
this persistent confidence in treatment and transformation might also marginalize 
individuals’ experiences of inconsolable loss; i.e. the experience of loss as a condition 
the individual cannot, and perhaps do not wish to, overcome. As a bereaved father 
wrote in response to the DSM proposal for a grief diagnosis,  
If you don’t experience “intense yearning or longing” ... “on more days 
than not” for more than twelve months after the death of your own child, 
if you don’t have “a diminished sense of self,” you have a problem that 
goes deeper than anything contemplated in the DSM. There are some 
things in life to which one should never hope to become adjusted (Adler 
2012). 
Or as one of the couples in my study state, 
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Chris: It’s important that people recognize that he has been here––and is 
here… It’s not something you just get over. You are in it. It’s a part of you 
that’s always with you. 
Linda: We must accept that it has happened, and learn to live with it. But 
we’ll never get over it. That’s a key word. I get mad when people say “get 
over.” 
Perhaps we need to ask ourselves whether we ought to accept certain kinds of 
suffering to escape the promises of treatment and transformation offered by 
contemporary psychiatry. However, the dilemmas that arise when grief is accounted 
for as a psychiatric disorder raise new questions as to how the needs of bereaved 
individuals can best be met. Provided that there are dilemmas associated with the 
individually oriented diagnostic approach to grief, how can we ensure the availability 
of adequate help and support to bereaved persons in need of such? How can we 
distinguish between those in need of professional intervention and those who are not? 
And how can we ensure an optimal use of public resources, if we do not have the 
current diagnostic system to differentiate between the conditions? These are only a 
few of the questions that demand answers, before there can be any serious changes in 
the way we handle human suffering and existential problems in the pervasive 
diagnostic culture of contemporary Western societies. 
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CHAPTER 11. CONCLUSIONS AND 
PERSPECTIVES FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
In this thesis, I have examined bereaved parents’ experiences of infant loss in 
contemporary Danish culture. Summed up, the present study argues a perspective on 
grief as a radically situated, relational, and normative phenomenon. Grief can neither 
be reduced to an individual or intra-psychological process delimited from the 
individual grievers situated being in the world, nor to factors external to the individual, 
such as socio-cultural practices, norms, or discursive constructions. Grieving involves 
the bereaved individuals’ relationship to the lost loved one, to oneself, and to other 
people. These relationships are mediated and informed by the normative practices we 
are involved in in our everyday lives.  
I have attempted to develop analytical as well as evocative accounts of the lived 
experiences of grief after infant loss, and to relate these experiences to contemporary 
cultural practices and ways of understanding grief, suffering, and personhood. My 
research has been guided by a dialectical relationship between my initial research 
questions and the themes that have emerged during the analytical process of doing 
interviews, listening to interview records, transcribing, writing, reading, and talking 
with colleagues and others who have been interested in hearing about my project. 
As I have described in chapter 4, in spite of a proliferating literature on parental grief 
after infant loss, only few studies have addressed how bereaved parents experience, 
draw upon, and negotiate culturally distributed understandings and practices related 
to grief after infant loss. While parental bereavement has been linked to detrimental 
health effects and mental disorders, few studies have explored how such a “medical” 
and “diagnostic gaze” in itself informs and shapes parental bereavement experiences. 
The studies that do address these issues tend to analyze medicalization and 
pathologization as detrimental processes that prevent, disturb, and disenfranchise 
parental grief. Although I initially shared and still share some of these concerns, my 
research has challenged my initial conceptions of diagnostic and medical approaches 
to grief as unambiguously restricting, pathologizing, and marginalizing parental grief 
experiences. Throughout my research, I have examined how parental grief is 
experienced, interpreted, and enacted within cultural practices and repertoires that 
include diagnostic, existential, and moral perspectives. I have examined grief as a 
radically situated phenomenon that involves the relationship to the lost loved one, to 
oneself, to other people, and to normative understandings and practices of grief and 
suffering. 
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In the following, I will outline the main arguments, contributions, and conclusions of 
the thesis. Lastly, I will point to some possible avenues for future research on grief 
experiences in contemporary Western cultures. 
11.1. GRIEF AS SITUATED AND MEDIATED EXPERIENCES, 
INTERPRETATIONS, AND ENACTMENTS  
The four articles as well as my empirical chapter on parental experiences of DIDA’s 
practices (chapter 6) offer different perspectives on how individual grief and cultural 
norms, beliefs, and practices mutually constitute each other. Taken together, the 
articles and the empirical chapter provide different perspectives and answers to my 
research questions, as well as to some of the analytical concerns that have emerged 
during my research process. 
The first article traced the historical background for our contemporary understandings 
and practices related to grief.  The second article explored the cultural, epistemic, and 
ethical significance of my role as a bereaved researcher in the study of bereavement. 
In the third article, co-written with Svend Brinkmann, we examined how parental grief 
following infant loss in contemporary Danish culture is mediated by diffuse, yet 
inescapable normative understandings of infant loss and parental grief. The normative 
nature of grief was further investigated in the empirical chapter on DIDA’s practices 
(chapter 6). Here, I examined how such practices may be involved in the development 
of parental identity and social validation of infant loss. Finally, in my fourth article, I 
examined how contemporary understandings of grief as a potentially pathological 
condition is conceived of and experienced by bereaved parents after infant loss.  
11.1.1. HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS OF GRIEF 
In my first article, “From morality to pathology,” I examined some of the historical 
background for how grief has been conceptualized in contemporary Western cultures 
as a question of the individual mourner’s health and illness. The aim was not to 
provide a comprehensive account of historical practices and beliefs related to 
grieving. Rather, my ambition was, more modestly, to provide some historical context 
for our current prevailing understandings of grief. Informed by a cultural 
psychological framework, the selected historical accounts served to illustrate that grief 
is mediated by historically specific and inherently normative practices. This 
perspective highlighted some limitations inherent in the current diagnostic account of 
grief as an individual reaction, analytically separated from cultural-historical norms 
and practices. On this basis, the article developed a perspective of grief and suffering 
as radically situated, involving a mutual interplay of personal and cultural, 
experiential and discursive factors. 
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11.1.2. SENSITIZING ACCOUNTS OF GRIEF 
In my second article, “Becoming a bereaved parent,” I explored the significance of 
my own background and involvement in the co-production of qualitative accounts of 
suffering and loss, and related this to cultural conceptions of grief as a private, 
emotional and time-limited process delineated from a public, rational, and normal 
state of being. By intersecting autoethnography and inquiries into the interview 
encounters with the participating parents in this study, I demonstrated the co-narrated 
character of interview accounts, as well as the open-ended and transforming process 
of becoming a bereaved parent and integrating the loss of a small child in one’s 
continuing life story. Through balancing between the evocative and analytic, my 
ambition was to provide insight into the continuing realities of becoming a bereaved 
parent, and to challenge the cultural dichotomies between grief as either present or 
absent, transient or permanent, resolved or unsolved, etc. The underlying theme 
“becoming a bereaved parent” suggested that parenthood and parental relationship to 
a deceased child is not a straight-forward and once-and-for-all dealt-with matter. 
Instead, the relationship between the parents and the deceased child is an on-going 
process which meanings and significance might alter over time. 
11.1.3. NORMATIVE ACCOUNTS OF GRIEF 
The third article (“Grief as a normative phenomenon”) provided some answers to my 
first research question of how parental bereavement experiences are related to 
culturally available practices and interpretive repertoires. Informed by an Aristotelian 
and teleological line of thinking, we27 challenged the reactive and universalist 
conceptions of grief as causally inflicted, passive responses to loss represented within 
mainstream scientific psychology (leaving aside phenomenological, discursive, 
constructivist, cultural psychological and related perspectives). Instead, we articulated 
a normative perspective on psychological phenomena that emphasizes the dialectical 
relations between experiential, interpretive, normative, and cultural aspects. 
Following this perspective, we argued that grief is performed or enacted, rather than 
merely passively undergone. The performative aspect should not be understood as an 
entirely voluntary and reflective process. Rather, experiences, interpretations and 
enactments of grief (or any other mental phenomenon) are dialectically mediated, 
restricted, and enabled in and through the individual’s situated being within an 
inherently normative social reality. Based on an analysis of the recent cultural-
historical developments regarding the conceptions of infant loss and parental grief in 
our society, we argued that parental grief following infant loss in contemporary 
Danish culture is mediated by diffuse and conflicting, yet inescapable normative 
understandings of infant loss and parental grief. Illustrated with findings from the 
present study, we demonstrated how cultural norms and practices not only “affect” 
                                                            
27 This article was co-written with Svend Brinkmann. 
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parental grief, but are involved in reflective and pre-reflective ways in the parents’ 
mediation of their experiences, interpretations, and enactments of grief. Rather than 
merely being “repressed” or disenfranchised by cultural norms about grieving such 
losses, the parents actively negotiate the significance and meanings of their loss and 
grief. In other words, the parents’ grief responses are not causally inflicted by cultural 
norms and practices, insofar as these norms and practices are open to alteration and 
negotiations through individuals’ reflexive and pre-reflexive acts and interpretations. 
Finally, we briefly discussed some possible consequences of the current development 
within contemporary Western cultures towards conceiving of suffering as adverse and 
unnecessary conditions to be dealt with in medical and psychiatric terms, in order to 
maximize personal health, happiness, and well-being. 
Chapter 6, “Here everybody knew I was a parent,” shed light on my third research 
question concerning how DIDA’s services are involved in parental experiences, 
interpretations, and enactments of grief. Throughout the chapter, I explored how the 
practices and interpretive repertoires provided by DIDA are involved in the 
participating parents’ mediation of their relationship to themselves, to their loss, and 
to other people. The present study echoes findings from previous studies regarding 
the potentially important role of communities of bereaved in terms of offering social 
validation of the dead children’s significance and bereaved parents’ identities. 
Furthermore, the chapter illustrated how the participating parents in this study 
navigate between cultural repertoires available in DIDA and in the wider social 
realities of their lives. In line with the normative argument outlined above, the findings 
suggested that bereaved parents relate to the normative understandings and practices 
represented through the organization in reflective and highly individual ways. Finally, 
I argued that practices provided by an organization such as DIDA are inherently 
normative, and that those responsible for developing these practices need to pay 
attention to the normative implications and dilemmas involved in this endeavor. 
11.1.4. DIAGNOSTIC ACCOUNTS OF GRIEF 
In my fourth article, “Grief as a border diagnosis,” I examined how contemporary 
understandings of grief as a potentially pathological condition is conceived of and 
experienced by bereaved parents after infant loss. The article contributes to the 
existing literature by providing new perspectives on how bereaved parents relate to 
medicalization and pathologization of grief. While previous studies have tended to 
portray parental grief experiences in opposition to pathologized and medicalized 
conceptions of grief, the present study demonstrates that bereaved parents may relate 
to pathologization and medicalization in multiple, and sometimes contradictory ways. 
Based on the interview data, I identified four different positions towards diagnosing 
grief. The first position suggested that a grief diagnosis can serve as a potentially 
normalizing and legitimizing practice, insofar as the diagnosis may provide a 
language for articulating the suffering of loss and hence enhance public awareness 
and understanding. Secondly, the diagnosis was conceived of as a potential source for 
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mediating and regulating one’s way of living with the loss, by providing guidelines 
for differentiating between normal and complicated grief responses. Thirdly, the 
diagnosis was conceived of as an illegitimate pathologization of long-lasting, but 
normal grief. Finally, a fourth position indicated that a diagnosis may also serve as a 
normative ideal to strive for in order to prove one’s love for the deceased child. 
However, rather than representing stable positions towards the question of diagnosing 
grief, the parents often shifted between these different perspectives during the flow of 
our conversations. For example, the parents could easily move between critically 
voicing a skeptical position towards the diagnosis as illegitimate pathologization, 
seeing it as a way to normalize and legitimize the suffering of grief, and as a pragmatic 
tool for providing necessary help and support. Based on these findings, I argued that 
how people relate to and draw upon diagnostic understandings cannot be accounted 
for as exclusively iatrogenic or therapeutic, repressive or emancipating. Rather, in line 
with the cultural psychological outlook of this study, the findings suggest that the 
diagnostic language is involved in cultural forms of life (Wittgenstein, 1953). That is, 
the meanings of the diagnostic language are not fixed, but polyvalent and malleable, 
depending on the situated practices in which the language is used.  
11.2. GRIEF AS A RADICALLY SITUATED, RELATIONAL, AND 
NORMATIVE PHENOMENON 
Taken together, the four articles and the empirical chapter on DIDA’s practices have 
presented and analyzed historical, sensitizing, normative, and diagnostic accounts of 
grief, and argued that grief is an inherently situated, relational, and normative 
phenomenon. For bereaved parents after infant loss, grieving is mediated by cultural 
norms and understandings of parenthood; of the personhood and human status of 
babies who die before or shortly after birth, and of health, normality, and pathology. 
Ultimately, our ways of relating to grief inform us of our current cultural conceptions 
of the place of suffering in what we conceive of as a good life. As such, examining 
the cultural conditions of grief represents an avenue for broader analyses of the human 
condition, insofar as grief is a form of suffering that is inextracibly linked to our 
existential condition as thrown into a vulnerable, mortal, and mutually dependent 
existence with each other.  
As the present study has suggested, the cultural conditions within which grief is 
experienced and enacted in our time and culture are increasingly informed by medical 
and diagnostic accounts of human suffering. Since the beginning of the 20th century, 
grief has been subjected to psychological, psychiatric, and diagnostic understandings. 
Like Walter (1999) has argued, formerly shared rituals and practices has to a certain 
extent been replaced by cultural conceptions of normal and abnormal, healthy and 
pathological grief reactions. In this process, Walter asserts, “the grief process” has 
become our main frame of reference for dealing with loss. As the present study has 
shown, the scientific and professional accounts of grief have increasingly been 
distributed into popular culture, where it informs us of how to deal with loss in our 
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everyday lives. In spite of the descriptive intentions of such scientific accounts, the 
present study has demonstrated the inherent normativity involved in the production of 
knowledge of human kinds (Hacking, 1995). Throughout the history of modern 
bereavement research, descriptions of normality have repeatedly and inevitably been 
translated into normative prescriptions for allegedly healthy and normatively 
preferable ways of grieving. Through the looping effects described by Hacking, these 
normative ways of understanding grief shape bereavement experiences, 
interpretations and actions, which again feeds back into the scientific descriptions of 
grieving human kinds. Rather than standing outside the realm of normative human 
practices, research concerning the human condition is in itself an inherently normative 
practice. Consequently, rather than trying to evade the normative implications of our 
research by striving for scientific neutrality, we need to develop a critical awareness 
of the normative and moral consequences of our scientific endeavors.  
This, of course, also applies to the present study. Some of the normative dilemmas I 
have recognized in my own approach are connected to how it sits with the bereaved 
parents I am giving voice to in this study. For example, while articulating a critical 
position toward individualizing and pathologizing diagnostic accounts of suffering, I 
am simultaneously aware of the potential unintended consequenses of such a critical 
position for those who are suffering. Embarking upon this study, I imagined myself 
giving voice to people’s resistance against being pathologized and stigmatized due to 
their grief. I honestly thought most bereaved individuals would be alarmed by the 
prospect of grief as a mental disorder. However, my own notion of pursuing a 
liberating project against medicalization and pathologization was soon challenged by 
the voices of those I thought I should empower. Their quest for recognition certainly 
did not map neatly on to my critical perspective of diagnoses and pathologization. 
Although some of the informants expressed perspectives similar to my own critical 
position, surprizingly often they welcomed the idea of a diagnosis as a legitimization 
rather than a stigmatization of the suffering of grief. Indeed, by raising a critical 
position towards the current diagnostic and individualizing accounts of grief, my 
message runs the risk of being translated (by the very language I am critically 
addressing) into an argument against the realness of the suffering of grief. Although 
this is certainly not my intended message, an argument against a grief diagnosis might 
easily be translated into a message that people really just need to pull themselves 
together. However, a radically relational perspective of suffering implies that none of 
the conditions we are faced with in our lives can be addressed solely on an individual 
level. As the Danish theologician and philosopher K. E. Løgstrup (1956) has pointed 
out, we never have something to do with another person without holding some of the 
other person’s life in our hands (p. 27). The ethical demand that rises from this 
intrinsically interdependent nature of human existence ought to inform our practices 
for dealing with suffering, so that we not mistakenly exclude human interdependency 
from our analytical gaze and practical interventions.  
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One question that might be drawn from the present study is whether the attempts to 
dodge the issue of normativity (by insisting on descriptive, value-neutral accounts of 
grief; abandoning grand theories in favor of increasingly individualized approaches to 
grief, etc.), contributes to amplify the normative uncertainty experienced by many 
grievers in contemporary society. In a secularized and individualized world, people 
search for normative standards where they can find it, regardless of whether these 
standards were set forth as such or not. Accordingly, descriptive models of grieving 
have been subjected to the so-called humean fallacy, not because human beings apply 
faulty logics, but because descriptions of human practices are inherently laden with 
moral significance. In this light, communities of bereaved, personal accounts, self-
help literature, as well as the recent suggestions to introduce a diagnosis for 
complicated or prolonged grief may offer normative frameworks which fill the gap of 
former common practices, rituals, and normative standards for grieving. Indeed, the 
present study indicates that this is exactly one of the functions of such accounts, e.g. 
when the participating parents welcome a grief diagnosis as a way to legitimize the 
suffering of grief, conceive of it as guidelines for regulating their grief, or even as a 
normative ideal worth striving for.  
This gives rise to a range of questions concerning the conditions for grieving in 
contemporary Western cultures. One question is how the current normative 
frameworks for grieving, increasingly informed by medical and diagnostic accounts, 
shape the conditions for grieving in contemporary cultures. If grief is comprehended 
as a phenomenon to be assessed by standards of health and pathology, how does this 
enable articulations of existential, moral, and relational dimensions of loss? If 
suffering is understood as a detrimental and fundamentally meaningless effect of loss, 
how does this shape the experience of grief as an affectionate relationship to the 
deceased loved one? If grief is conceived of as a mental disorder of the individual 
griever, how does this mediate the relationship between the grieving individual and 
his or her friends, family, and wider social reality? These are all questions that need 
to be addressed in future research on bereavement. Due to the socially contested and 
normatively ambiguous status of parental grief after infant loss in contemporary 
Western societies, these questions are perhaps even more urgent in this context. 
The main lessons to be drawn from this is that in order to understand as well as 
alleviate the suffering of grief, we need to take the following into account: 
• Grief is a relational and situated phenomenon: In the most fundamental 
sense, grief is a relational phenomenon. First and foremost, grief is in itself 
an existentially significant relationship to the lost loved one which is 
intrinsically intervowen with our sense of self, meaning, and being in the 
world with others. Moreover, experiences, interpretations, and enactments of 
grief are inevitably situated in relations to other people, and to material and 
socio-cultural circumstances.  
• Grief is a normative phenomenon: The suffering involved in grieving cannot 
PARENTAL GRIEF AFTER INFANT LOSS 
 
 
184 
 
be accounted for merely in terms of causal reactions to loss, insofar as grief 
involves meaningful reasons for experiencing, interpreting, and acting upon 
a loss. Hence, grief cannot adequately be accounted for in terms of individual 
symptoms without taking into account the meanings they hold for people. 
This, in turn, cannot be understood without taking into account the relational, 
cultural, and normative frameworks that render such meanings conceivable. 
• Hence, grief can only conceivably be “prolonged” or “complicated” in 
relations to other people and cultural norms. A comprehensive analytical and 
interventional approach to grief need to include this situated and normative 
nature of grief as a meaningful and existential human condition. 
 
On this background, the present study argues that we need other interpretational 
resources for understanding and dealing with grief than those provided through the 
diagnostic accounts: We need to include languages and practices that enable us to 
address grief as something that does not merely concern the individual’s physical and 
mental health and well-being, but also its existential and moral significance. We need 
languages that acknowledge that the suffering is not merely an adverse reaction or 
symptom to be reduced in the same manner as we reduce the pain caused by a physical 
illness. Unlike the suffering caused by the latter, the pain involved in grief is evaluated 
by normative standards of meaning. The pain has a potential moral and epistemic 
value, which may explain why grieving individuals are often so afraid of forgetting. 
Because forgetting means losing again––losing the existential connection to what the 
loss meant to you, and losing a sense of the reality of what was lost. In the diagnostic 
suggestions, this is evident in the persistent preoccupation with the deceased loved 
one or with the circumstances of the death. However, what is missed out from the 
diagnostic framework is the significance of the social reality in which this 
preoccupation is situated. As the present and several other studies have addressed, 
social lack of acknowledgment and disenfranchisement of the loss and grief may 
magnify the need to stay preoccupied with the loss, because other people do not help 
the grieving individual to integrate the loss in his or her social reality. Likewise, the 
lack of interest in or ability to engage in social activities, etc. are arguably often related 
to the difficult social encounters grief is so famous for provoking. For many people in 
grief, the prospect of yet another social situation marked by awkward silences, 
pretending to be okay, or being reminded of one’s good luck in spite of the loss (the 
seemingly endless series of positive circumstances people so eagerly need to remind 
grieving individuals about) might simply be too much to put up with. The 
responsibility for these situations does not entirely belong to those in the bereaved 
person’s network, but it certainly neither belongs entirely to the suffering individual. 
From this perspective, it does not only seem unfair that the “problem” is located within 
the grieving individual, but also genuinely misguided. Simply put, an individual 
account of grief fails to address the relational, social and cultural circumstances which 
contribute to complicate or prolong grief. Moreover, a comprehensive understanding 
of grief needs to include how the grieving individual makes sense of his or her 
responses. Rather than merely probing individual symptoms, it is essential to gain an 
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understanding of the grieving individual’s experiences of his or her social reality. As 
a culture, we need to critically examine the conditions we create for suffering 
individuals to be a part of the social life. Rather than merely targeting and treating 
complicated and prolonged grief as an individual phenomenon, we need to include the 
relational and cultural level in our analyses and interventions.  
11.3. AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this research project, I have had the opportunity to follow my informants during an 
extraordinarily difficult and stressful period of their lives. Although my ambition has 
been to examine grief in a life perspective, for most of the parents, these two years 
will probably be looked back upon as a critical and exceptional time. During the time 
I followed the parents, they were learning to live with the loss of a child, going through 
new, stressful pregnancies, and becoming parents again to living children. As I have 
indicated in my second article, “Becoming a bereaved parent,” integrating the loss in 
one’s life story and identity is an ongoing and arguably never entirely ending process. 
However, as my autoethnographic inquiries have indicated, the meanings and 
significance of the loss in one’s continued life may change over time. Studying grief 
following early infant loss over a longer period of time could provide important 
insight into how such changes occur. This could for example shed light on how the 
ambivalent normative expectations concerning infant loss are involved in bereaved 
parents’ and families’ ways of living with the loss in their social realities over time. 
For example, how do the parents involve their loss in their everyday practices and 
personal narratives over time? How do other people in their social world relate to this? 
Does grief become more privatized with time, or do the parents pursue social 
validation of their loss by seeking out communities that provide recognition of their 
loss?, etc. 
Another interesting avenue for future research could be to further develop the situated 
perspective on grief that has been argued in this project by including the material and 
embodied aspects of grief to a further extent than the present study has allowed for. 
This could for example involve further examinations of grief as emotional practices 
(Scheer, 2012) that are temporally, materially, socio-culturally and relationally 
situated. A related and promising perspective for examining grief is offered by the 
growing body of studies examining the human mind as extended and distributed (see 
e.g., Slaby, 2016). From this perspective, the human mind, including our emotionality, 
is not limited to our individual brains and bodies, but is extended and distributed 
throughout (as well as invaded by) socio-material practices and artefacts. While 
several studies have examined the use of material artefacts such as pictures, 
memorabilia, etc. in parental grief (Blood & Cacciatore, 1014; Christensen & 
Sandvik, 2015; Layne, 2000; Riches & Dawson, 1998), the analytical approach to 
human emotions offered by this line of research could potentially broaden our 
understanding of grief as a radically relational and situated phenomenon. The 
profound embodied and technologically mediated nature of perinatal loss makes this 
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perspective highly relevant for examining such loss experiences. For example, it 
would be interesting to examine the significance of fetal diagnostics, the use of so-
called “cuddle cots” (a refrigerated bassinet used in some hospitals for stillborn 
babies, allowing the parents to keep their baby close for a longer period of time after 
a stillbirth), and a range of other socio-material practices and technologies for parental 
grief experiences following early infant loss.  
Finally, a crucial avenue for future research is to examine the cultural distribution and 
consequences of the expected grief diagnosis as it sets through within the next years. 
How will experiences, interpretations, and practices related to grief and loss be shaped 
and transformed in light of the introduction and dissemination of the grief diagnosis? 
How will it mediate individual loss experiences, and how will it manifest itself within 
the institutional practices of medicine, psychotherapy, bereavement support 
organizations, etc.? How will the cultural distribution of a diagnostic approach to grief 
shape cultural understandings of grief and suffering? As argued in the present study, 
the culturally contested nature of early infant loss––combined with the intensity and 
longevity of parental grief––makes these questions especially pertinent to address in 
relation to such losses.  
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This thesis examines bereaved parents’ experiences of grief after the loss of 
an infant child, and how cultural representations, expectations, and norms 
mediate individual bereavement experiences. It explores how bereaved par-
ents interpret and mediate their own grief experiences and practices by draw-
ing on interpretive repertoires that are available through their personal and 
family history, popular culture, personal accounts, bereavement communi-
ties, etc. In light of recent debates on diagnosing prolonged or complicated 
grief as a mental disorder within the diagnostic manuals, the thesis also ex-
plores how bereaved parents relate to professional and popular accounts of 
grief as a potential illness. 
